Concept
Statutes That Provide Otherwise
Priority of liens arising by law (§ 9-333)
Statutes That Provide Otherwise
The fourth requirement of § 9-333 is the one that can reverse the outcome for a lien that otherwise qualifies. A possessory lien on goods outranks a security interest in the goods “unless the lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise.”1 The full test makes the same point from the other direction. The lien must be possessory, must secure services and materials furnished in the ordinary course of the lienholder’s business, must arise under a statute or rule of law other than Article 9, and must depend on possession for its effectiveness. In addition, the statute creating it must not expressly provide otherwise.2 A lienor who meets the first three requirements therefore stays on top unless the lien statute itself says something different. The analysis reduces to three questions, asked in order: Does a statute create this lien? Does that statute speak to priority? If it does, what rule does it state?
The first question disposes of liens that rest on court decisions. The exception speaks of a lien “created by a statute,” and a lien that exists because courts recognized it has no statutory text that could provide anything, expressly or otherwise.3 The test treats a lien created by “a statute or rule of law” alike through its third requirement, and its fourth looks to “the statute creating the possessory lien.”4 A common-law lien never trips that requirement, because it has no such statute.
The second question asks whether the statute speaks to priority, and the word “expressly” makes silence the repairer’s friend. A statute that defines the qualifying work, fixes the lien at the agreed or reasonable price, and lets the repairer keep the goods until paid, but never mentions other lienholders, does not provide otherwise. The repairer who holds the goods ranks first.5 The tempting error is to reason that the lender filed first and therefore wins. That brings back the filing-date comparison that the possessory-lien rule displaces. A court looks for words in the lien statute that change the order, and it does not infer subordination from the statute’s general shape.
The third question arises when the statute does speak, and then the statute’s own rule governs. State statutes that create liens commonly state rules for their priority.6 One repair-lien statute gives a person who renders service or furnishes material in repairing or improving inanimate personal property, with the owner’s assent, a lien for the agreed or reasonable compensation while the property is lawfully in that person’s possession. It then makes the lien “subject to all prior liens of record,” unless notice is given to all lienholders of record and written consent is obtained from all of them, in which event the repairer’s lien is prior to the liens of record.7 That single sentence is a complete priority scheme. It states a default of subordination, names the condition that reverses the default, and fixes the result once the condition is met. Other statutes write their own rankings in the same way. The federal tax lien statute, treated below, declares the tax lien inferior to the interest of a holder of a security interest until notice of the tax lien has been filed, so a security interest perfected before the filing beats the tax lien.8
The two shops hold the same kind of lien on the same kind of goods. What separates them is what each did under the statute before starting work, and the lien statute, not Article 9, decides what that conduct is worth.