Concept
Consequences of Breach
Duty of care for collateral in the secured party's possession (§ 9-207(a))
Consequences of Breach
Section 9-207(a) commands a secured party in possession to “use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party’s possession.”1 A secured party can come into possession at the outset, when the debtor pledges the collateral, or after default. For goods, Article 9 gives it two routes after default: simply taking the collateral, if it can do so without a breach of the peace, or bringing a court action.2 The rules in this unit follow the secured party’s possession, however it began.
The Code attaches one consequence to a lapse. A pledgee is liable for any loss caused by its failure to exercise due care, or by any other failure this unit describes, but it does not lose its security interest.3 The rule is implied in § 9-207(a), and § 9-625(b) is the related provision. The “other failures” are the specific rules of § 9-207(b) and (c): who bears the cost of keeping collateral and the risk of its loss, when collateral must stay traceable to the debtor, when a secured party may use it, and what the secured party must do with the money and property that collateral produces. The later section on liability develops the remedy. The task here is to learn what counts as a failure, and who carries the burden when nothing has failed.
Expenses and Risk of Loss
Two clauses of § 9-207(b) divide the ordinary costs and dangers of custody. Both apply if a secured party has possession of collateral, subject to the exception in subsection (d).4 Clause (b)(1) makes reasonable expenses incurred in the custody, preservation, use, or operation of the collateral, including the cost of insurance and the payment of taxes or other charges, chargeable to the debtor and secured by the collateral.5 Clause (b)(2) puts the risk of accidental loss or damage on the debtor to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance coverage.6 The first clause answers who pays to keep the collateral safe. The second answers who loses if something destroys it through no one’s fault.
Each half of clause (b)(1) does separate work. Chargeable to the debtor means the secured party may add what it spends to the debt the debtor owes. Secured by the collateral means the added sum is covered by the same property that secures the loan, so the secured party can look to the collateral for reimbursement instead of relying on the debtor’s separate promise to repay.7 Ownership explains the allocation. The debtor will get the collateral back, or its value, when the debt is paid, so money spent keeping it safe protects the debtor’s asset. A holder that could not recover its costs would also be tempted to skimp on the steps reasonable care requires, and clause (b)(1) removes that temptation by making careful custody a secured charge on the property kept. The word reasonable limits the charge to the upkeep that careful custody of that kind of property calls for.
Clause (b)(2) applies the same ownership logic to danger. Fire, flood, and theft travel with the property, and the debtor owned the collateral before delivery and still owns it while the secured party holds it, so the chance of accidental destruction stays with the debtor. Insurance comes first, because the debtor bears the loss only “to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance coverage.”8 The debtor carries the shortfall, the amount by which the loss exceeds what insurance pays. Read effective to mean coverage that actually responds to the event: a lapsed policy, or one that excludes the peril that struck, leaves the debtor holding the whole risk. Security agreements typically address both insurance and who bears the risk of loss, and they bind the parties according to their terms except as the Code provides, so read the agreement alongside § 9-207(b).9
Exam problems in this area turn on why the goods were destroyed. The statute puts accidental loss on the debtor. Loss that results from the secured party’s own lack of care is a different matter, because a pledgee is liable for any loss caused by its failure to exercise due care.10
The difference between the two scenes is the lender’s own conduct, and that difference explains the shape of the rule. A debtor can fairly carry risks that no one controlled, because ownership brings those risks along and insurance can spread them. A debtor cannot fairly carry a risk the holder created, because after delivery the debtor has no means of watching the collateral. If the risk ran to the debtor even when the holder’s lack of care caused the loss, every breach of the duty in subsection (a) would end as a loss the debtor bore, and the duty would protect nothing.11 The working sequence is short: charge the reasonable costs of keeping the collateral to the debtor, let insurance absorb what it covers, leave the uninsured accidental remainder with the debtor, and place any loss traceable to the holder’s lack of care on the holder.
Identifiable Collateral
Section 9-207(b)(3) sets a traceability rule: the secured party “shall keep the collateral identifiable, but fungible collateral may be commingled.”13 Three terms carry the rule. Collateral is identifiable when the secured party can still point to it as the property of the particular debtor who pledged it.14 Fungible collateral consists of interchangeable units, such as bushels of grain of one grade, any one of which is as good as any other of its kind. To commingle is to mix such units from different owners in one place. The rule therefore makes traceability the default and withdraws it where tracing accomplishes nothing. Like the other rules of subsection (b), it governs a secured party in possession, subject to subsection (d).
The default rests on ownership. The debtor expects the pledged property back when the debt is paid, so the secured party’s custody must keep it possible to return what was pledged. A holder that has mixed non-fungible property into its own holdings may be unable to separate the debtor’s asset again, and nothing handed back afterward can be the particular thing the debtor delivered.
The exception has a different reason. When units are interchangeable, an equal quantity of the same kind replaces what the debtor pledged completely, so the debtor loses nothing when the secured party returns other units. A separate bin for each debtor, meanwhile, costs space and handling and buys the debtor no protection. For a parallel rule on goods stored for others, compare § 7-207(a), to which the rule is cross-referenced.15
An exam problem under this clause turns on classifying the collateral. Pledged stock is the standard example of collateral that must stay identifiable as the property of the particular debtor, and pledged grain is the standard example of fungible collateral that may be stored with other similar grain in a warehouse.16 A lender that holds corn pledged by several debtors in one bin has therefore done nothing wrong: each debtor’s claim is to a quantity of corn of a given kind, and any bushels of that kind satisfy it. The premise is interchangeability, so commingling is defensible only among like units. A lender that blends materially different grades cannot claim the exception for the mix.
A lapse of this kind is an ordinary failure, and the consequence follows the usual pattern. The pledgee is liable for the loss its failure caused, and the breach does not cost it the security interest in the collateral.17 The debtor’s remedy is compensation for the loss that traces to the untraceable collateral.
Use and Operation of Collateral
Section 9-207(b)(4) answers a question the duty of care leaves open: may a secured party that holds collateral also put it to work? The answer is yes, but only in limited circumstances.19 The statute permits use or operation in three situations: (A) for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value;20 (B) as permitted by an order of a court having competent jurisdiction;21 or (C) except in the case of consumer goods, in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.22 The three are independent paths. A secured party needs only one, but it needs one, and a use that fits none has no permission under the subsection.
Holding collateral is not owning it, and that difference explains why the permission is narrow. The debtor still owns the pledged property, and the secured party holds it as security, so what the secured party can look to is the property’s value. Use draws down that value: machinery loses working life, vehicles pile up mileage, and tools wear with each job. If the holder could run the collateral for its own benefit, it would collect the gain while the debtor absorbed the depreciation, and a debtor who has delivered the collateral can neither watch the wear nor stop it. Free use would also set the holder against subsection (a), because a custodian bound to use reasonable care in preserving what it holds cannot also be spending that value.23 Each of the three permissions describes a situation in which use is consistent with the debtor’s stake: the use protects the value, a court has reviewed it, or the owner has accepted its cost.
Use for preservation serves the same interest the duty of care protects. Some collateral holds its value only if it is kept in working order, and for that property an occasional operation is part of good custody. A lender holding a pledged engine that starts and runs it periodically, so that it does not seize from disuse, is using the collateral for the purpose of preserving it and its value.24 The operative word is purpose. The statute asks why the holder runs the collateral, so a use that happens to leave the equipment undamaged does not qualify when the real reason is the holder’s own convenience or profit.
The court-order permission hands the question to a neutral decision-maker. A secured party that wants to use collateral for a purpose outside preservation, and has no agreement with the debtor to rely on, can seek an order of a court having competent jurisdiction.25 The court has no stake in the use, so someone other than the party who profits weighs the debtor’s interest in the collateral’s value. The permission reaches only as far as the order does, because the statute authorizes use “as permitted by” the order.
The third permission rests on the owner’s own consent. Except in the case of consumer goods, a secured party may use the collateral in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.26 Two limits sit inside that clause. Manner and extent confine the permission to the kinds and amount of use the debtor accepted. The consumer-goods exclusion means that a debtor’s agreement cannot supply the permission for consumer goods: a lender holding a borrower’s pledged home electronics cannot rely on a use clause in the security agreement, although preservation or a court order can still authorize use of such goods. The likely reason is bargaining position, since a commercial debtor can price a use term and a consumer on a standard-form loan is least able to. The Code also lists the debtor’s rights under clause (C) among the rights that cannot be waived or varied by agreement (§ 9-602(1)), a point developed in the earlier discussion of varying the duty by agreement.27
Do not carry the Code’s rules on a debtor’s consent to acceptance of collateral into this clause. Where a secured party proposes to accept collateral in satisfaction of the debt, a debtor consents if the debtor agrees to the terms in a record authenticated after default, or if the secured party sends a proposal and receives no objection within 20 days, and silence is not consent to acceptance in partial satisfaction.28 Clause (C) contains no such machinery. It speaks only of use “in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.”29
Use outside the three permissions is another failure of the kind the due-care rule reaches. The wear it produces is damage the secured party’s own conduct caused, not accidental loss, and a pledgee is liable for loss caused by its failure to exercise due care or by any other failure of this kind, though it does not lose its security interest.30 The debtor’s remedy is compensation for the value the use consumed, while the debt and the lien remain in place.
Proceeds and Repledging
Section 9-207(c) turns from how a secured party must handle collateral to what it may do with the value the collateral produces and with the collateral itself. It reaches a secured party that has possession of collateral or control of it under the listed sections, subject again to subsection (d).32 The reference to control matters because the duty of care in subsection (a) speaks of collateral “in the secured party’s possession.”33 Subsection (c) extends beyond the classic pledge to a secured party that controls collateral without physically holding it. Its three rules each have their own reason.
The first rule covers value that arrives in a form other than money. A secured party may hold as additional security any proceeds, except money or funds, received from the collateral.34 Pledged stock supplies the standard illustration: when the issuing corporation pays a stock dividend while the secured party holds the shares, the new shares become additional security for the debt.35 A stock dividend generally spreads the same underlying value over more shares. If the new shares went to the debtor while the secured party kept only the original certificates, the pledge would be worth less than when the loan was made, and the debtor would pocket the difference. Holding the increase keeps the security from shrinking. The verb is permissive, so the secured party may hold what arrives, and what it holds stands behind the same debt.
Money is handled differently. A secured party shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured obligation, unless it remits them to the debtor.36 A cash dividend on pledged stock is the standard case: a lender holding the stock for a loan may remit the dividend to the debtor but, if it does not, must apply it to the debt.37 Money is singled out because money is what a debt is paid with, so applying it satisfies part of the obligation directly. The debtor owns the shares, and the debtor sees the benefit of the dividend either as a smaller debt or as the cash itself. The word shall leaves the secured party two choices, apply or remit, and no third choice of keeping the dividend for itself. An exam stem in which one corporation pays both a stock dividend and a cash dividend on the same pledged shares is testing this sort by form: the new shares stay behind as added security, and the cash reduces the debt or goes back to the debtor.
The third rule concerns the collateral itself. A secured party in possession or control may create a security interest in the collateral.38 That permission is the right to repledge: the first pledgee uses the debtor’s pledged asset as security for its own borrowing by handing it on to a second pledgee.39 The permission helps a secured party that finances its own business, and it costs the debtor nothing as long as the debtor’s position stays the same. That condition is the limit. Section 9-207 does not mention the debtor’s right to redeem the collateral by paying the debt, but the right remains, and the first pledgee may repledge only on terms that do not impair it.40 A debtor who pays is entitled to get the collateral back, so the first pledgee must stay able to deliver it.
A repledge goes wrong when the choice of second pledgee or the terms of the deal defeat that guarantee. A repledge on terms that impair the debtor’s right to redeem falls outside the permission, and a first pledgee that repledges to a second pledgee known to be irresponsible faces possible liability.41 The liability risk fits the duty of care. Deciding where the debtor’s property sits is part of custody, and handing it to a holder the pledgee knows to be irresponsible is hard to square with reasonable care in its custody and preservation.42 Repledging is therefore permitted in the abstract, and liability turns on how the secured party does it. As with other lapses, the debtor’s remedy is compensation for the loss, and the first pledgee keeps its security interest.43