Concept
The Security Agreement
Enforceability (§ 9-203)
The Security Agreement
The third condition for attachment, § 9-203(b)(3), is that one of several listed circumstances be present.1 The first is that the debtor has signed a security agreement that describes the collateral and, when the collateral is timber to be cut, describes the land as well.2 Article 9 defines a security agreement as an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.3 In practice it is the parties’ “bargain in fact,” the agreement by which the debtor grants the interest.4
The statute demands almost no ceremony. A debtor who writes on the back of an envelope, “I hereby grant bank a security interest in my cattle, John Jones,” has made a valid agreement; if the bank lends and the debtor owns the cattle, the interest attaches despite the informality.5
The document’s substance, not its title, makes it a security agreement. Forms headed “conditional sale contract,” “chattel mortgage,” “trust receipt,” or “retail installment sales agreement” are security agreements, whatever the heading, if they contain the necessary requirements.6 Most real agreements say far more than the minimum. The debtor represents that no prior liens exist, promises to insure the collateral, and accepts the other terms of the deal. None of that is needed to create the interest; those provisions fix the parties’ rights and obligations as the terms of any contract do.7
The converse catches careless creditors. A financing statement must contain the names of the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral; it need not be signed, and it contains no language granting a security interest.8 A document that meets only those requirements cannot substitute for a security agreement, and a creditor that does nothing more than file holds no security interest in the property the filing describes.9
A signed record is not the only route to attachment. Article 9 does not require the terms of the security agreement to be written down; the agreement may instead be evidenced by an authenticated record with an adequate collateral description, by the secured party’s possession of specified collateral, or by its control of specified collateral.10 A later section takes up possession and control. This unit stays with the signed record and the description it must contain, because the description is the part a challenger can attack. Three questions follow in order: how precise a description must be, which broad phrases fail outright, and which kinds of collateral need more than a label.
Reasonable Identification
Section 9-203(b)(3)(A) demands a description of the collateral but does not say how precise it must be.11 Section 9-108(a) answers: a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.12 Nothing requires the description to be specific or detailed. The test asks whether the words tell a reader which property the parties meant.
The generous standard suits a common contest over descriptions. In many disputes over an allegedly ambiguous description, the challenger is not the debtor but a third party, such as a bankruptcy trustee or another creditor. The source finds it disingenuous for such a party to say that the debtor and creditor should have written the description more clearly simply because the writing looks ambiguous.13
Section 9-108(b) lists the methods that satisfy the test: a specific listing, a category, a type of collateral the UCC defines, a quantity, a computational or allocational formula, and any other method “if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.”14 Every method must still point at actual property. A bare share fails: “one half” identifies nothing, while “one half of the grain stored in the Harlan elevator” leads to a definite body of grain.
The catch-all method lets a description borrow facts from outside the document. A grant of the debtor’s inventory located at its plant at 625 S. State St. qualifies, although a court would need testimony about what was at the plant at the relevant time to learn which goods the words cover.15 Outside facts complete the words; they cannot replace them.
The official comment rejects any requirement that a description be “exact and detailed,” the so-called serial number test.16 A description of a truck as a “2018 Mack Anthem Truck with serial number AB7777” is adequate even though the true serial number is AB7888, provided the debtor owns only one Mack Anthem truck, because the parties’ intent to cover that truck is then objectively determinable.17 Results like this turn on what the debtor actually owns, so a court may need testimony or other proof to determine the collateral.18
A description can fail in either direction. It is too narrow when it leaves out collateral the parties meant to cover, and too broad when it may reach property they did not mean to cover; the next subsection treats the broadest form. When a description is too narrow, the secured creditor lives with it and, unless it persuades the court to hear testimony, receives a security interest only in the collateral duly described.19
That limit follows from the document’s job. A security agreement defines and limits the collateral subject to the creditor’s interest, while a financing statement merely puts third parties on notice that the creditor may have a lien and that further inquiry is prudent.20 A creditor therefore cannot enlarge its collateral by filing. If the signed agreement covers only accounts and inventory, the creditor has no interest in the debtor’s equipment, even when its financing statement lists equipment, because a filing alone gives no security interest in the property it describes.21
FSL Acquisition Corp. v. Freeland Systems, LLC shows both halves of the problem. Minnesota’s enactment of § 9-108(b)(6) permits description by “any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable,” so long as the description is not supergeneric.22 Kardia first argued that Freeland’s security interest was invalid in its entirety because the collateral was not sufficiently described, and the court found Kardia unlikely to prevail on that argument. Kardia argued next that the interest did not reach software and customer lists that postdated May 2008, because the collateral language did not cover them, and the court found Kardia likely to prevail on that one.23 A description can thus be good enough to create a security interest and still too narrow to reach particular assets.
Supergeneric Descriptions
Section 9-108(c) bars the broadest descriptions. A description of collateral as “all the debtor’s assets” or “all the debtor’s personal property,” or in words of similar import, does not reasonably identify the collateral.25 These phrases are called supergeneric descriptions. A security agreement whose only description is supergeneric fails the third condition, so no security interest attaches under it.26
The ban limits generality; it does not demand detail. The Minnesota court in FSL Acquisition Corp. v. Freeland Systems, LLC read the statute as an outer limit on how general a description may be, and otherwise treated the requirement leniently: any collateral that avoids the supergeneric form may be described by a method that makes its identity objectively determinable.27 A grant of a whole category, such as all of the debtor’s inventory, identifies property. A bare phrase of totality identifies nothing in particular.
The ban follows from the job the agreement does. A security agreement defines and limits the collateral subject to the creditor’s interest, so its description has to say which of the debtor’s property stands behind the debt.28 “All assets” leaves that question open, and a list of types makes the drafter answer it.
The same words are adequate in a financing statement. Revised Article 9 permits supergeneric descriptions, such as “all assets” or “all personal property,” in the financing statement but not in the security agreement.29 The two documents do different work. A financing statement gives notice, need not be signed, and contains no language granting a security interest.30 A searcher who sees “all assets” must still inquire into the extent of the interest.31 The test runs one way. A description adequate under § 9-108 for the security agreement is adequate under § 9-504 for the financing statement, but a supergeneric description is adequate only in the financing statement.32
A creditor that wants an interest in everything the debtor owns can still obtain it. The ban reaches the words of the description, not the scope of the deal. The drafter lists each type of collateral the Code defines, such as all of the debtor’s inventory, equipment, accounts, and general intangibles, and ties each type to the debtor. A type defined in the UCC suffices except in the cases § 9-108(e) singles out, which the next subsection takes up.33 The Code defines many of its types with care. A “supporting obligation,” for instance, is a letter-of-credit right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument, or investment property.34 Listing has a price, however: a type left off the list is not collateral.
Descriptions Needing More Detail
A description by a UCC-defined type ordinarily identifies collateral, but § 9-108(e) withdraws that convenience for a short list. A description by type alone is inadequate for a commercial tort claim in every transaction. In a consumer transaction it is also inadequate for consumer goods, security entitlements, securities accounts, and commodity accounts.36 For these kinds of collateral, the agreement must add information that tells a reader which claim, goods, or account is meant. A creditor that stops at the label has failed the third condition and holds no attached interest in that property.
The commercial tort claim rule binds businesses and households alike. A grant of all of the debtor’s “commercial tort claims” identifies no particular claim, so the agreement must say something more, such as the event that gave rise to the claim.37
The consumer categories turn on the kind of transaction, not on the label of the goods. In a consumer transaction, a grant of all of A’s “consumer goods” rests on type alone and fails. A grant of all of A’s “consumer goods located at A’s lake cabin” adds a location and no longer rests on type alone. The same pair works for investments: “securities entitlements” fails in a consumer transaction, while “securities entitlements held at Brokerage, Inc.” names where the entitlements are held. A grant of “all existing and after-acquired investment property,” without more, is likewise insufficient in those cases.38
In a nonconsumer transaction, the rule for investment holdings eases. A securities account, a securities entitlement, or a commodity account may be described by those terms, as “investment property,” or by the underlying asset that is held in the account or is the basis of the entitlement.39 A business debtor can thus grant its securities entitlements by type, while a consumer cannot. Commercial tort claims stay strict in both settings.
A Kansas bankruptcy court confronted the consumer rule when debtors argued that Capital One’s description of its collateral was insufficient under the state’s counterpart to § 9-108(e)(2). The court framed the question as whether the description sufficed to allow attachment and enforceability under the counterpart to § 9-203(b)(3)(A), and the debtors did not dispute that Capital One had met the other prerequisites.40 Because the description was the only contested condition, its failure alone would defeat attachment.