Concept
Varying the Duty by Agreement
Duty of care for collateral in the secured party's possession (§ 9-207(a))
Varying the Duty by Agreement
Article 9 lets the parties rewrite part of the secured party’s duty of care, but not the duty itself. The starting point is freedom of contract: except as the Code otherwise provides, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the debtor and the secured party.1 The Code therefore tolerates many optional terms beyond the ones it requires, and § 9-201 confirms that they take effect.2 Three limits matter for the duty of care. The parties may measure care but not disclaim it. They may reassign one specific task on paper collateral. And the debtor’s protections tighten around default.
The floor beneath that freedom comes from the Code’s general provisions rather than from § 9-207. Former § 1-102(3), carried forward in revised § 1-302, permits variation of Code provisions by agreement except where the Code says otherwise. It forbids disclaiming “the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care” that the Code prescribes. The parties may, however, “by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”3 The reasonable care that § 9-207(a) demands of a secured party in possession is an obligation of that kind.4 Two verbs carry the distinction: the parties may measure care, and they may not disclaim it. An agreement that spells out what careful custody means for this property gives content to the word “reasonable.” An agreement that excuses the secured party from care removes the obligation itself. The limit on manifestly unreasonable standards keeps a measure from becoming a disclaimer in disguise, because a standard that no prudent holder would accept as care measures nothing.
Exam questions test this line with boilerplate, and the quickest way to sort a clause is to ask what it does to the duty. Either it tells the secured party how to be careful, or it tells the debtor that care is unnecessary.
The first clause subtracts the duty; the second supplies its content. The first lender is liable for the loss its want of due care caused, because a pledgee answers for any loss caused by its failure to exercise due care.5
The words “unless otherwise agreed” appear only in the second sentence of § 9-207(a), so they qualify one thing. For chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking the necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless the parties agree otherwise.6 A security agreement that assigns those steps to the debtor reallocates a single task, and the text itself authorizes the reallocation. The first sentence is untouched. Subject to the exception in subsection (d), the secured party must still use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the paper itself. A clause making the debtor responsible for the steps that preserve rights against a pledged note’s indorsers is therefore effective. A clause declaring that the lender owes no care to the note, or to any other pledged item, is a disclaimer, and “unless otherwise agreed” gives it no support.7
Before default, the Code treats many of the repossession and disposition rules as the debtor’s protections and generally refuses to let the parties waive them, whether by a term in the security agreement or otherwise. The secured party’s obligation to care for collateral in its possession is on that list.8 The debtor’s rights under § 9-207(b)(4)(C) are protected in the same way: except for consumer goods, the secured party may use or operate the collateral only in the manner and to the extent the debtor agrees.9
After default, the Code opens a narrow door. Certain debtor rights can be waived, but only by an agreement entered into and authenticated after default. They include the right to notification of a disposition under § 9-611, the right to require disposition of collateral under § 9-620(e), and, except in consumer transactions, the right to redeem under § 9-623.10 A waiver tucked into the original security agreement does not qualify, because the timing requirement ties the waiver to a default that has already occurred rather than to one the debtor merely foresees. The duty of care does not appear among the waivable rights, and the Code-wide bar on disclaiming it stays in force.
The same insistence on a post-default record appears when a secured party proposes to take the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. A debtor consents if the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated after default, or if the secured party sends a proposal and receives no objection within 20 days.11 Partial satisfaction is stricter. Silence is not consent, and a secured party who wants a partial strict foreclosure must obtain the debtor’s agreement in a record authenticated after default.12