Concept
Debtor's Protected Liberties
Use or disposition of collateral by debtor (§ 9-205)
Debtor's Protected Liberties
Section 9-205(a)(1) lists four things a debtor may do with collateral without putting the lien at risk. Each item completes the same phrase, “the debtor has the right or ability to,”1 and that phrase finishes the lead-in clause of § 9-205(a): a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely because the debtor has the right or ability to do a listed act.2 The four acts fit four commercial settings: goods the debtor uses or sells, receivables the debtor collects, goods that come back to the debtor, and the proceeds the debtor receives in exchange for collateral.
“Right” and “ability” name two different sources of the debtor’s power over collateral, and the statute treats them alike. A right is permission, usually granted in the security agreement; an inventory lender, for example, ordinarily lets the borrower sell the goods to customers. An ability is practical power that the debtor holds whether or not anyone granted it, such as the power to sell goods sitting on the debtor’s own floor when the agreement is silent. Because the statute joins the two words with “or,” a creditor gains nothing by showing that the debtor’s power came from a grant, and gains nothing by showing that it came from circumstances.
The statute names both words because either one alone would leave a gap. If only contractual rights were protected, a creditor could still attack a lender whose agreement was silent or restrictive by proving that the debtor in fact dealt freely with the collateral, which is the dominion inquiry the repealed Benedict rule required. Protecting ability as well as right closes that gap. A lender keeps the benefit of the rule even when its agreement is silent or it tolerates what the debtor can do in practice, and validity turns on whether the lender took the steps that create and perfect a security interest, with no regard to how closely it watched the debtor.
Using, Commingling, and Selling Collateral
Section 9-205(a)(1)(A) protects the debtor’s right or ability to “use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral, including returned or repossessed goods.”4 Read with the lead-in clause, it bars an attack on the lien that rests solely on any of those acts.5 Each verb names a distinct dealing: to use collateral is to put it to work in the business, to dispose of it is to sell or otherwise part with it, and to commingle it is to mix it with other goods. The words “all or part” show that the freedom need not be total to be protected, so a debtor that sells half its stock does not endanger the lien on the other half. The closing phrase reaches goods that came back to the debtor after a sale or that the debtor repossessed, and the returns subsection below takes them up.
Inventory shows the clause at work, because disposition is the point of the loan. A lender financing a dealer’s stock lends against goods that exist to be sold, and the dealer repays out of the sales; a dealer forbidden to sell could never earn the repayment. Between the parties, whether the debtor may sell is a matter for the security agreement.6 The Code answers a different question, which is what the debtor’s other creditors may make of that freedom. Their argument that the sales prove the lien a sham fails, because the right or ability to dispose of collateral is no ground of invalidity.7 The lender’s protection never rested on watching the debtor. It rests on taking a security interest, advancing value, and following the filing and priority rules.
The freedom to use collateral works the same way for goods the debtor employs instead of sells. A contractor that runs a financed excavator every working day wears it down, and a lender that permits or tolerates the wear gives the contractor’s other creditors no basis for attacking the lien. In both settings the lien rests on the grant and perfection of the security interest, and the debtor’s handling of the goods has no bearing on validity.
Commingling has a specific meaning. Goods are commingled when they are physically united with other goods so completely that their identity is lost in a product or mass.8 Flour baked into cakes is the standard example, and ball bearings built into a machine are another.9 The worry is that the lien vanishes because the original goods can no longer be pointed to, and it does not. A security interest does not exist in commingled goods as such, but it attaches to the product or mass, and an interest perfected before the commingling stays perfected in the product or mass.10 The lien travels with the goods into their new form, which is why a debtor’s freedom to mix collateral cannot make the lien a sham: the lender’s position never depended on keeping the goods unmixed.
When several perfected interests attach to the same product, they rank equally and share in the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each originally attached bears to the cost of the whole product or mass.11 Suppose one lender holds a perfected interest in a baker’s eggs, worth $300 and securing a $400 debt, and another holds a perfected interest in the baker’s flour, worth $500 and securing a $600 debt. The baker turns both into cakes worth $1,000. The interests share in the ratio 3 to 5, which tracks the relative worth of the eggs and flour rather than the debts they secure, so the egg lender is entitled to $375 and the flour lender to $625.12 That division ranks two secured parties against each other. The baker’s choice to mix the goods created the shared product, and nothing in the division suggests that either lien is invalid for that reason.
A creditor’s attack on the lien raises a threshold question: does a security interest exist at all? The clause shields an existing interest from one ground of attack, and it creates no lien where none was granted.13
The lender in that example loses because no lien exists. Where one does exist, the debtor’s freedom to use, sell, or mix the collateral never invalidates it against creditors.
Collecting and Dealing with Collateral
Section 9-205(a)(1)(B) shelters the debtor’s right or ability to “collect, compromise, enforce, or otherwise deal with collateral.”15 Read with the lead-in clause, it bars an attack on the lien that rests solely on those acts.16 The verbs trace the life of a receivable. An account is a right to be paid for goods sold or services rendered, and the customer who owes the money is the account debtor. To collect is to receive payment, to compromise is to settle a disputed account for less than its face amount, and to enforce is to demand payment or sue for it. The closing words reach whatever other handling an account needs, such as giving a customer more time to pay.
A business that finances its accounts must still run them: it sends invoices, takes in payments, and settles disputes with customers who say the goods arrived late or damaged. If each of those acts made the lien suspect, the lender would face two poor choices. It could collect from the borrower’s customers itself, or it could demand that every payment be handed over on receipt. Protecting the debtor’s freedom to collect and deal leaves the parties free to decide how collection will work, and the lien’s validity stays out of that decision.
The agreement between the debtor and the secured party chooses between two collection arrangements.17 In non-notification financing, the account debtors are never told of the assignment, so they keep paying the borrower as before, and the agreement gives the borrower the right to collect. In notification financing, the secured party tells the account debtors of the assignment and collects from them directly.18 Neither choice affects the lien’s validity against creditors. Where the debtor collects, the clause closes off the old attack based on that freedom. Where the lender collects, the debtor has no collecting freedom for a creditor to attack. A lender comfortable with the borrower’s business can leave the customer relationship undisturbed, and a lender that wants closer control can notify.
The old rule did its harm in non-notification financing. A borrower who kept collecting and spending the money had exactly the dominion that the pre-Code cases condemned, and lenders responded with a ritual: the borrower remitted every collection to the lender each day, and the lender handed the money straight back to keep the loan at an agreed level.19 Under § 9-205(a)(1)(B) the ritual buys the lender nothing, because the debtor’s right or ability to collect is no ground for attacking the lien. Whether the lender wants any turnover or accounting at all is left to agreement, and a lender that requires none does not weaken its lien. Subparagraph (a)(2) says so directly, and the section on no duty to account or replace takes it up.20
The clause answers the creditor’s attack and goes no further. A security agreement that forbids the debtor to collect and directs that every payment be delivered to the lender gives the lender a contract claim and gives the debtor’s creditors nothing. What the debtor may do as against the secured party is left to their agreement,21 so a debtor that collects anyway and keeps the money has breached, and § 9-205(a)(1)(B) is no defense against the lender. A single fact pattern can therefore produce two results: the supplier loses its validity attack, and the lender wins a claim against the debtor for breach. Once a collection is made, the money itself raises a further question, which the proceeds subsection below takes up.
Returns and Repossessions
Section 9-205(a)(1)(C) protects the debtor’s right or ability to “accept the return of collateral or make repossessions.”23 Read with the lead-in clause, it bars an attack on the lien that rests solely on the debtor’s taking goods back in either way.24 The two terms describe a seller recovering goods after a sale on credit. A return occurs when the buyer sends the goods back voluntarily, for any reason, and a repossession occurs when the seller takes them back, usually because the buyer has defaulted. The seller here is a debtor whose inventory secures a loan, so the recovered goods land in its hands as the lender’s collateral once more. Subparagraph (A) already covers the seller’s later use or disposition of “returned or repossessed goods,” and subparagraph (C) covers the earlier step of getting them back.25
The protection follows from how a credit seller operates. A seller that lets customers pay over time bears the risk of nonpayment, and its practical remedy is to retake the goods, which it may do itself when it handles its own collections.26 If retaking goods put the inventory lender’s lien in doubt, the seller could not enforce its own credit sales without handing its other creditors an argument that the lien was a sham. The same logic covers resale: a repossessed appliance that sits in a warehouse repays no one, and the seller must put it back into the stream of goods it sells. The lender’s protection against competing creditors never depended on keeping the seller from doing these things. It depends on the lender’s having taken a security interest and followed the filing and priority rules.
The supplier loses because validity is the only question its argument raises, and validity is the only question § 9-205 answers. A different dispute arises when the seller has assigned the account or chattel paper from the credit sale to a second financer. (Chattel paper is a writing that combines the buyer’s promise to pay with a security interest in the goods sold.) When the goods come back, the inventory lender and that financer may both claim them, and each can point to a valid lien. The question is which interest ranks first, and the priority rules of § 9-330 answer it. Section 9-205 does not.27
The returned-goods rules of § 9-330 can be recognized on sight by a few features. The inventory lender’s security interest carries over to the returned goods automatically. An unpaid transferee of chattel paper or an account has no such carryover: it must file or take possession of the returned goods to protect its interest against the seller’s creditors and against purchasers of the goods.28 Those rules belong with the priority material, and here they show only that a contest among financers is decided by ranking, with no one’s lien struck down because the seller took goods back. The same repossessed washing machine, once resold to a buyer in the ordinary course of business, shows how far the priority answer reaches. That buyer is fully protected against the inventory lender and against the financer holding the account or chattel paper alike.29 The buyer wins on a priority rule while the inventory lender’s lien remains valid against the seller’s creditors, so the two questions stay separate.
Dealing with Proceeds
Section 9-205(a)(1)(D) completes the list by protecting the debtor’s right or ability to “use, commingle, or dispose of proceeds.”31 Read with the lead-in clause, it bars an attack on the lien that rests solely on those acts.32 Subparagraph (A) already protects the debtor’s dealings with the original collateral, such as selling inventory.33 Subparagraph (D) turns to what the debtor gets in return, such as the cash a customer pays. Without it, a creditor barred from attacking the sale of the goods could move one step downstream and attack the spending of the money, and the Code closes that second door as well.
Proceeds means whatever the debtor acquires on the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral.34 The definition reaches well beyond cash. When a car dealer sells a vehicle out of financed inventory, the buyer may hand over a trade-in car, a check or cash, and a promissory note or other promise to pay the balance, and every one of those items is proceeds of the inventory.35 Proceeds is the name for what the original collateral turns into as the debtor’s business runs.
A lender can safely leave proceeds in the debtor’s hands because the lien goes with them. A security interest attaches automatically to identifiable proceeds, and the security agreement need not mention proceeds at all.36 The Code builds that rule on the assumption that parties to a secured deal intend to cover proceeds unless they agree otherwise, and a required reference would only trap a lender who drafted carelessly.37 Because the interest follows the money without anyone taking a step, the lender has no need to insist that the debtor segregate collections or hand them over each day, which would be the old remittance ritual again. Automatic attachment matters most when goods leave the lender’s reach. A buyer in the ordinary course of business takes goods free of a perfected security interest, even when the buyer knows the interest exists.38 The lender’s lien on the sold goods therefore ends at the sale, and its protection shifts to whatever the buyer paid, which is proceeds.39 Whether the debtor may handle proceeds as it pleases is, between debtor and lender, a matter for their agreement, and § 9-205(a)(1)(D) gives the debtor no defense if the agreement forbids it.40
Attachment reaches only identifiable proceeds, and the hard case for identification is cash deposited into a bank account that already holds the debtor’s own money. Courts sometimes reasoned that proceeds lost their identity once mixed with other property, a result that would let ordinary banking defeat the lender’s claim. Article 9 rejects it: commingled proceeds remain identifiable in some circumstances.41 One method of identifying them is the lowest intermediate balance rule, which presumes that the identifiable proceeds are the lowest balance the account reaches between the deposit and the time of tracing, up to the amount of proceeds deposited.42 The logic is that money which stayed in the account throughout could still be the proceeds, while funds taken out are treated as the debtor’s own, and later deposits come from some other source and do not revive proceeds already spent.
The standard illustration shows the arithmetic. A lender holds an attached security interest in a debtor’s equipment, and the debtor sells a machine and deposits the $100 it receives into a checking account holding $500, for a balance of $600. The debtor then withdraws $550, leaving $50, and later deposits $200, bringing the balance to $250. The identifiable proceeds are $50, the lowest the balance ever reached, even though $250 sits in the account at the end.43 The debtor’s mixing and spending did not invalidate the lien, and the lender can claim the $50 that tracing identifies. Had the account never dipped below $100 after the deposit, the whole $100 would have remained identifiable.
The illustration marks the boundary of the clause. The debtor’s freedom to use, commingle, and dispose of proceeds never invalidates the lien, yet it can limit what the lender is later able to identify or keep perfected. The $200 of new money in the account above was never proceeds, so tracing gives the lender no claim to it. Perfection sets a second limit. A security interest in proceeds is perfected automatically when the interest in the original collateral was perfected, but perfection continues beyond 20 days only if a listed condition is met. One condition is that a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the same office, and the proceeds were not acquired with cash proceeds.44 The full § 9-315 rules belong to the perfection materials, and what matters here is the cost to a lender when a debtor converts one category of collateral into another.
A conversion can leave the lender with a perfection problem, and the deciding fact is whether cash sat in the middle.
The two forklifts differ in one fact, and that fact moves the answer: a trade stays within the original filing, while a cash purchase of a different category needs a new filing.45 The lapse is a perfection cost and no defect in validity. It matters in later priority contests, and it gives an unpaid creditor no ground for a validity attack.