Concept
Where Title Still Matters
Title to collateral immaterial (§ 9-202)
Where Title Still Matters
Section 9-202 removes title from one question and leaves every other question alone. Its text says that, except as otherwise provided for consignments and for sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, the provisions of Article 9 on rights and obligations apply whether title to the collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.1 The question it removes is what a secured party and a debtor owe each other under the Article. A student who restates the rule as “title never matters” has claimed more than the sentence gives.
Title keeps two footholds, one on each side of the Article's boundary. Outside Article 9, other law that needs to know who owns goods decides the matter for itself. Inside it, the opening clause of § 9-202 sends consignments and sales of receivables to provisions of their own. This section takes up the outside foothold first and the two carve-outs after it.
The rule is plainest in a credit sale with a title clause. Store sells a piano to Buyer on credit, and the document provides that “title shall remain in Store until all of the payments are made.” Title passes in spite of the language, and Store is a secured party while Buyer is a debtor.2 If Buyer defaults, what Store may do and what it owes Buyer come from Article 9, and they come out the same whether the contract places title in Store or in Buyer.3
The rule also leaves alone a question that sits close to it: which collateral the security interest covers. That turns on the description of the collateral. If the description is too narrow, the secured creditor lives with it and receives a security interest only in the collateral duly described.4
Title Under Other Law
When another body of law needs to know who owns goods, that law answers, and Article 9 does not. The drafters' comment says as much: rights, obligations, and remedies under the Article do not depend on the location of title, but title may become important for other purposes, such as determining the incidents of taxation, and in that case the parties are left free to contract as they will.7 A tax law that must identify the owner of goods is the plain example, and the tax law supplies its own answer.8
Where title is relevant, the form the parties chose gets weight as evidence. A form traditionally regarded as determinative of title, such as a conditional sale, could reasonably be regarded as evidencing the parties' intention about title.9 A title clause therefore keeps a job outside Article 9 even though it does none inside. The outside law may consider the clause, and how much it counts is for that law to say.
The Code's own sales provisions are the other place the question can go. Where a secured transaction arises in connection with a sale of goods, the location of title, to the extent it is relevant, may be determined by resorting to § 2-401.10 The two bodies of law divide the labor. The tax statute and the sales article ask about ownership for their own purposes, and Article 9 asks what the secured party and the debtor owe each other.
A stem that describes a retained-title sale and then asks two questions about it is testing which body of law answers which.
Students most often skip step three. The drilled instinct that title never matters leads them to treat a tax question as an Article 9 question and to dismiss a title clause that an outside statute is entitled to consider.
Consignments
Section 9-202 yields in its own first words: it applies “except as otherwise provided with respect to consignments or sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.”13 The boundary in the last subsection lay outside Article 9. This one is written into the section itself. A consignment is a delivery of goods by their owner to a dealer who is to sell them, and the carve-out tells us that Article 9 reaches such an owner differently than it reaches a lender.
The 1999 revision brought consignments inside by definition. A debtor now includes a consignee of goods, and most aspects of consignment sales moved out of Article 2 and into Article 9.14 The consignor, for its part, is deemed to hold a security interest in the consigned goods whether or not anyone meant to create one. In the standard illustration, a retailer accepts diamonds on consignment from their owner and agrees to sell them for the owner and pay over the proceeds. No one expresses an intent to create a security interest, yet the transaction is a secured transaction governed by Article 9, and the consignor is deemed to have a security interest in the goods.15
The pre-Code history suggests why the Article does not let an owner stay outside the system on the strength of its ownership. Whatever pre-Code lenders and lawyers did to avoid the filing requirement, the law kept re-imposing it for the benefit of those who needed notice of the debtor's true financial condition and the status of the debtor's assets.16
Being inside Article 9 does not mean being subject to every rule in it. Generally, a secured party whose security interest arises from a true consignment is not subject to the duties that Part 6 imposes.17 The duty of reasonable care under § 9-207(a) reaches a consignor only if the consignor is entitled to recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor on account of uncollected collateral. The remaining provisions of § 9-207 do not apply to a consignor, and other law controls those matters.18 The duty to respond to requests under § 9-210(b) does not apply to a consignor either.19
The pattern tracks the consignor's position. Lender-style duties assume a creditor holding someone else's property against a debt. A consignor holds its own goods and has no loan balance to collect. The recourse exception in § 9-207 follows the same logic, since an obligor who may have to answer for a shortfall has a stake in how the goods are kept.
An exam stem that says an owner delivered goods to a dealer “on consignment” invites two opposite errors. The first treats the consignor as an owner who kept title and so sits outside Article 9. That fails because the Article classifies the consignor as a secured party whatever the paperwork says about title, and it does so even though no one granted a security interest. The second treats the label “secured party” as a reason to charge the consignor with every Part 6 and § 9-207 duty a lender carries, and that fails for the reasons above. The consignor is inside Article 9 for its status and outside the lender-specific duties. How the consignor ranks against the dealer's own lenders is a priority question this unit does not reach.
Sales of Receivables
The opening clause of § 9-202 sets a second group of transactions apart: sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes.23 Each is a right to payment, or the paper that records one, and a business can sell such a right outright as readily as it can borrow against it. The buyer pays a price and owns what it bought, so the deal looks unlike a loan. Article 9 reaches it anyway. A sale of accounts or chattel paper is within the Article under § 9-109(a)(3), and the Article uses loan vocabulary for the parties: the seller is the debtor, called the debtor-assignor, and the buyer is the secured party.24
The carve-out is needed because the general scheme assumes a debt. A lender holds collateral to secure repayment, accounts for value beyond the debt, and looks to the debtor for a shortfall. A true sale of receivables has no debt of that kind. The buyer owns what it bought, so what it collects above its price is its gain and what it fails to collect is its loss. Rules built on surplus and deficiency would misdescribe that deal if they applied unchanged.
The same separation shows in the duties Article 9 imposes. Part 6 generally imposes none of its duties on a secured party whose interest arises from a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, and a buyer of those assets has the right to collect on the obligations owed by the account debtors once the sale is completed.25 Most of § 9-207 does not apply to such a buyer, and the duty of reasonable care reaches it only if it is entitled to recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor on account of uncollected collateral.26 The § 9-210(b) duty to respond to requests does not apply to a buyer of these assets either.27
An exam question about a sale of receivables almost always reduces to one inquiry: when the customers pay more or less than the buyer paid, who keeps the excess and who absorbs the shortfall? The answer depends on whether the buyer took the credit risk. Suppose the sale carries no right of recourse or charge-back if an account proves uncollectible. The assignee then assumes the credit risk completely, so the seller is not entitled to any surplus and is not liable for any deficiency unless the security agreement so provides.28 The allocation follows the bargain. The buyer paid a price for the accounts and took the chance of collecting more or less.
When the assignee keeps recourse or a charge-back right, it has not taken the credit risk completely, and the lender-style rules return. The assignee must liquidate the accounts in a commercially reasonable manner, so as not to enlarge a possible deficiency claim or reduce a possible surplus.29 Where the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party may deduct its reasonable expenses of realization from collections, must account to the debtor-assignor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, may hold the debtor-assignor liable for any deficiency.30
Three reflexes lead students wrong here. A stem that says the receivables were “sold” invites the conclusion that Article 9 stays out of the case, but the sale is named in the opening clause of § 9-202 and falls within the Article.31 Once the sale is inside, the label “debtor” invites the opposite conclusion, that the seller is entitled to any surplus and liable for any deficiency. That fails whenever the buyer took the credit risk. A recital that title to the accounts passed to the buyer settles nothing, because ownership is a given in a true sale. The one fact that moves the answer is whether the assignee kept recourse or took the accounts as security for a debt.