Concept
Interpreting the Description
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Interpreting the Description
Section 9-108(a) makes a description of personal or real property sufficient, “whether or not it is specific,” if it reasonably identifies what is described.1 The test assumes a reader. Someone other than the drafter looks at the words and asks which property they cover, so every dispute over a description ends as a dispute about how to read a text. The earlier sections of this chapter showed which formats pass and which fail; this one begins after the words are chosen, when a creditor, a debtor, or a trustee disagrees about what they reach. Interpretation also has a ceiling. No reading, however generous, turns “all the debtor’s assets” into a sufficient description, because subsection (c) says that such words do not reasonably identify the collateral.2
Three questions recur. May a second document supply or complete a description that the security agreement leaves thin? How far may a court look outside the writing when the parties dispute what it covers? And what does a court do when an agreement lists specific items and also grants a general type? Each turns on what an objective reader would conclude from the writing, and the purpose of the writing explains why courts accept some supplementation yet refuse to rewrite clear terms. A security agreement is evidence of the parties’ bargain. It serves a statute-of-frauds function between creditor and debtor and is not meant to give notice to third parties.3 A court that reads the debtor’s own papers together adds to that evidence. A court that lets testimony alter unambiguous words reopens the dispute over terms and collateral that the formal requirements exist to minimize.4 A fourth question, how far a sufficient description reaches, belongs to the later section on scope. It includes, for example, how a description of an account relates to a guarantee that supports it.5
Incorporated and Composite Documents
Section 9-108(a) asks whether a description reasonably identifies the property; it does not say where in the paperwork the identifying words must sit.6 The attachment rule asks only that the debtor have authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral,7 and a record is authenticated when the debtor executes or adopts a symbol or process with the present intent to identify itself and adopt or accept the record.8 Neither text demands a single integrated page. Courts therefore use two related doctrines. Incorporation by reference lets a security agreement borrow its description from another identifiable writing. The composite-document doctrine lets a court read several records together to find a debtor-authenticated agreement that describes the collateral.
re Amex-Protein Development Corp. shows incorporation at work. A promissory note there incorporated by reference invoices that described the collateral, and the Ninth Circuit found that incorporation consonant with the liberal reading § 9-203 should receive.9 A treatise passage reproduced in one opinion states the principle broadly. Nothing in the Code prevents a security agreement from referring to another writing for the description, so long as the reference reasonably identifies what that writing describes. It will often be expedient to give a general description in the agreement and refer to a list for the details, and the agreement may even consist of separate parts, one covering the obligation and the parties’ rights and duties and the other describing the collateral, both signed by the debtor and stated to form a single agreement or referring to each other.10 Courts put the test in terms of the reader. The description need not be complete within the four corners of the security agreement or any other single document, and it suffices if it gives information that would lead a reasonable inquirer to the identity of the collateral.11
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc. used incorporation to cure a thin description. The parties attached the financing statements to the security agreement, which incorporated the financing statements’ clarifying language and created a lien on the inventory in all of the debtor’s stores.12 Incorporation can also carry a whole earlier agreement forward. In one reported dispute, promissory notes for later advances referred to and were secured by an earlier security agreement that contained future-advance and after-acquired-property clauses, and the court recited that collateral may be described by incorporation by reference to other identifiable documents.13
Incorporation changes where a description is found and leaves the standard where it was. The borrowed words must still reasonably identify the collateral, and a financing statement’s description may restrict the security interest the security agreement creates but cannot enlarge it.14 The point bites hardest on blanket phrases. A financing statement may indicate collateral as “all assets,” but a security agreement may not describe it that way, so a security agreement that borrowed the phrase would inherit its defect.15
The composite-document doctrine meets a larger gap, in which no single record holds the debtor’s authentication, the grant, and the description. When trouble comes, a creditor holding a financing statement sometimes cannot find its signed security agreement. It then argues that the financing statement, supported by other documents such as a resolution of the debtor’s board or “security” notations on a note, is itself the security agreement.16 The financing statement cannot carry that argument alone, because the debtor does not sign a post-1999 financing statement and the document therefore lacks the authentication a security agreement needs. The commentary nonetheless warns that a clever creditor may tack the debtor’s signature on a note onto a financing statement, or onto a document referring to the grant of a security interest, and so cobble together an “authenticated security agreement.”17 The rule for real estate follows the same logic. Under the composite document rule, a land description missing from the security agreement is supplied if the financing statement contains it.18
The retail-credit cases show where the doctrine stops. Courts have treated sales slips as security agreements when the slip incorporates a long-form security agreement by reference, the retailer can prove its general documentation practices, and the slip contains solid granting language and a transaction-specific description of the merchandise.19 Each condition ties the slip to something the debtor adopted. A slip that mentions no security interest and refers to no other paper gives a reader no link to follow, and for consumer goods a description by type alone does not suffice.20 A court can safely read papers together when they point to one another and show that the debtor adopted them as one bargain. Without those links, a creditor could assemble an agreement after default from whatever its files happened to hold.
Even so, a secured party should not count on a court to combine its papers. Attachment by agreement rests on an authenticated record with an adequate collateral description, or on possession or control of certain collateral,21 and the safe course is to put the debtor’s authentication, the grant, and the description in one record.
Limits on Extrinsic Evidence
When the parties disagree about what a description covers, the next question is what the court may consult. Section 9-108(a) supplies the standard, and § 9-203 supplies the writing to which it applies, an authenticated agreement that provides a description of the collateral.23 Neither says what a court may weigh from outside that writing. Extrinsic evidence means testimony, lists, and records that come from outside the agreement, and its oral form is parol evidence. Courts decide by asking what the evidence is offered to do. They admit it to explain, supplement, or apply words that can bear the meaning offered, and they refuse it when it would alter words that cannot.
The permissive side is broad. Nothing in the Code bars parol evidence in aid of the description, even when the agreement already identifies the collateral reasonably. Because descriptions are often general, such evidence may explain or supplement the general terms or resolve ambiguities.24 One commentary urges courts to be receptive to performance evidence, such as inventories taken and lists submitted under the loan, to fill out a description. It observes that the challenger is often a trustee or another creditor rather than the debtor, and it calls it disingenuous for a third party to say that debtor and creditor should have been clearer in their private agreement merely because the writing looks ambiguous.25
The restrictive side rests on the purposes of the writing. The Ninth Circuit, applying California’s Article 9, refused to admit parol evidence that a creditor offered to alter the unambiguous language of a security agreement. The comments to § 9-203 say that its formal requirements minimize the possibility of future dispute over the terms of the agreement and over what property stands as collateral, and that the signed writing is in the nature of a statute of frauds. Testimony altering clear words would undermine both purposes.26 The court added that Article 9 aims to provide a simple, unified structure in which financing transactions can proceed with less cost and greater certainty, and that disregarding the parties’ written instruments in favor of parol evidence would detract from that certainty. It held that parol evidence may not be admitted to reform the agreement.27 The court saw no conflict with Amex-Protein, where a note incorporated invoices that described the collateral.28
The two lines do not conflict. The treatise passage and the commentary address words that can bear the meaning offered, and the California decision addresses words that cannot. Evidence that applies or clarifies the words the parties wrote adds to the writing, while evidence that enlarges or contradicts them replaces it.
A court also reads the words before it weighs any evidence, and it reads a phrase together with its neighbors. In one dispute the collateral paragraph listed patent applications and then continued with “corresponding rights to patent and all other intellectual property protection of every kind.” The court held that “corresponding” referred back to the applications just listed and that nothing separated the patent rights from the “other” protections, so the whole phrase was limited by the word “corresponding” and related to the patents. It would not read “all other intellectual property” in isolation and took its meaning from the surrounding words.31
That decision belongs beside the California ruling, because each refuses to let a broad-sounding term or an asserted intent outrun the grant on the page. A sweeping tail phrase is not ambiguous merely because it sounds sweeping, and a court that finds a clear limiting context has no ambiguity left for evidence to resolve. Students often treat extrinsic evidence as either always barred or always welcome. The answer depends on whether the evidence applies words that can objectively cover the property or contradicts words that cannot.
Schedules and Omnibus Clauses
Security agreements often do two things at once. They itemize particular assets on a schedule, and they add an omnibus clause, a catch-all grant in general words such as “all equipment” meant to sweep in whatever the schedule misses. Section 9-108(a) tests both formats the same way: the description suffices, whether or not specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.33 The trouble comes when the debtor owns an item that falls within the type word but appears nowhere on the list. The schedule suggests that the parties picked certain items, and the clause suggests that they meant the whole type. Whoever consults the agreement afterward, whether a later creditor, a trustee, or a court, must decide which signal governs, and courts have decided it in different ways.
re Laminated Veneers read the list against the lender. The agreement mentioned one vehicle, an International truck on Schedule A, and otherwise relied on an omnibus clause and the generic word “equipment.” The court asked what a potential creditor would find on examining the agreement and answered that any examining creditor would conclude that the truck, as the only vehicle mentioned, was the only one intended to be covered. It then looked to § 9-110, which requires that a description of personal property reasonably identify what is described, and concluded that greater specificity was required.34
Citizens Bank and Trust v. Gibson Lumber read the clause in the lender’s favor. The agreement granted a security interest in “[a]ll inventory of lumber and logs, accounts receivable, all saw mill equipment and all rolling stock, including, but not limited to” some twenty-one listed items. A gang saw, a feeder mechanism, and a diesel generator were not on the list. They were integral to the sawmill’s operation and substantial enough to be housed in their own building, and the bank claimed the proceeds of their sale by the trustee as senior secured creditor.35 Because an omnibus clause is consistent with the purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code, the court held the clause effective to cover all three items. It acknowledged that this changed Kentucky law.36
A court surveying decisions of this kind located the problem in the parties’ intent. Using both a schedule of specific items and an omnibus clause describing a general type creates an ambiguity when an item is missing from the schedule but ostensibly covered by the clause, and because the ambiguity concerns intent, further factual inquiry may resolve it. The court noted that the question asked in Laminated Veneers, what a potential creditor would find on examining the agreement, resembles the “inquiry test.”37
The three approaches differ in what they treat the document as showing. Laminated Veneers treats the agreement as answering the examining creditor’s question by itself, because the list shows what the parties chose. Gibson treats the clause as an effective grant of the whole type. The ambiguity approach treats the agreement as supporting more than one reasonable answer, so the outcome depends on evidence of intent that the paper cannot supply. The first reading favors a creditor who relies on the face of the agreement, and the second favors a lender who wrote a general clause and left an item off the list. The drafter’s words can also settle the point. Gibson’s clause carried “including, but not limited to” language, which marks a list as illustrative, and a drafter who writes “no other equipment” closes the list. Both decisions applied the pre-revision sufficiency provision, which like § 9-108(a) required only that a description reasonably identify what it describes.38 Because similar documents produced different results, an exam answer should present the competing readings and the facts that favor each, not a single settled rule.
Both readings assume that the omnibus clause is itself a sufficient description. Each clause named a kind of equipment, a type word of the sort discussed earlier under UCC-defined types, so the only dispute was whether the list cut the clause down. A catch-all that reaches everything fails before that question arises. “All other assets of the debtor” does not reasonably identify collateral,39 and no schedule can lend it meaning, because the schedule describes only the items it names. When three listed presses are followed by “all other assets,” the three presses are the whole of the described collateral.
Step three carries most of the weight in practice, because a few words from the drafter remove the ambiguity that the courts had to confront. Step four is where the decisions diverge. A complete answer names both readings and says which facts in the problem make each one persuasive.