Concept
Buyers and Consignors Exception
Duty of care for collateral in the secured party's possession (§ 9-207(a))
Buyers and Consignors Exception
Section 9-207(a) states the duty of reasonable care, but it opens with a qualifier: the duty applies “except as otherwise provided in subsection (d).”1 Subsection (d) takes one class of holders out of the duty. It covers a secured party that is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, or a consignor.2 Most of these assets are rights to be paid, such as the right to collect an invoice or the amount due on a note, and a consignor is an owner who delivers goods to a merchant to sell. Article 9's enforcement rules reach only interests within its scope,3 and these buyers are inside it: the statute speaks of the buyer as “the secured party” even though the buyer owns the asset outright.4 Without subsection (d), that status would pull the buyer into the custody duty of subsection (a).
The carve-out follows from what a custody duty protects. A lender holding collateral owes care because the debtor still owns the collateral and still has an interest in its value, so careless handling is a loss the debtor feels. A buyer that purchased the paper outright stands elsewhere. The seller gave up the asset, and unless the seller kept a charge-back or recourse right, the seller has nothing at stake in how the buyer treats it. A duty owed to a party with no stake would protect no one, and the statute leaves it off.
The exemption is conditional, and the condition is recourse. Subsection (a) does not apply to these buyers and consignors unless the secured party is entitled under an agreement to charge back uncollected collateral, or otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor based on the nonpayment or other default of an account debtor or other obligor on the collateral.5 To charge back is to return unpaid paper to the seller and recover its value from the seller. Recourse is a right to look to the seller, or to someone liable behind the seller (a secondary obligor, such as a guarantor), when the person who owes on the paper fails to pay. Full recourse reaches the whole shortfall; limited recourse reaches part of it. The person who owes on the paper is the account debtor or other obligor.
Recourse brings the duty back for the same reason its absence removed the duty. Once the buyer holds a charge-back or recourse right, paper that goes uncollected through the buyer's neglect returns to the seller as a charge-back or a recourse claim. The seller regains a stake in careful handling, and the buyer, though still the owner, owes reasonable care. Two textual limits confine the trigger. The entitlement must arise under an agreement, so the purchase documents are where the question is answered. The recourse must also rest on the nonpayment or other default of the account debtor or other obligor, so a right against the seller that rests on some other ground does not meet the clause by its terms.6
The same promissory note can fall on either side of the line, depending on the transaction. A lender that takes the note as collateral for a loan is not a buyer of it, so the exception never arises and the lender must use reasonable care. A buyer that purchases the note outright is within subsection (d), and its duty turns on whether the agreement gives it charge-back or recourse rights.8
Recourse revives subsection (a) and nothing more. Subsection (d) also provides that subsections (b) and (c) do not apply to these buyers and consignors, and that statement is unconditional, because the recourse condition is written into paragraph (d)(1) alone.9 A buyer with a charge-back right therefore owes reasonable care but does not take the rules on charging expenses to the debtor, risk of accidental loss, keeping collateral identified, using or operating collateral, and handling proceeds, which the neighboring sections of this chapter address. For those matters, whatever governs lies outside § 9-207. The exception is also confined to § 9-207. Subsection (d) says nothing about duties found in other sections, such as the duty under § 9-208(b)(1) of a secured party with control of a deposit account to send the bank an authenticated record releasing it from any obligation to comply with the secured party's instructions.10