Concept
Bankruptcy Cutoff of the Floating Lien
After-acquired property
Bankruptcy Cutoff of the Floating Lien
Most liens survive the avoidance sections, because they cannot be set aside under sections 522(f), 544, 545, 547, 548, or 549.1 The question left for the lender is what the bankruptcy case does to a lien that stands. It presses hardest in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13, where a case can last three years or more and the debtor usually remains in possession of the encumbered property.2
A floating lien is exposed on exactly this point, because it exists to reach property the debtor does not yet own. Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an after-acquired property clause, even a valid one, is not effective to attach a security interest to property acquired by the bankruptcy estate or the debtor after the case commences.3 The clause may be perfectly good under § 9-204(a), which lets a security agreement create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.4 The federal rule sets a date after which that grant stops adding anything.
The Code takes the same stance toward new money. It carefully restricts the debtor's ability to grant security interests in collateral while a case is pending, so advances the secured party makes after the filing are not automatically secured by estate collateral, even under a valid future advances clause. A court may approve a security interest in estate property to secure those advances, but only after notice and a hearing.5 A prepetition clause that went on attaching to whatever the estate acquired would work around that restriction, and § 552(a) closes the gap by ending the clause's effect at the filing.
The limits in § 9-204(b) sort what a clause can reach by type of collateral, consumer goods and commercial tort claims, while the bankruptcy rule sorts property by time. Both restrict what the clause adds, and neither disturbs the lender's interest in value that flows out of collateral it already holds. The three subsections below take the federal cutoff, the federal exception for proceeds and rents, and the Article 9 carve-back that follows the same logic.
Postpetition Property Cutoff
A clause that satisfies § 9-204(a) is a valid grant when signed, and § 552(a) fixes the date on which it stops adding collateral.6 A security agreement entered into before the case does not attach a security interest to property the estate or the debtor acquires after the case commences.7 The statute therefore asks one question of every item the clause might otherwise have captured: did the debtor acquire it before the case commenced, or after? An item acquired earlier is governed by the attachment rules covered above, so the interest attached when the debtor gained rights in it and the filing leaves it in place. An item acquired later falls outside the clause, however plainly the agreement promises future collateral.
Harbor Bank lends to Dunn Hardware on January 10 and takes a perfected security interest in all of Dunn's inventory, whenever acquired. Dunn acquires more inventory on March 3, files a Chapter 11 petition on March 4, keeps operating, and acquires still more inventory on April 7. The bank's collateral falls into three lots:
- Inventory on hand January 10 was covered from the start.
- Inventory acquired March 3 was covered the day Dunn acquired rights in it, a day before the petition, so § 552(a) has nothing to undo.
- Inventory acquired April 7 is outside the clause, because Dunn acquired it after the case commenced.
The petition date alone separates the second lot from the third. The debtor, the lender, the clause, and the type of goods are the same on both sides of it, and the results are opposite. The usual error is to test the April lot against the bank's drafting or its perfection. Both are sound here, and neither helps, because § 552(a) turns on when the debtor acquired the item.8
The textbook version of the same point uses initials. A authenticated a security agreement granting B a security interest in A's inventory, then owned or thereafter acquired, to secure a loan. A filed bankruptcy and then acquired a new piece of inventory. Unless B can show that the new piece is proceeds of inventory A had before the filing, B's interest does not attach to it.9 That proceeds qualification is the one route by which value arriving after the filing can still be reached, and the next subsection takes it up. What Harbor Bank loses is collateral. The cutoff trims the pool of assets securing the loan and leaves the loan itself alone.
A separate rule blocks the other route to the same result. The automatic stay prevents the secured party from acting to create a security interest in the property of the estate or in the debtor's property, so if an interest had not attached to an item by the filing, any step by the lender that produces attachment afterward violates the stay.10 The two rules attack different problems. Section 552(a) disables the clause the lender already holds, and the stay disables anything the lender might do after filing to build a lien by its own act. Facing the April inventory, Harbor Bank has neither the clause nor a self-help substitute.
The cutoff also changes what a Chapter 11 debtor has to bargain with. Cash collateral is cash or a cash equivalent that the creditor's lien reaches, including cash derived from other collateral as proceeds or rents.11 A debtor may use it only upon the lienholder's consent or adequate protection.12 Section 552(a) gives the debtor something to offer toward that protection. The prepetition lien does not float to inventory acquired after filing,13 so a lien in that inventory is an interest the lender did not already hold, and the lender gets it only through the arrangement the debtor proposes rather than through the old clause.
Proceeds and Rents Exception
Section 552(b) reopens a narrow channel for the same lien. Proceeds, products, offspring, or profits of property in which the secured party held an interest before the case may be subject to its security interest even though the debtor receives them afterward, if the prepetition security agreement extends to them.16 The court, “after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case,” may order otherwise.17 The result is a default in the lender's favor, tied to tracing, that the court can adjust.
The two subsections protect different things. Section 552(a) keeps a lender from using a clause signed before the case to claim new assets the estate acquires during it. Proceeds and their kin are not new assets. Each is the prepetition collateral in another form, or what that collateral produces, and the lender bargained for that value when it took the lien. Without § 552(b), a debtor could convert encumbered goods into cash during the case and leave the lien behind.
Return to Harbor Bank and Dunn. Inventory Dunn acquires on April 7 is new property and stays outside the lien. If Dunn sells some of its January inventory on March 5, however, the cash is the bank's own collateral after a sale, and the lien follows it into Dunn's hands as cash collateral.18 The timing of the payment matters as little as the timing of the sale. If a debtor sells encumbered inventory before filing and the buyer pays afterward, the payment is received after the case commences, yet it ordinarily goes to the secured party as proceeds.19 A student who sees a postpetition date and stops at § 552(a) misses that the value traces back to collateral held before the petition.
The same source draws the boundary. Cash from selling land or other property outside the lender's lien is not cash collateral, and receivables generated by a postpetition sale of prepetition inventory become cash collateral only when collected.20 The definition also confirms the pattern behind the heading of this subsection: collateral can be derived from other collateral, as proceeds, rents, and the like.21
The exception has a condition: the security agreement must extend to the property. For proceeds, Article 9 does much of the work, because a security interest in collateral attaches automatically to its identifiable proceeds and the agreement need not mention them.22 That makes the condition easy to meet in the usual proceeds case. For products, offspring, and profits, check that the agreement actually covers them.
The court's power to order otherwise keeps the exception from becoming a windfall. Tracing the lien into proceeds is the default because the value came from the lender's own collateral, and the court may depart from that default after notice and a hearing, based on the equities of the case.23 A lender whose claim to postpetition value is contested should expect to show the connection to its prepetition collateral.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define proceeds, products, offspring, or profits.24 Article 9 defines proceeds broadly: (i) whatever is acquired on disposition of collateral, including by sale, lease, or license; (ii) whatever is collected or distributed on account of collateral; (iii) rights arising out of collateral; (iv) claims arising out of loss, defects, infringement, or other impairment of its value; and (v) insurance payable on account of those claims.25 With no federal definition to fall back on, Article 9's list is the natural starting point, though a good answer still explains why the item is value that traces to collateral the lender held before the case.
Step 2 carries most of the weight. An item that is the old collateral in a new form is reached, and an item that is entirely new property is not.
Proceeds Carve-Back
The Article 9 limits show the same pattern from the state-law side. Section 9-204(b) keeps an after-acquired property clause from attaching to consumer goods the debtor acquires more than ten days after the secured party gives value, and to commercial tort claims. The next subsection, § 9-204(c), marks the edge of that bar: subsection (b) “does not prevent a security interest from attaching” in three situations.30
- To consumer goods as proceeds under § 9-315(a), or to commingled goods under § 9-336(c).31
- To a commercial tort claim as proceeds under § 9-315(a).32
- Under an after-acquired property clause, to property that is proceeds of consumer goods or of a commercial tort claim.33
These exceptions do not depend on the clause at all. Once a secured party has an attached security interest in any collateral, the interest attaches automatically to identifiable proceeds, and the security agreement need not mention proceeds.34 The limits in subsection (b) restrict what the clause itself can add, so they have nothing to say about value that comes out of collateral the lender already holds. If they did reach proceeds, a debtor could sell an encumbered item and keep the cash free of the lien, and a limit on what a clause adds would become a way to defeat the lender with a single sale.
An exam stem that pairs a consumer-goods clause with an item acquired well after the ten-day window invites the conclusion that nothing attached. The first question should be where the item came from.
Timing cannot explain the different results, since both items arrived outside the ten-day window. Source decides them. Value that comes out of the lender's own collateral stays attached by operation of law, while value from anywhere else must rely on the clause, which subsection (b)(1) cuts off. A student who sees a late-acquired consumer good and reaches for the ten-day rule before asking whether the item is proceeds has applied the limit to a situation it does not govern.
The remaining categories work the same way. A claim arising out of the loss, defects, infringement, or other impairment of the value of collateral falls within the definition of proceeds, so a lender with an interest in a business's delivery trucks reaches the business's tort claim for the destruction of one of them without any clause promising future claims.35 Commingled goods appear in the first item because § 9-336(c) governs attachment there, a rule outside this unit, and the carve-back keeps subsection (b) from interfering with it. The third item says the same about a clause itself: even an after-acquired clause is not blocked from reaching property that is proceeds of consumer goods or of a commercial tort claim.36 A tort claim with no connection to the lender's collateral gets no help from any of this and stays under the limit in subsection (b)(2).
Read with § 552(b), the carve-back leaves one idea to carry out of this unit: a limit on what an after-acquired clause adds does not cut off value that flows out of collateral the lender already holds.