Concept
Elements of Purchaser Priority
Purchaser of chattel paper: other security interests
Elements of Purchaser Priority
Section 9-330(b) states its conditions in a single sentence. A purchaser of chattel paper takes priority over a security interest claimed other than merely as proceeds of inventory if the purchaser gives new value; takes possession of each authoritative tangible copy of the record evidencing the paper and obtains control under Section 9-105 of each authoritative electronic copy; and acts in good faith, in the ordinary course of its business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the secured party's rights.1 A buyer and a lender that takes the paper as collateral both count as purchasers, so one list governs both. The provision is intricate but clear, and its drafters built it to match commercial practice.2
The conditions are cumulative, and each answers a different worry about who deserves to displace an earlier lender. That lender usually holds an interest, perfected by filing or by possession, that wins under the ordinary rule favoring the earlier perfected secured party.3 Section 9-330(b) asks the purchaser to earn an exception to that rule. New value shows that the purchaser parted with something in reliance on the paper. Possession or control gives it an exclusive hold, so the dealer cannot sell the same paper twice. Good faith and ordinary course confine the exception to genuine participants in the market for paper. Lack of knowledge, the last condition, is what sets subsection (b) apart from the proceeds-only rule of subsection (a).
A purchaser that misses any one condition falls back on the ordinary rules, and under those rules the earlier perfected secured party prevails. Success on four conditions does not offset failure on the fifth. A financer that pays full price and takes the contracts into its own files still loses if the purchase falls outside its ordinary business, and one that deals in the ordinary course and takes possession still loses if it gave no new value. The discussion below follows the statute's order, beginning with what the purchaser must have given.
New Value
The first condition is that the purchaser give new value.4 Section 9-102(a)(57) defines the term: new value means “(i) money, (ii) money’s worth in property, services, or new credit, or (iii) release by a transferee of an interest in property previously transferred to the transferee,” and it “does not include an obligation substituted for another obligation.”5 The definition pairs a list with one exclusion, and you need both to know what the purchaser had to put into the deal.
Money is the plainest form. A financer that pays cash for a stack of contracts, or advances loan proceeds against them, has parted with something it was not already bound to give. Money’s worth in property, services, or new credit reaches value that does not arrive as cash, so a lender that extends a fresh line of credit to the dealer in return for the paper gives new credit. The third form covers a transferee that releases an interest the debtor earlier transferred to it. Each form moves something new from the purchaser toward the dealer, and the exclusion removes the common arrangement in which nothing new moves: a trade of one obligation for another.
The requirement exists because the priority comes at the expense of an earlier lender who may have done nothing wrong. That transfer is justified only when the purchaser put fresh value into the deal in reliance on the paper. A purchaser that paid out money or extended credit stands to lose that payment if the paper proves encumbered, and protecting it keeps the market for paper working. A purchaser that merely swapped one obligation for another paid nothing new. If it loses, it holds the same claim against the dealer that it held before; if it wins, it gains at the earlier lender’s expense without having changed its position. Nothing in the swap offsets the earlier lender’s loss, so the statute withholds priority.
A finance company that wires Tidewater $300,000 of fresh money for the same stack, or takes the contracts as collateral for a new loan of that size, has met the first condition, because money and new credit both appear on the statutory list. Four conditions remain. The usual exam error treats any consideration as new value; a stem in which the financer takes the paper for a promise already outstanding, or swaps one note for another with nothing fresh passing, describes none.
A special rule in § 9-330(e) fits one kind of lender into this test. For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory gives new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory.6 Consider the lender whose advance let a dealer acquire a car. When the dealer later sells the car on credit, the buyer’s contract is chattel paper that is proceeds of that inventory, and the lender hands over nothing new when the paper arrives, because its value went out earlier, when it financed the car. Without subsection (e), that lender could not satisfy the first condition for the very paper its own financing produced. The rule credits the earlier advance and goes no further. The lender must still take possession or control, act in good faith and in the ordinary course of its business, and, where subsection (b) governs, lack knowledge that its purchase violates the secured party’s rights. The rule is also narrow: a lender whose inventory interest is not purchase-money, and a purchase-money lender claiming paper that is not proceeds of its inventory, receive no deemed value and must show actual new value like any other purchaser.
Possession or Control
The second condition turns on what the purchaser holds when it buys. Section 9-330(b) requires it to take “possession of each authoritative tangible copy of the record evidencing the chattel paper” and to obtain “control under Section 9-105 of each authoritative electronic copy of the record evidencing the chattel paper.”8 Older materials speak of possession of tangible chattel paper and control of electronic chattel paper; the revised text eliminates those two defined terms and speaks of authoritative copies of the record instead.9 Either way the purchaser must hold the paper. For a paper copy, possession means having the original in hand; for an electronic copy, § 9-105 supplies the test of control. Chattel paper can be held because a record evidences it. An account, by contrast, is not evidenced by an indispensable writing, so no original exists to take into one’s hands.10
The earlier lender usually secures its position by filing or by taking the paper itself, and possession is the stronger step: perfection by possession of chattel paper “provides better protection.”11 A lender that perfects by filing alone need not hold the paper at all,12 and a financing statement tells a searcher nothing about who holds the contracts. The dealer stays free to hand the same originals to a second financer. The purchaser’s possession or control closes that gap in two ways. It is exclusive: only one person can hold a given original, and once the purchaser holds it, the dealer has nothing left to deliver to anyone else. It is also open to inspection: a purchaser holding the paper can read it, including any notation that it was assigned elsewhere. Exclusivity does the structural work, and the chance to inspect ties into the knowledge condition below.
The statute’s word each matters because exclusivity disappears if any authoritative copy stays behind. A purchaser that carries off some authoritative copies and leaves others in the dealer’s files has not shut the dealer out, since the dealer can still deliver a retained copy to a different financer. Partial possession therefore fails.
The earlier lender’s method of perfection shows how the condition operates. If that lender filed and let the dealer keep the contracts, the dealer can sell them to a second bank, and the bank takes free of the first lender’s interest if it gives new value, takes possession, acts in good faith and in the ordinary course of its business, and lacks knowledge that the purchase violates the first lender’s rights.13 If the first lender instead perfected by taking possession, no one else can take possession of paper that lender already holds, and the second bank cannot meet this condition.14
Filing is the method the earlier lender used to get its priority, and it does not substitute for the purchaser’s own hold on the paper. A purchase agreement, a payment, and a promise to collect later all describe a purchaser that does not yet hold anything. Had Pinnacle carried the originals out of the dealer’s office when it paid, it would have cleared this condition, though other conditions would still stand between it and priority. An exam stem in which the financer “filed” and “agreed to take” the contracts describes a purchaser that missed the condition.
Good Faith
The statute also requires that the purchaser act “in good faith.”16 In the Code’s general sense, good faith means honesty in fact and observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. The two halves test different things. Honesty in fact is subjective: it asks what the purchaser actually believed and intended, and it excludes a purchaser that knowingly joins a scheme to cheat the earlier lender. Fair dealing is objective: it asks how a financer that buys paper for a living ordinarily behaves, and it can reach a purchaser that was sincere but acted in a way the market would not call fair.
The condition follows from what the priority does. Section 9-330(b) strips priority from an earlier lender that may have done nothing wrong, and the only justification is that the purchaser is a bona fide participant in the market for paper. A purchaser whose priority would exist only because it helped the dealer slip contracts past the dealer’s lender is not that participant, because its priority would reward the dealer’s scheme. Honesty in fact catches the purchaser that knowingly takes part. The fair-dealing standard catches the one that deals on terms or in ways no legitimate financer would accept.
A financer that pays full price, takes the originals under its usual routine, and shows no sign of helping the dealer cheat its lender raises no good-faith problem. Both financers paid and both took the originals; what separates them is how they dealt.
Good faith also differs from the knowledge condition that follows it in the statute. Knowledge asks one narrow question: did the purchaser know that this purchase violates the secured party’s rights? Good faith asks about the purchaser’s honesty and fair dealing overall. A purchaser can lack knowledge of a violation and still fail on good faith if it deals outside reasonable commercial standards, so the absence of knowledge never establishes good faith by itself. Analyze the two conditions separately.
Good faith does not oblige the purchaser to investigate. Comment 6 to § 9-330 states that a purchaser of chattel paper “is not required as a matter of good faith to make a search in order to determine the existence of prior security interests.”17 The exception depends on this rule, because it lets a financer buy paper by taking the paper itself, and a good-faith standard that demanded a filing search would bring back the burden the exception removes. The general priority rules point the same way. Under §§ 9-322 and 9-323, knowledge of a preexisting unperfected security interest is not itself bad faith, because priorities should not turn on disputatious inquiries into who knew what.18 The usual exam error is to call a purchaser that skipped the search, or noticed a filing, a bad-faith purchaser. A statement in a financing statement that the purchase would violate the filed party’s rights does change the analysis, but it supplies knowledge, which the knowledge condition below covers, and not bad faith.19
Decisions outside chattel paper show the same reluctance to find bad faith on mere awareness. Treat them as analogies and not as § 9-330 holdings. A buyer in ordinary course under § 9-320(a) must also buy in good faith, yet it takes free even though it knows the security interest exists, and it is hard to say what good faith adds there beyond the no-knowledge requirement.20 Where something more than knowledge appears, the result can change. In General Insurance Co. v. Lowry, Lowry’s attorney, who knew of the security agreement between General and Lowry, took and perfected a security interest in the same stock. The court imposed an equitable lien despite the priority provision of former § 9-312, because the obligations of good faith under § 1-203 had not been met, and it stressed that the case involved an attorney for one of the parties, not a disinterested creditor protecting its own commercial interests.21 The lesson for chattel paper is that the good-faith condition is reserved for dealing that is dishonest or commercially unfair, as in the colluding purchaser above.
Ordinary Course: Whose Business Counts
The fourth condition requires that the purchaser act “in the ordinary course of the purchaser’s business.”23 The possessive names the yardstick. The dealer that created the paper sells goods on credit and routinely passes the resulting contracts along, but the dealer stands on the selling side of the transaction. The statute looks to the party on the other side: the bank or finance company that regularly buys dealers’ installment contracts or lends against them. That financer is the paradigm purchaser, and the question is whether the purchase at hand is the kind its business ordinarily makes.
The phrase does two jobs. “Ordinary course” screens out a purchase that departs from the way the purchaser normally deals, and “the purchaser’s business” ties that screen to the party claiming priority. The tie follows from the bargain the statute strikes. A qualifying purchaser takes ahead of an earlier lender who may have done nothing wrong, and the justification rests on the practice of financers who buy paper by taking the paper itself instead of searching the records. A financer for whom buying paper is routine relies on that practice every time, so protecting its routine purchases keeps paper moving through dealer financing. A one-time acquisition by a company that does not deal in paper shows no comparable reliance, and it looks more like an accommodation to a dealer in trouble than participation in the market the exception serves. The dealer’s habits cannot supply the condition. A dealer that sells contracts every week proves only that the dealer is active, and says nothing about whether the purchaser belongs to the market for paper.
The dealer behaves the same way toward a carton maker and toward a finance company that buys boat-dealer paper every week. Only the purchaser differs. A student who confirms that Kestrel satisfied the other conditions and stops there has missed the condition that decides the outcome, and a student who counts the dealer’s weekly sales has looked at the wrong party.
Ordinary Course: Applying the Test
The classic setting for § 9-330 is a lender with a floating lien on a dealer’s inventory who claims chattel paper as proceeds, against a purchaser of that same paper.25 One standard illustration shows the ordinary-course condition met. A dealer gave financer A a perfected security interest in its automobile inventory and the proceeds. The dealer sold a car on credit, and the buyer signed a security agreement for the unpaid price. The dealer then delivered that paper to financer B, which paid value and regularly bought such security agreements, representing automobile sales, from that dealer. B took priority over A as to the paper even though B knew that A was financing the dealer’s inventory, and A’s only claim was to the proceeds the dealer received from B.26 B’s regular buying is what makes the acquisition ordinary. B did what its business consisted of, with a source it customarily dealt with, in the form it customarily took. The illustration involves a proceeds-only claim, which uses the same ordinary-course wording as subsection (b), and what B knew about A’s financing is a knowledge question taken up below.
The illustration yields a working test drawn from the paradigm financer: is this the kind of paper the purchaser regularly buys or lends against, from the kind of dealer it regularly deals with, in the form it customarily takes? A lender that takes paper as collateral is also a purchaser, so a finance company whose business is lending against dealers’ contracts meets the condition when it makes a customary advance of that kind.
Article 9 and the Code’s sales rules use the same pattern elsewhere, and the comparison helps you see the structure. A buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest created by its seller under § 9-320(a).27 Under the entrustment rule, a merchant who deals in goods of that kind has power to transfer an owner’s rights to a buyer in ordinary course who buys in good faith and without knowledge of the owner’s rights.28 A lessee in ordinary course must lease in good faith, without knowledge that the lease violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind.29 Those definitions measure the business of the person on the other side of the deal, the one “in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind.” Section 9-330(b) measures the purchaser’s business instead and adds no requirement about the dealer’s line of work.30 Use these provisions to recognize the three-part pattern of good faith, lack of knowledge, and ordinary course, and do not import their definitions into § 9-330(b).
Knowledge of a Violation
The last condition most distinguishes § 9-330(b) from the proceeds-only rule: the purchaser must act “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.”32 The wording builds in two limits. The condition looks to what the purchaser knew when it bought, and it looks to knowledge of a violation, meaning that this sale or pledge of this paper breaches what the earlier lender is entitled to. A purchaser that regularly buys dealer paper will often know that some earlier lender exists, so most problems under this condition turn on the gap between knowing a lender exists and knowing the purchase wrongs it.
Knowledge here means what the purchaser actually knew, and the purchaser need not search the records to learn whether the purchase violates the secured party’s rights. Comment 6 to § 9-330 takes this position on good faith, stating that a purchaser of chattel paper need not search for prior security interests.33 The reason follows from how the exception works. A financer that buys or lends against dealer paper does so repeatedly, and it protects itself by taking the paper into its own hands, not by combing the records before each deal. A rule that charged the purchaser with whatever a search would have shown would put the search back into every purchase. The earlier lender is better placed to carry the risk. It can stamp the paper to show the assignment, and the drafters gave a lender that does so a safe harbor: no later purchaser takes priority over it.34
Knowing that a security interest exists is therefore not the same as knowing that the purchase violates it. A lender that finances a dealer may well expect the dealer to sell its paper and remit the proceeds against the loan.35 A purchaser that learns only that some lender holds an interest has no reason to think this sale is wrongful, and the drafters say as much: it is insufficient to subordinate a purchaser merely because it has seen a financing statement covering the paper and so knows an interest probably exists.36 Disqualifying that purchaser would defeat the very financers the subsection protects, since a bank that deals in dealer paper will routinely know the paper may be encumbered. Knowledge of a violation requires something more specific: information that the sale itself breaches what the lender is entitled to.
The comparison with former § 9-308 shows how much the wording matters. Under that statute, when the earlier lender’s claim went beyond proceeds, the buyer had to act without knowledge that the specific paper was subject to a security interest, so awareness of the interest alone cost the buyer its priority.37 Section 9-330(b) lets the purchaser take free even though it knows of a security interest in the particular paper, provided it does not know that its purchase violates the secured party’s rights, and the change conforms the rule to what the drafters believed to be current practice.38 A student who carries the former standard into a current problem will wrongly subordinate a purchaser whose only fault was noticing a filing.
The financing statement shows where the line falls. A purchaser that has seen a financing statement listing the chattel paper as collateral, and has no other information about the lender’s arrangement with the debtor, knows only that an interest probably exists, and that does not subordinate it.39 A filed statement that says more reverses the result. A purchaser that sees a statement in a financing statement to the effect that a purchase of the paper from the debtor would violate the filed party’s rights has the knowledge that defeats it.40 Two purchasers may both read a financing statement, and only the one that reads words telling it that buying would wrong the lender loses.
Skipping the search does not count against Stonebridge on good faith, since a purchaser need not search. Alder’s protection lay in its own hands: stamping the contracts as assigned to Alder would have put the information on the paper itself, and an indication on the paper that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser establishes the purchaser’s knowledge of a violation.41 The next subsection develops that rule.
The buyer-in-ordinary-course rule draws the same line, and it serves as a useful analogy. A buyer in ordinary course takes free of a security interest its seller created even though the buyer knows the interest exists.42 Knowing more changes the result: in one illustration, a retailer’s security agreement barred sales to other retailers who might resell at a discount, and a buyer that knew of the bar and bought anyway took subject to the security interest.43 A licensee of general intangibles that takes in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates another’s rights, and in the ordinary course takes free of the licensor’s security interests, even perfected ones, though it knows they exist.44 A purchaser of chattel paper fares the same way: knowing of the lien is harmless, and knowing the sale breaches the lender’s rights is fatal. As with the ordinary-course definitions above, these comparisons aid reasoning, and each provision keeps its own conditions.
A purchaser that clears all four steps has satisfied only the knowledge condition. Good faith remains a separate question about honesty and fair dealing, so a purchaser can lack knowledge of a violation and still fail if it dealt dishonestly or outside reasonable commercial standards.
The Assignment Legend
Subsection (f) of § 9-330 turns one fact about the paper into a conclusion about the purchaser’s state of mind. For purposes of subsections (b) and (d), if the authoritative copies of the record evidencing chattel paper or an instrument indicate that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, the purchaser has knowledge that the purchase violates that secured party’s rights.47 The knowledge condition asks what the purchaser actually knew; subsection (f) settles the question in advance for one situation.48 When the paper carries the marking, the statute supplies the knowledge, and the purchaser cannot escape by showing that no one in its office read the notation. The deeming is conclusive.49
The deeming rule has three triggers, and all of them must appear on the paper:
- The indication appears on the authoritative copies of the record evidencing the chattel paper, which means the paper itself and not a filing in a public office.
- The indication is one of assignment, as with a stamp stating that the paper has been assigned to a named finance company.
- The assignment is to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, so the marking must point to a particular assignee, and that assignee cannot be the purchaser.50
For tangible chattel paper the indication normally takes the form of a written legend on the paper.51 The statute speaks of authoritative copies of the record without regard to form, so an authoritative electronic copy whose record shows the assignment is covered along with a paper original.
The rule gives the earlier lender a cheap protection and the purchaser a standard it can follow without investigating. A lender holding an interest in a dealer’s paper can mark the paper to show who holds that interest, and a mark costs almost nothing compared with a lawsuit over who knew what. The marking is a safe harbor: a lender that stamps the paper ensures that no later purchaser takes priority over it.52 The purchaser’s side explains why the marking can carry that weight. A purchaser under subsection (b) must take possession of each authoritative tangible copy, so it has the paper in hand at the moment of purchase, and whatever the paper says is in front of it. Charging the purchaser with the paper’s own contents asks nothing new of it. That sets the rule apart from charging it with whatever a search of the filing records would show, a search it has no duty to make. The deeming also moves the dispute off the purchaser’s state of mind, because a court asks what the paper shows, not whether a particular employee read the stamp.
The Alder and Stonebridge illustration above shows the same dealing without the stamp. Nothing on those contracts mentioned Alder, so Stonebridge took priority even though Alder had filed a financing statement with a no-sale restriction. Put a stamp naming Alder on those contracts and the result reverses, with nothing else about Stonebridge’s conduct changed. A financing statement alone works differently. A purchaser that has merely seen a filing covering the paper learns only that an interest probably exists, and that is not enough to subordinate it.53 The filing defeats a purchaser only when its own words say that a purchase of the paper from the debtor would violate the filed party’s rights, and that knowledge comes from reading the statement, not from subsection (f).54 Subsection (f) asks about the paper in the purchaser’s hands, so an unmarked set of contracts leaves the earlier lender dependent on the ordinary knowledge analysis.
The words “other than the purchaser” limit the rule to a marking that points to someone else.55 A lender whose own name appears on the stamp, and who later takes the paper as a purchaser, cannot be said to know that it is violating its own rights, so the marking supplies no deemed knowledge and the ordinary conditions of subsection (b) apply to that lender. The legend must also identify the assignee. A marking that points to no particular assignee does not trigger the deeming rule, though a purchaser that actually learns from it that the purchase would violate someone’s rights is still tested under the actual-knowledge standard.
Subsection (a) reaches the same protection by a different route. When the earlier lender’s claim is merely to proceeds of inventory, the purchaser faces no knowledge condition, so subsection (f) has nothing to attach to. Subsection (a) instead writes the legend into its own conditions by requiring that the paper not indicate an assignment to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.56 Together the two provisions mean that a stamp defeats the purchaser whether the earlier lender claims merely as proceeds or something more.57 A lender therefore need not first decide how its claim would be classified before it marks the paper. By its terms, subsection (f) also reaches instruments under subsection (d), where an indication of assignment on the instrument carries the same consequence.58