Concept
Security Agreement Versus Financing Statement
Including sufficiency of description (§ 9-108)
Security Agreement Versus Financing Statement
A secured creditor who files describes its collateral twice, and each description does a different job. The security agreement creates the security interest, so its description marks the property the lien can reach.1 The financing statement, filed in the public record, warns searchers that the creditor may have a lien on the property it describes and that further inquiry into the extent of that lien is prudent.2
Section 9-108(a) supplies the sufficiency standard: a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.3 Revised Article 9 applies that requirement to the security agreement and the financing statement alike.4 One family of descriptions fails outright in the security agreement. A description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property,” or in words of similar import, does not reasonably identify it.5
Two rules follow from the difference between the documents. First, the standards diverge: a financing statement may use the blanket description that a security agreement cannot, although a filing is only as good as the warning its words give. Second, when the two documents describe different collateral, the secured party’s rights follow the narrower description. Priority among competing claimants is a question for the perfection material, and a financing statement can fail for reasons unrelated to the collateral, as when it fails sufficiently to provide the debtor’s name and is seriously misleading under § 9-506(b).6 This section stays with descriptions.
Notice Function of Financing Statements
A financing statement indicates its collateral sufficiently in either of two ways. It may give a description that satisfies § 9-108, which carries over the methods listed earlier in the chapter, including categories and Code-defined types such as inventory.7 Or it may indicate that it covers all assets or all personal property, an option that § 9-504 adds and that § 9-108 denies the security agreement.8
The two standards diverge because searchers use the documents differently. A searcher who finds a filing is deciding whether to ask more, so the filing must signal a possible lien on the property that interests the searcher. It need not say how far the lien reaches, because inquiry answers that.9 The security agreement is where the answer sits. It embodies the intentions of the parties and is the primary source to which a creditor’s inquiry is directed, which is why it must be reasonably specific.10 The generosity toward filings has a limit that comes from the same function. A filing warns only as well as its words read, and words that point toward a narrower claim than the creditor holds give no notice of the rest.
re Grabowski shows the generosity at work. A later lender attacked a financing statement that indicated a lien on the debtors’ “inventory, chattel paper, accounts, equipment, and general intangibles” as too general to give notice. The court held that the filing told later creditors a lien existed and that they had to inquire to learn its extent, which is all the notice function demands, and Code-defined types remain permitted descriptions.11 The lender also argued that the debtors’ business address on the filing led it to read the lien as limited to equipment at the dealership. The court rejected that reading. The address was no part of the collateral description, the filing indicated equipment without limit by place, and the address gave later creditors an accurate and ready way to reach the debtors and ask about the lien.12
Courts commonly state the measure as an inquiry test: a description suffices, in a security agreement or a financing statement, if it puts subsequent creditors on notice so that, aided by inquiry, they may reasonably identify the collateral.13 Bishop v. Alliance Banking Co. applied the test to a filing that described a 1999 Case Backhoe 580L correctly but gave a serial number that differed from the real one in its first three digits. The description sufficed, because the accurate year, make, and model would lead an inquirer to the machine the later purchaser bought.14 Grabowski forgave generality and Bishop forgave a wrong detail, and in each the words still pointed a searcher toward the property.
The same test defeats a filing whose words give the searcher no reason to suspect a lien on the property in dispute. In re Flores a financing statement listed the debtor’s major assets with exact descriptions and closed with the phrase “miscellaneous equipment.” The court found the phrase too ambiguous to warn lenders of a claim to the debtor’s rose bushes, one of its largest assets. Even a lender who took the phrase as a warning would have learned nothing from the security agreement, which repeated the same description.15 The court added that the terms “inventory,” “equipment,” “supplies,” or “consumer goods” will generally suffice in a financing statement, so the defect lay in the vague closing phrase and not in generality as such.16 In re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC shows a different failure, in which the words were clear but narrow. The filing described the debtor’s patent applications and related rights, and a reasonable reader would take its words to stop there. The court held it insufficient as a matter of law to give inquiry notice of a lien on the debtor’s other intellectual property.17 A creditor who wants the wider lien can indicate all assets, which a financing statement may do, and this creditor chose narrower words.18
These cases show how the two standards relate, and the relationship runs one way. Anything adequate in the security agreement under § 9-108 is adequate in the filing, but some descriptions that pass in a filing fail in the agreement. The blanket phrase is the main example. The consumer-goods type description is another: a type description does not suffice to describe consumer goods in a security agreement, yet the term “consumer goods” will generally do in a financing statement.19 Flores put the difference in terms of particularity: because the security agreement identifies the items of collateral, it requires greater particularity than the financing statement.20 Apart from consumer goods, the revised § 9-108(b) treats a Code-defined type such as inventory or farm products as a description that reasonably identifies collateral.21 A creditor that files all assets has warned searchers but has described nothing in the document that fixes the grant, and the next subsection takes up that gap.
Steps three and four decide the close cases, and step five guards against a common mistake: carrying the generous filing standard back into the security agreement.
Narrower Description Controls
A security agreement and a financing statement sometimes name different collateral, and § 9-108(a), which asks only whether each description reasonably identifies what it describes, does not say which one governs.23 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Staggs answers by dividing the question. The security agreement fixes what the security interest covers, the financing statement fixes how far that interest is perfected (effective against competing creditors), and the secured party’s rights reach only as far as the narrower of the two descriptions.24 As the opinion puts it, the two documents are “double screens through which the secured party’s rights to collateral are viewed, and his rights are measured by the narrower of the two.”25
Each half of the rule has its own reason, and the ceiling is the more basic. The agreement is the source of the right: a security interest cannot exist without a security agreement, so the interest is limited to the property the agreement describes.26 The financing statement does a different job. It puts third parties on notice that the secured party who filed may have a perfected interest in the collateral described, and a notice form that could enlarge the grant would let a creditor write its own collateral.27 The floor on perfection comes from the same notice job, seen from the searcher’s side. A searcher learns only what the filing indicates, so a filing that omits a type of collateral gives no warning of it, and the secured party cannot count on that filing to protect its interest in the omitted collateral.28
In Allis-Chalmers the mismatch ran toward the broader filing. The security interest the agreements defined covered the inventory of the debtor, Staggs, as of July 19, 1979, and later inventory “acquired by the Debtor from Allis-Chalmers Corporation,” but the financing statements described inventory “manufactured by or offered for sale by Allis-Chalmers Corporation.”29 From the filing language the trial court found that the interest reached all after-acquired Allis-Chalmers inventory, including inventory Staggs acquired from a third party.30 The reviewing court held that the trial court erred in fixing the parties’ rights by the filings’ description. The interest was limited to inventory Staggs owned on July 19, 1979, or acquired afterward from Allis-Chalmers, and the broader filing could not extend it.31 As to the third-party inventory there was nothing for priority to rank, because no interest had attached.
The same one-way limit appears in a simpler setting. When a security agreement covers “all accounts and inventory of the debtor,” no security interest exists in the debtor’s equipment even though the financing statement also lists equipment, because the agreement never granted one. The extra word in the filing is surplus.32 In re Amex-Protein Development Corp. states the principle in general terms: a financing statement’s description may restrict the security interest created in the security agreement but cannot enlarge it.33
The screens work in reverse when the filing is the narrower document. Collateral that the agreement grants but the filing omits still falls within the security interest, because the agreement alone creates the interest. But a searcher gets no warning of it, so the interest in that collateral is unperfected.34 Filing is how most security interests are perfected, so an omission from the filing is a perfection problem and not a problem with the grant.35
Step one is where this rule meets the supergeneric rule. A financing statement may indicate that it covers all assets, but a security agreement that describes its collateral only as all the debtor’s assets fails under § 9-108(c), so the first list is empty and the all-assets filing has no attached interest to perfect.36 The common error is to treat the broader document as the measure of the secured party’s rights, because the filing is the one searchers see. A filing broader than the agreement adds nothing, and a filing narrower than the agreement costs perfection in the omitted collateral.