Concept
The Four Protected Takers
Holders and purchasers of negotiable instruments
The Four Protected Takers
Section 9-331(a) names four takers whose rights Article 9 leaves untouched: a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, a protected purchaser of a security, and a qualifying purchaser of a controllable account, controllable electronic record, or controllable payment intangible.1 The newest of these terms is the controllable payment intangible, which the 2022 amendments define as a payment intangible evidenced by a controllable electronic record under which the account debtor undertakes to pay whoever has control of the record under § 12-105.2
Each entry is a label for a status that another article defines: Article 3 for the holder in due course, Article 7 for due negotiation, Article 8 for the protected purchaser, and Article 12 for the qualifying purchaser. The section confers no priority on the label alone. These takers have priority over an earlier security interest, even a perfected one, only "to the extent provided in" those articles.3 A taker must therefore pass the defining article's own test before it wins anything.
The sections below work through the first of the four, the holder in due course, because it is the taker a filed lender most often meets. The other three follow in later sections.
Elements of Due Course Status
Section 9-331(a) protects a holder in due course without saying what one is. Article 3 supplies the definition, and it also sets how far the protection reaches.4 Under § 3-302(a), a holder in due course is a person in possession of a negotiable instrument as a holder who takes it for value, in good faith, and without notice of any claim to the instrument or defense against it.5 Articles 1 and 3 define value, good faith, and notice, and a course on negotiable instruments treats those definitions in full. Here the concern is how the elements fit together and what they win.
The elements demand a clean transaction before a taker may cut off anyone else's rights. Value shows that the taker gave up something and would suffer if an earlier claim revived. Good faith and the absence of notice show that the taker relied on the paper rather than on a flaw it already knew about. Together they require a thoroughly honest and fair transaction.6 The cost falls on the earlier claimant, which could have guarded its proceeds with a device such as a lockbox.7
The first four steps show that the taker is a genuine participant in the market for paper, and they are usually easy. A creditor that takes an indorsed check in payment of an existing debt meets them without strain, as the check scenario earlier in this chapter shows.9 The fifth step is where priority contests are fought, because the secured party's case is usually that the taker knew of the lien. A later subsection takes up what counts as notice.
Once the taker qualifies, Article 3 gives it two kinds of freedom, and only one decides a priority contest. A holder in due course takes free of claims to the instrument under § 3-306 and, under § 3-305, free of most defenses and claims in recoupment.10 A claim is a third person's assertion of ownership or a lien in the instrument itself. A defense is a reason that someone obligated on the instrument gives for refusing to pay, such as a complaint that goods bought with the check were defective. A security interest in the instrument is a claim of the first kind, which is why § 9-331(a) works together with § 3-306. Freedom from defenses protects the taker against the obligor, and it does not settle who wins between a secured party and a taker.
Because Article 3 removes the claim, Article 9's ranking rules never get a chance to operate. A holder in due course takes the instrument with priority over a security interest in it even if that interest is perfected, and the order in which the two arose makes no difference.11 An unperfected interest fares no better: if perfection does not protect a security interest against a holder in due course, its absence cannot either. The analysis should therefore start with the taker's status rather than with filing dates, because a taker that is a holder in due course makes the dates irrelevant.
In Agriliance, L.L.C. v. Runnells Grain Elevator, Inc. a grain elevator, as drawer, mailed a check for a debtor's grain-harvest proceeds to the debtor's landlords even though it knew of a prior perfected security interest. The landlords qualified as holders in due course and took free of that interest.12 The drawer's knowledge of the lien changed nothing, because the landlords' own status decided the case. The secured party's claim ran against the check itself, which is exactly the kind of claim a holder in due course takes free of.
A fact pattern can break the chain at other steps as well. A taker that knew of the lien fails at step five, and a taker whose paper is not a negotiable instrument fails at step one. The second failure calls for a caution, because Article 9 uses the word instrument more broadly than Article 3 uses negotiable instrument. A purchaser of a nonnegotiable note, which Article 9 still treats as an instrument, can never be a holder in due course, so § 9-331(a) gives that purchaser nothing. It may have another route under § 9-330(d), which protects a purchaser of any instrument, negotiable or not, who gives value and takes possession in good faith without knowing that the purchase violates the secured party's rights. That protection operates only against a security interest perfected by a method other than possession.13
Secured Party as Holder
Nothing in § 9-331(a) confines holder-in-due-course protection to takers who are strangers to the debtor.15 A holder, including a secured party, in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the instrument with priority over a security interest in it, even if the conflicting interest is perfected.16 The status turns on the Article 3 elements, so a lender that takes a check for value, in good faith, and without notice of a competing claim qualifies just as a supplier or a landlord would. Article 3 tests the quality of the transaction, and a lender that advances money or cancels a debt in exchange for a check has relied on the paper as any buyer would. That the lender's own claim is a security interest therefore does not stop it from beating another secured party's earlier lien on the instrument.
Secured-party status does limit how much of the instrument the taker can claim. When a taker holds only a security interest in the instrument, § 3-302(e) lets it assert holder-in-due course rights only up to the unpaid amount of the obligation the interest secures.17 Suppose Payee negotiates Maker's $1,000 note to Holder as security for Payee's $600 debt to Holder, and Maker has a defense against Payee of which Holder has no notice. Holder is a holder in due course to the extent of $600. As to the remaining $400 of face amount, Holder has only a security interest, so its rights stop at the amount of the secured debt.18 The cap follows the reliance that earns the protection. Holder put $600 at risk on the strength of the paper and nothing more, so treating it as a holder in due course for the whole note would hand it a windfall at the obligor's expense, or at the earlier secured party's expense in a priority contest. The ceiling is measured by the unpaid obligation, so it falls as the debt is paid down.
Section 9-331(a) does not repeat the cap, and it need not, because it preserves a holder in due course's rights only "to the extent provided in" Article 3. Every limit Article 3 sets therefore travels with the holder into the Article 9 contest.19 Article 9 adds nothing and subtracts nothing. A lender that holds a check merely as collateral for a loan faces a ceiling measured by the loan. A creditor that takes the check outright in payment of a debt holds the instrument itself, and § 3-302(e), which speaks only to a holder of a security interest, does not apply to it.20
The hardest version of the problem arises when a debtor pays a junior secured creditor by indorsing over checks that came from the debtor's own customers. Suppose a senior creditor holds a prior perfected interest in the debtor's inventory and receivables. The checks are identifiable proceeds of that collateral, so the senior lien reaches them unless a take-free rule intervenes.21 The junior creditor will often be unable to use § 9-330(d), which requires that it lack knowledge that the purchase violates the senior creditor's rights.22 Its protection then has to come from holder-in-due-course status under § 9-331(a), which depends on good faith and the absence of notice.23 A junior creditor in this position usually knows that the senior lien exists and may know that the debtor must turn proceeds over to the senior creditor. Whether that knowledge amounts to notice of a claim, or defeats good faith, is unsettled. The official comment to § 9-331 discusses the point in equivocal terms, so an answer that treats it as settled in either direction overstates the law.24
Several considerations favor protecting the junior creditor. From the senior creditor's side, a junior creditor's receipt of a customer's check by indorsement looks much like the debtor collecting the check and paying the junior creditor from general funds. In that case the junior creditor would take the money free of the senior interest unless it acted in collusion with the debtor under § 9-332.25 Collusion is a demanding standard that calls for a genuine bad actor, and knowing that a payment violates the senior creditor's rights does not by itself satisfy it.26 Because the § 9-331 cases sit so close to the § 9-332 cases, courts may reasonably be somewhat more willing to find good faith here than in other settings.27 The comparison has an outer edge. When the debtor is going out of business and the junior creditor collects accounts by telling account debtors to pay it directly, the senior creditor is likely to be hurt, and collections of that kind may fall short of the fair dealing that good faith requires.28
Notice Defeats Status
Section 9-331(a) rewards only a taker that actually is a holder in due course, and Article 3 excludes anyone who takes with notice of a claim to the instrument.32 A taker with actual knowledge of a competing security interest in a check therefore cannot qualify, and § 9-331(a) gives that taker nothing. Notice is the element most likely to decide a priority contest, because the secured party's best argument against a taker of paper is almost always that the taker knew.
The rule protects reliance. A holder in due course cuts off competing claims because it had only the paper to go on, and the law wants paper to circulate on the strength of what it shows. A taker that knows of a competing claim holds information the paper does not contain, and letting it eliminate the claim would turn a protection for the innocent into a way to defeat a creditor the taker knew about. Article 3 asks for a thoroughly honest and fair transaction, and taking with knowledge of an adverse claim falls short of it.33 The statute asks what the taker took without notice of, so the taker's own knowledge controls.34 What the drawer who wrote the check or the debtor who indorsed it knew carries no weight.
The two Agriliance decisions mark the line from either side, and the failing side comes first. In Agriliance, L.L.C. v. Farmpro Services, Inc. checks from the sale of a debtor's crop were mailed to a secured party that had agreed to subordinate its own interest to a competing secured party's interest.35 The subordination agreement gave that secured party knowledge of the competing claim, and a taker with that knowledge could not be a holder in due course of the proceeds check.36 Its knowledge came from its own agreement, which is why the status failed.
In Runnells, the knowing party was someone else. The drawer, a grain elevator, mailed a crop-proceeds check to the debtor's landlords despite having notice of a prior perfected security interest, and the landlords took free of that interest as holders in due course.37 The drawer's knowledge was irrelevant because the drawer was not the party claiming priority. The landlords were, and they took without notice of their own. Both cases involved a check for a debtor's crop proceeds, a competing secured claim, and a taker asserting freedom from it. They differ in whose knowledge was in play: in Farmpro the taker knew, and in Runnells the drawer knew while the taker did not.
Notice also operates across the whole instrument. A holder in due course must take without notice of any claim to the instrument and without notice that any party has a defense or a claim in recoupment, so a taker that knows of one competing claim cannot qualify even as to a defense it never heard of.38 In the standard illustration, a corporate payee's president indorses a check to a buyer of his personal automobile, and the buyer knows the president will use the money for himself. That knowledge gives the buyer notice of the corporation's claim that its officer breached his trust. The buyer has no notice of the drawer's separate complaint that the goods paid for were defective, yet the buyer is still not a holder in due course, and the drawer may raise the defense against the buyer.39 Carried into a priority contest, the same logic means that a creditor who knows of a lender's lien on a check has notice of a claim to the instrument. That single piece of knowledge costs it the status and the protection of § 9-331(a).
Losing due course status does not end every argument, because §§ 9-330(d) and 9-332 offer separate routes, which the backstop sections later in the chapter take up. The first of them, though, asks the same question about the taker's knowledge.40 For the secured party, the lesson is that its public filing is not what defeats the taker's status. As the check scenario earlier in this chapter showed, the filing gave the taker no notice,41 so the secured party must prove what the taker actually knew. The proof may come from a subordination agreement, a loan document the taker read, or a warning from the lender, and facts about what the drawer or the debtor knew add nothing.
Takers Outside Article 3
Section 9-331(a) protects a holder in due course only to the extent that Article 3 provides, so a taker that Article 3 excludes from the status gets no priority under the subsection, however much it paid.43 Section 3-302(c) draws the exclusions, and what the excluded takers share is the way the instrument reached them. Each may have paid full value and acted honestly. A taker cannot be a holder in due course when it acquires the instrument in any of these ways:
- by legal process, or by purchase at an execution, bankruptcy, or creditor's sale;
- by purchase as part of a bulk transaction that is not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business; or
- as successor in interest to an estate or other organization.44
Each route moves the instrument by operation of law, by the sale of a business's assets as a whole, or by succession, and none involves a taker who bargained for a particular piece of paper and relied on what it shows. The law answers by treating the taker as standing in the transferor's shoes, a result known as the shelter principle: a transferee of an instrument acquires the rights its transferor had under § 3-203(b).45 The taker is exactly as well off as the transferor was, and its own good conduct adds nothing. If the transferor held the instrument subject to a perfected security interest, so does the taker, and § 9-331(a) has no holder in due course to protect. If the transferor was itself a holder in due course, the same principle passes those rights along, so the exclusion costs a taker something only when the transferor's own position was weaker than a holder in due course's.
A fact pattern will usually present the excluded taker as an innocent one: it paid full price, acted honestly, and never heard of the lien. Those facts satisfy the elements studied earlier and still do not decide the question, because the first inquiry is how the taker obtained the instrument.
A buyer who obtains the same note from the debtor by indorsement and delivery, paying a comparable price in good faith and without notice of the lien, stands on the other side of the line. That buyer took by negotiation rather than by legal process, so it can be a holder in due course and, under § 9-331(a), take priority over the lender's earlier perfected interest.46 When the taker falls into one of the excluded categories, the subsection gives it no priority and the contest falls to the ordinary Article 9 rules. In one setting federal law runs the other way: when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation takes over an insolvent bank in a purchase-and-assumption transaction, federal law gives it holder-in-due-course status.47