Concept
Methods of Describing Collateral
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Methods of Describing Collateral
The reasonable-identification test asks whether a description’s words let a reader tell what property is covered. Section 9-108(a) states the test in general terms: a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.1 Section 9-108(b) then names six formats that satisfy it. A description reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by specific listing, by category, by a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, by quantity, by a computational or allocational formula or procedure, or by any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.2 Each format carries exceptions of its own, noted below as they arise.
The list is open-ended, because its sixth entry admits any other method that makes the collateral’s identity objectively determinable.3 Drafters therefore have wide latitude, though not unlimited latitude.4 A description can fail from either side. If it is too narrow, it excludes collateral the parties meant to cover, and the secured creditor lives with the words it chose: unless it persuades the court to hear testimony, it receives a security interest only in the collateral duly described. If it is too broad, it may include property the parties never intended, and § 9-108(c) makes the broadest descriptions ineffective.5
No format works alone in every case. A type word must be tied to the debtor’s property, and a quantity or formula must be paired with a type, category, or listing that names the property being measured.6 The sections below take the formats in the statute’s order and ask of each the same question: how does it let a reader find the property?
Specific Listing
Specific listing, the first format in § 9-108(b)(1), identifies collateral item by item.7 The list may sit on an attachment to the security agreement, and it may hold any number of items. A debtor who owns a number of trucks and other vehicles, for example, can have the agreement refer to a separate sheet that lists each by make, model, and VIN.8
Itemizing invites the question of what a slip in one entry costs, and the usual answer is little. A mistake in the serial number will not invalidate the description unless it is misleading, and a mistake elsewhere is not necessarily fatal either: a 30-inch television described as a 27-inch set is still adequately described if other language makes clear which television is meant.9 Bishop v. Alliance Banking Co., taught above, reflects the same tolerance for an imperfect detail.
The same reasoning explains why thin listings fail more often. “A 2010 27-inch Sony Television” is clearly sufficient, and “a 27-inch Sony Television” would likely pass. “Debtor’s television set” would probably suffice if the debtor owned only one, but not if the debtor owned two or more, and “a television” probably would not suffice at all. The less the description says, the likelier it is to be insufficient.10 A wrong detail is therefore harmless when the other details exclude every competing item, and damaging when nothing else separates two candidates.
Because itemized lists so often travel on a separate page, a description can depend on a document that was never created. Courts have held many security interests invalid because the attorney forgot to attach the list.11 Kardia relied on decisions of that kind in its dispute with Freeland, the secured party. One of them, In re Southern Illinois Railcar Co., held that an agreement covering “Equipment as more fully described on Schedule A” did not adequately describe the collateral because no Schedule A was attached to the loan and security agreement.12
The same dispute shows where the missing-schedule rule stops. Kardia argued that Freeland’s failure to supply the DVDs promised in the Bill of Sale destroyed Freeland’s security interest in items such as customer lists and software. But the Bill of Sale described that collateral in its own words: paragraph 1.b covered “employee and customer lists,” and paragraph 1.k covered “all software, software development rights and copyrights, whether completed or under development,” each as it existed at closing. The court saw nothing unclear in either description. The parties could have limited the collateral to what a DVD contained by describing the software as “the software found on DVDs to be supplied at closing.” They did not. They agreed to language that reasonably identifies the collateral and, separately, that Freeland would undertake to supply Kardia with DVDs or other inventories.13
The two lines of authority differ in what the description depends on. In the missing-schedule cases, the only words naming the property pointed to the attachment, so without it nothing identified anything. In the Freeland dispute, the words identified the property by themselves, and the DVDs were a separate undertaking to supply copies. A drafter who relies on a schedule should therefore attach it before anyone signs.
Category
Category, the second format, lets a drafter describe collateral by group rather than by item.15 The Code does not define the word, and the sensible reading is an ordinary-language grouping such as “all automobiles owned by the debtor.” The term has no technical meaning; it exists to emphasize how general a description may be and still pass.16 “All livestock” is another grouping the format presumably allows.17
A reader might take “categories” to mean the classes Article 9 itself defines, such as consumer goods or chattel paper. A description built from those labels, however, falls under the separate provision for a type of collateral defined in the Code, § 9-108(b)(3), which is taught next.18
A category works by membership: a reader can look at a given animal or vehicle and say whether it belongs to the group. In Mountain Farm Credit Service, A.C.A. v. Purina Mills, Inc., the security agreement covered “[a]ll dairy cattle including all bulls, cows, heifers, calves and all progeny resulting from said cattle,” along with proceeds and accounts receivable from milk sales. It also gave the location of the collateral as the premises of Jean Hethrington, the farm site, in Morganton, Burke County, North Carolina. The court held that this description reasonably identifies the collateral.19 A group whose members anyone can recognize, tied to a place, let a reader sort the debtor’s animals into covered and uncovered without any list.
A category has one outer boundary, and it comes from what makes categories work. The group must separate the debtor’s property into covered and uncovered, and a grouping that reaches everything separates nothing. Subsection (c) states the result: describing the collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property,” or using words of similar import, does not reasonably identify it.20
Students often treat breadth as the test. A category may be as general as “all livestock” and still pass, because the question is whether a reader can tell what falls inside the group. Failure comes only when the words reach everything the debtor owns.
UCC-Defined Types
Article 9 sorts the personal property a debtor might pledge into named classes, among them inventory, equipment, accounts, chattel paper, and farm products, and § 9-108(b)(3) lets a drafter use those names. A description reasonably identifies collateral if it identifies the collateral by a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, except as subsection (e) provides.22 Describing the collateral as “inventory” or “chattel paper,” for example, is permissible and very common.23 A type word works because it arrives with a definition against which a reader can test the debtor’s property.
A bare type word, however, does not finish the job. “Inventory” alone names a class every merchant has, and it does not reasonably identify the collateral covered. The description must refer to what inventory is covered, for example “all of debtor’s inventory” or “the inventory located at 4520 Montoya Street.”24 Parties sometimes depart from the Code’s vocabulary in favor of a phrase of their own, and the question then remains whether the words reasonably identify what is described.25 re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC shows a court working through a description of that kind.
The type word also sets the edge of the grant. A security interest is always in specific property, even when the description is broad, and the description in the security agreement fixes which property it is.26 A secured party whose agreement covers “all accounts and inventory of the debtor” therefore holds no security interest in the debtor’s equipment, even if its financing statement lists equipment too. The reason lies in the roles of the two documents. A financing statement merely puts creditors on notice that further inquiry is prudent, while the security agreement embodies the parties’ intentions and is the primary source to which a creditor’s inquiry is directed.27 The financing statement’s description can neither reduce nor enlarge the interest the parties actually created, and a “surplus” description has no effect.28
A lender that wants everything cannot say so with the phrase the Code rejects, but it can say so by naming each type. The bar in § 9-108(c) reaches the label rather than the substance: a security agreement can provide that the collateral is “all of the debtor’s inventory, accounts, general intangibles, equipment,…”29 Each name does what “all the debtor’s assets” cannot, because each sorts property into a defined class and everything else. One state’s enactment of the rule is even titled “Supergeneric description not sufficient.”30
Subsection (e) marks the first limit on the type format. It invalidates a description by type when the collateral is a commercial tort claim and, in a consumer transaction, when the collateral is consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.31 A creditor taking a security interest in a consumer’s securities account would need terms beyond “security entitlement,” presumably something like “the securities in my account at Merrill Lynch,” and consumer goods would presumably have to be identified as, say, “my 5-carat diamond ring.”32 The special rules for investment property, commercial tort claims, and consumer transactions are taught below. A different problem arises when a type word appears beside a schedule of particular items, because the two can point to different property; the section on schedules and omnibus clauses takes that up.33
Quantity and Formula
Quantity and formula, the fourth and fifth formats, describe how much collateral is covered. A quantity gives a number, and a computational or allocational formula or procedure states a share or a calculation.36 Both answer “how much” and neither answers “of what.” A reader holding only the measure cannot pick the pledged items out of the debtor’s holdings, so a measure standing alone fails the question § 9-108(a) asks: whether the description reasonably identifies what is described.37
Something more than a quantity term or a formula is therefore needed. The description must also name a type or category of collateral or contain a specific listing.38 The cleanest way to see the rule is to hold the measure constant and vary the pool. A security agreement that says the collateral is simply “one half” is insufficient, because nothing says one half of what. “One half of the grain stored in Silo #444” works, because a reader can go to the silo, find the grain, and apply the fraction.39 The formula format follows the same pattern. A security interest in “50% of debtor’s grain stored in the Harlan elevator” applies an allocation to a pool identified by type and by location.40
Naming a type does not always finish the job, because the measure can leave the selection open. A description reading “one half of debtor’s inventory,” or one half of its cattle or equipment, may be insufficient because it does not identify which inventory, cattle, or equipment is covered.41 A pool of distinct items raises the question of which items make up the half, and the words give no way to answer it. Quantity and formula are therefore of limited use standing alone, and a careful drafter treats them as supplements to a type, category, or listing that names the pool.
A common error is to read the presence of “quantity” and “formula” in the statutory list as meaning that a number is itself a description. The list names formats a drafter may use, and a description built from any of them must still reasonably identify the collateral. A number with no pool fails that test, and the same number attached to an identified pool passes it.
Objectively Determinable Methods
The sixth format is the catch-all. Except as subsection (c) provides, a description reasonably identifies collateral if it uses any other method and the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.43 The first five formats are familiar patterns; this one is the test any other pattern must pass. A description is objectively determinable when its words point to property that facts outside the document can identify. Presumably a court may sometimes hear testimony showing how the description objectively determines the collateral’s identity.44
The standard illustration is a place. If a debtor grants a security interest in all of its inventory located at its plant at 625 S. State St., the words list no goods, but they tell a reader where to look, and a court would need testimony about what was located at the plant at the relevant time to determine the collateral.45 That testimony applies the description to the property; it does not rewrite the description. Challenges to descriptions, moreover, often come from outsiders such as a bankruptcy trustee or another creditor rather than from the debtor, and one commentator calls it disingenuous for such a challenger to say that debtor and creditor should have been clearer in their private security agreement simply because the writing contains an apparent ambiguity.46
A place description also marks where the grant ends. In In re California Pump & Mfg. Co., a description limited to property situated in South San Francisco did not reasonably identify property located in Fresno or Hayward. The court applied § 9110, an earlier numbering of the reasonable-identification section, which allowed reference to personal property of a “general kind or class.” It was nonetheless unable to convert a clear and unambiguous designation of personal property in a specific place into a description of all the debtor’s personal property wherever situated.47 Nor would it admit parol evidence to alter the unambiguous language. The formal requirements for creating a security interest exist in part to minimize future dispute over what property stands as collateral, and disregarding the parties’ written instruments in favor of parol evidence would detract from commercial certainty.48
Time can serve as a boundary in the same way. In the Kardia and Freeland dispute, the Bill of Sale covered only “certain specified tangible and intangible assets . . . as they exist[ed] at the time of Closing.” The court found Kardia likely to prevail on its argument that Freeland’s security interest did not extend to software or customer information that Kardia developed or acquired after the closing.49 The section on reach in time returns to the point.
The catch-all’s flexibility has a firm edge, and answers go wrong by ignoring it. A creditor holding an agreement that says “all the debtor’s assets” might argue that anyone can investigate what the debtor owns, so the collateral is objectively determinable. The statute defeats that argument in its first words, because the format applies only “except as otherwise provided in subsection (c).”50 Subsection (c) declares that describing the collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property,” or in words of similar import, does not reasonably identify it.51 Without that exception the catch-all would swallow the rule, since a reader could always go and examine the debtor’s holdings.
Because applying a place description often calls for a factual look beyond the agreement itself, the catch-all leads directly to the question of what outside evidence a court may consider. The section on extrinsic evidence takes up that question.