Concept
Software Purchase-Money Interests
Is the consignor's interest a purchase-money security interest?
Software Purchase-Money Interests
Purchase-money status can pass between a machine and the programs that run it, and § 9-103 draws that line in both directions. A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest also to the extent that it secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest.1 The footing is the definition of purchase-money collateral, which reaches goods or software that secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.2 Subsection (c) supplies the reverse extension. A security interest in software is a purchase-money security interest to the extent that it also secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest, if the conditions of (c)(1) and (c)(2) are met.3 Equipment lenders need both provisions because they often pay for a machine and the programs that run it in a single package.
Subsection (c) matters because one financing in this setting brings both assets to the debtor. Without it, a lien on the program would be purchase-money only for debt incurred with respect to the program itself, so the part of the machine's price that the program also secures would fall short, even though a single loan paid for both. Because the extension lends purchase-money status to a lien the general definitions would not reach, subsection (c) limits it with two conditions. The debtor must have acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which it acquired an interest in the goods.4 The debtor must also have acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods.5 The first condition ties the program's acquisition to the same bargain that brought the goods to the debtor. The second ties its function to the goods, so the program is part of what makes the machine usable and not a separate asset sold alongside it. Added to the requirement that the lender hold a purchase-money interest in the goods, the conditions confine the extension to software that came with the goods and serves them.6
The accounting package fails because the lender's advance for the machine did nothing to bring that program to the debtor. Any claim to purchase-money status in it would have to rest on the general definition, which asks whether a debt was incurred as part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire it.7 The control software sits at the other pole, because the lender's credit bought it as part of the machine and for the machine's use.
These rules matter only for software acquired as a separate asset, because a program embedded in goods is already part of the goods. Under Article 9's definition of goods, a computer program embedded in goods in the manner the definition describes is goods, together with its supporting information.8 A lender's purchase-money interest in the goods therefore reaches the embedded program with no separate software analysis. A program affixed to a disc, CD, DVD, or thumb drive is different, because the medium merely carries the program and the program is not goods.9 Subsections (b)(3) and (c) do their work only for software that sits outside the goods in this sense.
A consigned appliance with an embedded control program is the easy case. The program is part of the goods, so the consignor's purchase-money interest in the consigned inventory covers the appliance and its program together. The software provisions come into play only when a separately acquired program forms part of a financing.
Burden of Establishing Extent
In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to which the security interest is a purchase-money security interest.11 The rule puts the proof of a quantity on the claimant, along with the proof of a label. Status is measured by portion, because a security interest in goods is purchase-money only to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.12 A claimant therefore cannot carry the burden by announcing that the deal was a purchase-money deal. It must show how many of the secured dollars were the price of the goods or value that enabled the debtor to acquire them, and a dollar it cannot place in that group is treated as an ordinary secured dollar.
Placing the burden on the claimant fits both what the status does and who holds the evidence. The status improves the claimant's position against other creditors, so the claimant is the party asking for more than ordinary treatment. The delivery records, advance records, and payment ledgers that show how much of the claim qualifies sit in its own files, while a trustee or competing creditor was a stranger to the transaction and would otherwise have to reconstruct the claimant's accounts from outside. The rule also gives the secured party a reason to keep those records current, because it knows when it extends credit that it will have to prove the figures later.
Challenges to purchase-money status come from parties who gain when the preference shrinks, such as a trustee in bankruptcy. They take two forms. The challenger may argue that mixing purchase-money and non-purchase-money debt in one security agreement makes the entire agreement non-purchase-money. Or it may concede two separate interests and argue that the debtor's payments should be applied first to the purchase-money one, so that it dwindles.14 The Code answers those arguments in subsections (f) and (e) of § 9-103, which the next two subsections take up. Both arguments turn on figures, and a claimant who cannot document the figures has little to say in reply to either.
A consignor relying on the deeming rule is still a secured party claiming a purchase-money interest, so it should expect the same burden and be ready to identify which goods the consignment covered and what remains owed on them. The burden rule also has a boundary. Like the payment-allocation and dual-status rules of subsections (e) and (f), it applies only to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions, and for consumer goods the statute declines to take a position on how these questions come out.15 The last subsection of this chapter returns to that limit.
Dual Status After Mixed Debt
Real financing rarely stays as simple as one loan against one machine, and § 9-103(f) says what becomes of purchase-money status when it does not. In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such even if any of three things happens, one in each clause of the subsection.17
- The purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation, as when a machine financed by its seller later secures an unrelated working-capital loan from the same seller.18
- Collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money obligation, as when the lender that financed a machine also takes a lien on goods the debtor already owned.19
- The purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.20
The three clauses rest on one piece of logic. An obligation is purchase-money because of what the value was in fact used to do, which is to pay the price of the collateral or to enable the debtor to acquire it, and that is a fact about the original advance.21 A later loan, an added lien, or a new set of loan papers leaves that fact where it was, so none of the three events can erase the purchase-money character of the original credit. Each can only add something beside it. Because a security interest in goods is purchase-money only to the extent the goods are purchase-money collateral for that interest, the added element takes its own place in the measurement and the original portion keeps its place.22 The outcome is called dual status. One security agreement produces a purchase-money security interest for the part of the debt that financed the goods and an ordinary security interest for the rest. How payments reduce the two portions is a separate problem, which the next subsection addresses.
The lathe's presence in the security agreement cannot cost the lender the status it earned in the press, and the lender cannot lend the press's status to the lathe. The extra collateral gave the lender more security but brought no additional asset to the debtor.
The third clause is the one most likely to be tested with numbers.
The lender, the equipment, and the rewritten documents are the same for both portions, and the line falls where the dollars stopped being acquisition money.23
The line between the portions matters most when someone attacks the claim from outside. Section 9-317 subordinates an unperfected secured creditor to a lien creditor and, by negative implication, lets a perfected one prevail.24 In the setting the sources describe, the debtor's trustee can defeat an unperfected non-purchase-money interest but cannot defeat a perfected purchase-money one, so what the trustee can reach turns on how much of the claim keeps purchase-money status.25
The rule also serves lenders and debtors. If one non-purchase-money element could cancel the status of the whole interest, a lender that financed equipment could not safely refinance it, take added collateral, or lend a further sum against it, because any of those steps would forfeit the original preference. The lender would decline the accommodation, and a business in difficulty would lose credit it needs. Dual status keeps the preference tied to the dollars that earned it, and everything added later ranks as ordinary debt.
The competing position is the transformation argument, under which a challenger says that mixing purchase-money and non-purchase-money debt in one agreement turns the entire agreement into a non-purchase-money one.26 For transactions other than consumer-goods transactions the Code rejects it. Revised Article 9 provides that a single document can create two security interests in business transactions, one purchase-money and one not.27 Section 9-103(f) then ensures that added debt, added collateral, or a rewrite takes nothing from the portion that qualifies.28
Two limits keep the rule in proportion. Dual status protects the purchase-money portion and does not enlarge it, so a secured party that wants purchase-money treatment for a mixed debt must still establish the extent of its status, and unrelated advances remain ordinary dollars. A consignor whose consigned inventory also secures other debts of the consignee is in the same position, with purchase-money status for the consignment portion and ordinary status for the remainder. The second limit is the statute's own scope. Subsection (f) covers only non-consumer-goods transactions, and subsection (h) leaves the proper rules for consumer-goods transactions to the court, so both the transformation and dual-status approaches remain open there.29
Allocating Payments
Section 9-103(e) answers a bookkeeping question that dual status creates. In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the statute dictates how that payment is applied.31 The rule is triggered only when the debtor owes more than one obligation and the purchase-money amount turns on which of them a payment reduced. A debtor with a single purchase-money loan raises no such question, because every payment reduces that loan. The question arises once one security agreement carries both a purchase-money portion and an ordinary portion, since the debtor's check arrives as a single sum that does not say which portion it retires.
The answer matters because it fixes how many dollars still carry purchase-money status. A dollar applied to the purchase-money portion shrinks the part that holds the preferred position, while a dollar applied to the ordinary portion leaves it standing. This is the second form of challenge described earlier, in which the challenger concedes two interests and argues that payments should go first to the purchase-money one so that it dwindles.32 The secured party and its challenger have opposite interests in the application, and a rule that let either choose after a dispute began would let the choice follow the dispute. Section 9-103(e) closes that off with three methods in sequence, each applying only when the one before it does not.
Each tier has its own reason. The first lets the lender and the debtor settle the question when they sign the papers, before any dispute exists, which is why the text speaks of any reasonable method and does not prescribe one. The word reasonable does work, because an agreement to an unreasonable method is not an agreement to a reasonable method, and the analysis then moves to the second tier. The second tier gives effect to the obligor's wishes, but only an intention manifested at or before the time of payment counts. A debtor who announces a preference after the payment, once a challenger has attacked the secured party's position, speaks too late, so neither side can rewrite the application after the fact. The third tier runs on a fixed order that does not depend on who is arguing. An obligation that carries no security absorbs the payment before any secured obligation does, and among secured obligations the purchase-money ones are paid in the order incurred. Nothing in the cascade lets the secured party pick, after the payment arrives, whichever application serves it best.
The choice of method can move the result substantially.
The cascade decides which of those results applies. If the lender and the debtor reasonably agreed in advance that payments go first to the later advance, the agreement controls, and the entire remaining claim stays purchase-money. If they made no agreement and the debtor gave no direction, the third tier applies. Both loans are secured, so the first step has nothing to reach, and the second step sends the payment to the purchase-money obligation, which leaves $100,000 purchase-money and $100,000 ordinary.38
The usual exam error is to jump straight to the default order, or to assume the secured party may apply a payment however it prefers once a contest begins. The sound answer runs the cascade in sequence, looking first for an agreed reasonable method, then for an intention manifested at or before payment, and only then for the statutory order, and it states the resulting purchase-money balance in dollars. Two limits keep the rule in proportion. It covers only transactions other than consumer-goods transactions, and the last subsection of this chapter returns to what the statute leaves to the courts for consumer goods. It also decides only how much purchase-money debt a payment leaves standing, so a secured party that wants the larger share must still document the extent of its status, including how each payment was applied. A consignor whose consigned inventory also secures other debts of the consignee is in the same position, because the cascade decides which portion each payment reduced.
Consumer-Goods Transactions
The last three subsections each carried the same limitation, and § 9-103(h) says what that limitation means. The rules on allocating payments in subsection (e), on dual status in subsection (f), and on the burden of proving extent in subsection (g) apply only to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions, which is to say they do not reach household credit purchases. Subsection (h) states that this limitation leaves to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions, and it adds that the court may not infer the nature of those rules from the limitation and may continue to apply established approaches.40
What the statute leaves open is exactly what the earlier subsections answered for business debtors: whether a purchase-money interest keeps its status after refinancing or added debt, how a payment is applied between a purchase-money obligation and another one, and who must prove the extent of the status. For business cases § 9-103 rules that purchase-money status is retained, but for consumer cases it declines to give an answer.41 The stakes are sharp. Even if the original interest retains its purchase-money status, a refinanced loan that adds new money is not purchase-money as to that new money and is not automatically perfected.42 Subsection (h) keeps a court's existing approaches available instead of replacing them with the commercial rules, and both the transformation and dual-status arguments remain open in consumer cases.43
The instruction not to infer a rule is the part of subsection (h) that an exam answer is most likely to violate. Subsection (f) gives business debtors dual status, and a tempting argument runs that the Code therefore wants the reverse for consumers, or that the carve-out shows a rejection of dual status for household buyers. Subsection (h) forbids that reasoning. A rule written only for commercial transactions says nothing about what the rule is for consumers, so any consumer rule drawn from that silence would be the court's own invention presented as the legislature's choice.44 What the court may do is keep applying the approach it already follows. A court with no settled approach may reason from other cases or apply the business rule by analogy, and commentators urge the analogy, but the choice is the court's and the limitation neither supplies nor forbids it.45
A manufacturer whose financed press is later refinanced with the same $600 of added money has no comparable choice to make. For business transactions the statute itself provides that purchase-money status is retained.46 The difference between the two scenes is whether the transaction is a consumer-goods transaction, and that one fact decides whether the answer comes from the statute or from the court's established approach.
This limit has a short consequence for consignments. As the consignment gate showed earlier in this chapter, goods that were consumer goods immediately before delivery to the consignee fall outside the Article 9 definition of consignment. A consignor in a defined consignment is therefore never in a consumer-goods transaction, and subsections (e), (f), and (g) are the rules the consignor relies on. An answer about a consignor's mixed debt, payment allocation, or burden of proof applies those subsections directly and needs no discussion of court-made consumer approaches. A person who leaves household goods at a shop to be sold on commission is outside Article 9's consignment rules altogether, so the consumer question does not arise there either.