Concept
Defining Possessory Liens
Priority of liens arising by law (§ 9-333)
Defining Possessory Liens
Section 9-333 gives one kind of lien priority over a security interest, so the first job is to say which liens belong to that kind. Subsection (a) defines a “possessory lien” as “an interest, other than a security interest or an agricultural lien” that satisfies three further conditions.1
The lead-in already sorts out two neighbors. A security interest is a consensual lien, one that arises from the agreement of the owner of the property.2 An agricultural lien comes from a statute outside the Code, yet Article 9 governs its perfection and its priority against security interests.3 The definition therefore leaves it to Article 9’s own treatment, which a later section takes up.
The definition matters because of what it unlocks. Subsection (b) gives a possessory lien on goods priority over a security interest in the same goods, unless the statute that created the lien expressly provides otherwise.4 A rule that lets one creditor beat a secured lender needs a firm entry requirement, and the three conditions supply it. A lien that fails any one of them is not a possessory lien, and subsection (b) does not reach it.
The conditions put three questions to the claimant. What did the lienor do? Where did its lien come from? How does the lien work? The first condition looks to the work furnished, the second to the lien’s source in law, and the third to the lienor’s possession of the goods.
Services or Materials Furnished
The first condition, in § 9-333(a)(1), looks at what the lienor did. The lien must secure “payment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person’s business.”5 That sentence sets three requirements: the obligation must be a debt for services or materials, the work must have been done with respect to goods, and the person who did it must have acted in the ordinary course of business. A claimant must satisfy all three, because each one screens out a different kind of creditor.
One state’s repair-lien statute shows the kind of debt the condition has in mind. It gives a lien to a person who “renders any service or furnishes any material in the making, repairing, improving, or enhancing the value of any inanimate personal property,” for “the agreed or reasonable compensation for the service and material,” and the lien lasts while the property is lawfully in that person’s possession.6 A garage that repairs a debtor’s car is the model case. Suppose a lender holds a perfected security interest in the car. The garage’s repair bill is a debt for services and materials furnished with respect to the car, so it satisfies the first condition. The lien statute fixes the amount of the lien; § 9-333(a)(1) says only what kind of obligation the lien must secure.
The phrase “with respect to goods” fixes what the lien is a claim against. A contractor whose lien attaches to land and a building worked on real property, and a lender holds a claim for money advanced; neither furnished services or materials with respect to goods, so neither holds a possessory lien. The statute’s verbs, making, repairing, improving, and enhancing value, show the kind of work the condition contemplates, and the same statute lets the person who did the work retain possession until paid.7
The ordinary-course requirement asks who the claimant is, not how good its work was. A shop whose business is repair qualifies when it fixes a customer’s goods. Someone who fixes goods once, as a favor, does not, however skillful the job and however willing the debtor was to have it done.
A claimant that clears all three steps has satisfied only the first condition. The other two ask where the lien came from and whether possession of the goods is what makes it effective.
Created by Statute or Rule of Law
The second condition, in § 9-333(a)(2), asks where the interest came from. It must be one “created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person” who furnished the services or materials.9 The first condition looked at the lienor’s work; this one looks at the source of the lienor’s right. A qualifying lien is nonconsensual: it exists because a legislature or a court decided that creditors of this kind should have it, and the debtor’s agreement plays no part in creating it. The wording also ties this condition to the first, because the law must give the lien to the very person who furnished the work.
Either kind of lawmaker can supply the source. Liens on a debtor’s property are usually created by statute, but sometimes by court decision.10 The words “rule of law” reach the judge-made liens, so a common-law artisan’s lien qualifies just as a statutory one does. A repairer in a state whose lien rests on court decisions stands where a repairer in a state with a lien statute stands.
The definition insists on a source in law because the priority in § 9-333(b) goes only to liens the law grants. An interest the debtor grants by agreement is a security interest, and the lead-in excludes security interests from the definition. That exclusion keeps the parties from placing a favored creditor ahead of a lender simply by labeling the creditor’s interest a lien.
A shop that took no paper and relied on its state’s repair-lien statute would hold an interest created by statute in its favor, and this condition would be met. Students most often go wrong by treating the debtor’s consent to the work as consent to the lien. The statute quoted earlier makes the owner’s assent to the work, “express or implied,” a condition of the lien, but it is the statute, not the owner, that creates the lien.11 The agreement supplies the price, and the law supplies the lien. A shop remains free to take a security interest as well, but that interest ranks under the ordinary Article 9 rules and cannot borrow the priority of a possessory lien.
Some lien statutes also speak to priority. The statute quoted above makes the lien subject to all prior liens of record unless the lienholders of record receive notice and give written consent.12 Subsection (b) defers to a statute that expressly provides otherwise, a point developed in the section on statutes that provide otherwise.
A legal source clears only this condition. An agricultural lien also arises from a statute outside the Code, yet the definition excludes it by name.13 A statutory lien that does not depend on the lienor’s possession fails the third condition, which comes next.
Effectiveness Depends on Possession
The third condition, in § 9-333(a)(3), asks how the lien works once it exists. Its effectiveness must depend “on the person’s possession of the goods.”15 The person is the lienor who furnished the services or materials, so the lien must be one that operates only while that lienor holds the goods. The condition describes the lien’s design, not where the goods happen to be. A claimant that holds the goods when the dispute arises does not qualify if its lien would work just as well with the goods elsewhere. The word “possessory” in subsection (b) is what this condition enforces.16
Repairers’ liens are built this way. The statute quoted earlier gives the lien while the property is lawfully in the repairer’s possession and lets the repairer retain possession until the compensation is paid.17 Many statutory and common-law liens on personal property share the feature, and in those cases the lien is lost if the lienholder gives possession to the debtor or to someone else.18 Gadgets Repair, which fixed Ace’s cash register for $750 and kept it, holds this kind of lien. Its hold on the register is what makes the lien effective, so the third condition is met for as long as Gadgets keeps the register.
A release of the goods before payment is where the condition most often defeats a claimant.
The lien ended when possession ended.19 The lender’s consent to the repairs never entered the analysis, so the lender did nothing to win the contest and simply benefits from a competitor’s disappearance.
The possession requirement also explains why the priority belongs to this kind of lien. In general, nonpossessory liens tend to be viewed as “secret liens” and do not fare well against perfected security interests.20 A lien that exists only while the lienor holds the goods avoids that criticism, and one that works without possession does not. Filing, not possession, drives the neighboring contest with a federal tax lien: the tax lien is inferior to the interest of a holder of a security interest until notice of the tax lien is filed, so a security interest perfected before the notice has priority.21
A lien that never depended on possession is not a possessory lien, and it never reaches the question of surrender.
One species of statutory lien that does not depend on possession, the agricultural lien, Article 9 treats in its own provisions, and a later section takes it up.22
A lien that passes all three tests is a possessory lien. It secures a debt for services or materials furnished on goods in the lienor’s ordinary course of business, it arises by statute or rule of law, and it works only while the lienor holds the goods. The next section applies the priority rule to such a lien.