Concept
Secondary Obligors
Is the collateral an account?
Secondary Obligors
Article 9’s defined terms fall into three groups: collateral types, transaction types, and actor types.1 This unit works with the third group. Two actors have already appeared in the chapter. A debtor is a person with an interest in the collateral, other than a security interest or other lien, whether or not that person is also an obligor.2 An account debtor is a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible, and not a person obligated to pay a negotiable instrument.3 The first label asks who has a stake in the pledged property. The second asks who owes the payment that the pledged right represents.
Every secured loan raises a third question: who has promised to answer for the debt if the borrower does not, and what can that person recover after paying? Section 9-102(a)(71) calls that person a secondary obligor. The definition has two prongs joined by “or.” An obligor is a secondary obligor if the obligor’s obligation is secondary, or if the obligor has a right of recourse, with respect to an obligation secured by collateral, against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.4 In practice the label usually marks a surety or guarantor of the debt.5
The label earns its place because enforcement against the collateral reaches the secondary obligor too. When a secured party enforces its security interest, its actions may affect the secondary obligor’s liability for any remaining debt and the secondary obligor’s duties to the debtor.6 The debtor label does not capture that position, since a guarantor with no interest in the pledged property is not a debtor even though the guarantor may end up paying. The debtor question therefore has to be asked again for every name on the loan. The next two subsections take the prongs in turn, and the third shows where a guarantee fits in the collateral vocabulary.
Secondary Obligation
The first prong makes an obligor a secondary obligor when the obligor’s obligation is secondary.7 Obligor is the broader term. The commentary describes an obligor as a person “accountable . . . in part for payment or other performance of the obligation,” a phrase wide enough to reach someone who answers for only part of the performance.8
Read alone, the first prong is circular: an obligor is secondary when its obligation is secondary. The commentators call it a “mysterious tautology.”9 The text supplies no test of its own, so the practical guide is the label’s usual target, a surety or guarantor of the debt.10 The working question becomes whose promise stands behind whose. The borrower’s promise is the primary one, because the loan exists to create it. A guarantor’s promise matters only if the borrower does not pay. The name a document gives the promise is evidence of that answer, not the answer itself.
The classification pays off at enforcement. Section 9-618(a) lists three tests: a person receives an assignment of the secured obligation, is subrogated to the secured party’s rights, or assumes the secured party’s duties. When a secondary obligor meets any of the three, a transfer of repossessed collateral to that person is not a disposition under § 9-610 and cannot be used to establish a deficiency against the debtor.11 The drafters’ reason is that a sale to a person with essentially the same interest as the secured creditor is not a reliable measure of the collateral’s value, so a secured party seeking a deficiency must make its own resale that satisfies § 9-610.12
The commentators’ illustration shows how the pieces fit when classification is murky. A manufacturer is probably an obligor, because it is accountable in part for the secured obligation, but whether it is also a secondary obligor turns on the tautology in the first prong.13 The authors need not settle that point, because the manufacturer receives no assignment of the secured obligation, is not subrogated to the secured party’s rights, and assumes none of the secured party’s duties. It meets none of the three tests in § 9-618(a).14 They add that a resale at wholesale invoice value is at least as good as a foreclosure sale could be expected to bring, so policy also supports treating the sale as a proper disposition under § 9-610.15
Right of Recourse
The second prong asks what an obligor could do once the secured debt has been paid. An obligor is a secondary obligor if the obligor has a right of recourse, with respect to an obligation secured by collateral, against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.17 A right of recourse is a right to look to someone else for reimbursement. The prongs are alternatives, so an obligor who meets either one carries the label.18
Where the first prong offers a tautology, the second poses a question the documents can answer: if this person pays, from whom can the person collect? The test follows substance rather than vocabulary. A co-signer who holds a reimbursement right against the borrower is a secondary obligor even if no document uses the word guarantee, because the co-signer can recover from the debtor. The paragraph names three places a paying obligor might look, the debtor, another obligor, or property of either, and a right against any one of them is enough.
Liability to the lender does not decide the classification. Calloway and Nunez each owe the lender the full $75,000, so a test that stopped at who can be made to pay would label them alike. The classification turns on what happens afterward: Nunez can collect from Calloway, and Calloway can collect from no one. An exam stem that calls both signers co-borrowers, or never mentions a guarantee, is asking the reimbursement question. The debtor question stays separate, and it is answered by who has an interest in the ovens.
The recourse question is also the cleaner way into the manufacturer illustration in the previous subsection. When the first prong yields only a tautology, ask next whether the person could recover from the debtor, from another obligor, or from property of either.
Guarantee Supporting an Account
A guarantee can generate two separate assets, and each is classified by its own question. The first is the guarantor’s fee. The definition of account lists eight sources of a right to payment, and clause (iv) is a right to payment “for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred.”20 A guarantor who charges for giving its guarantee therefore holds an account, in the same way that a seller holds an account for the price of goods sold. If the guarantor instead takes a negotiable note for the fee, the right to payment is evidenced by an instrument, which the definition of account excludes, just as a negotiable note given for real estate bought on credit is an instrument and not an account.21
The second asset is the guarantee itself. A supporting obligation is a letter-of-credit right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument, or investment property.22 The commentary names suretyship obligations, including guarantees, and letter-of-credit rights as the most common supporting obligations, and it gives a familiar example: a debtor grants a security interest in its accounts receivable, and the debtor’s parent corporation guarantees payment of those accounts, so the guarantee is a supporting obligation.23 The definition classifies the guarantee by what it backs.
A security interest in the supported right carries the guarantee with it. The interest attaches to the supporting obligation automatically under § 9-203(f), so the security agreement need not mention guarantees. Perfection follows the same path. Under § 9-308(d), perfection in the collateral also perfects in the supporting obligation, § 9-310(b)(1) confirms that no separate filing is needed, and § 9-322(b) essentially gives the supporting obligation the same priority as the supported collateral.24 The 1999 Code added perfection by control to the methods of the 1972 Code,25 and a lender who perfects in the supported collateral, by whatever method, needs no further step for the guarantee.
The rule matches what a lender wants. A guarantee is worth something to a lender only through the right it backs. If the guarantee were separate collateral that needed its own description, a lender whose security agreement said only “all accounts” would hold the receivables and lose the promise that makes them collectible, through a drafting gap alone.
The two assets sit on opposite sides of the guarantee. The guarantee belongs to the person whose right to payment it protects, and its label depends on what it backs. The fee belongs to the guarantor, and its label depends on what it is owed for. A student who calls the fee a supporting obligation will conclude that it attaches automatically to Fenwick’s interest in the lumber receivable. The conclusion fails, because the fee is owed to Marlowe and backs no right to payment, so it reaches a lender only through Marlowe’s own security agreement. The opposite mistake treats the guarantee itself as an account, which misreads clause (iv), since the clause speaks of the payment owed for incurring a secondary obligation and not of the secondary obligation.