Concept
Other Article 9 Overrides
Alienability of debtor’s rights (§ 9-401)
Other Article 9 Overrides
Section 9-401(a) sends the question of a debtor's power to transfer its rights in collateral to law outside Article 9, except as subsection (b) and §§ 9-406 through 9-409 provide.1 Subsection (b) answers one kind of restriction, a term in the debtor's own agreement with its secured party. The four remaining sections answer restrictions written somewhere else, either in the debtor's contract with a third party or in a rule of law. Each makes the restriction ineffective to prevent a security interest from attaching.2
The sections divide by asset, and each reaches both contract terms and legal rules that restrict assignment:
- Sections 9-406 and 9-408 cover accounts, chattel paper other than leases, general intangibles, and promissory notes.
- Section 9-407 covers leases.
- Section 9-409 covers letters of credit.
Each override works at one moment, attachment. What the secured party may then demand from the person who owes performance is a separate question, taken up in the later treatment of enforcement, and attachment does not answer it.3
The design follows from what debtors own. Payment rights, leases, and letter-of-credit rights are contract rights, and the contracts that create them often limit assignment. If such a term could stop a security interest from attaching, those rights would be useless as collateral, and every counterparty would hold a veto over the debtor's borrowing.
Receivables and Promissory Notes
A debtor's right to be paid by someone else usually arises under a contract with that person, and the contract may restrict assignment of the right. Sections 9-406(d) and 9-408(a) deal with the restriction. A term in an account, chattel paper (other than a lease), general intangible, or promissory note is not effective to prevent attachment if it requires the obligor's consent to the debtor's grant of a security interest or purports to prevent the grant.4
The obligor is the person obligated on the collateral. On an account, that person is the account debtor: when A sells goods to X on credit, X's obligation to pay is an account, and X is the account debtor.5
The override confirms in text what most courts were already doing. Under prior law such a prohibition was in theory given effect, but in practice most courts construed purported prohibitions so as to make them ineffective. Section 9-406(d)(1) of the 1999 text states the rule for accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes.6
The statute reaches clauses that require the obligor's consent as well as clauses that forbid the grant outright, so the result would be the same had the contract said S needed B's consent before granting any security interest.7
Attachment is only the first of two questions. The second, whether the secured party may then enforce against the obligor, belongs to the later treatment of enforcement, but the Code already draws one limit. When the assignment falls in one of the transactions below and the anti-assignment clause or anti-assignment law would otherwise make it unenforceable, the obligor need not render performance to the secured party:
- a sale of a payment intangible;
- the creation of a security interest in a general intangible;
- an assignment of a promissory note;
- an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable; or
- an assignment of letter-of-credit rights.
The list comes from §§ 9-408 and 9-409, and it is short.8 A no-assignment clause on a note therefore raises two questions that come apart: whether the lender's interest attaches, and whether the lender can collect from the maker. Check the asset against the list before you answer the second.
One limit protects individuals. The attachment rule may be subject to other law that establishes a different rule for an account debtor or obligor who incurred the obligation primarily for family, personal, or household purposes.9 When the obligor on a receivable is an individual who bought for the home, check whether such other law changes the answer before you apply the override.
Legal Rules Barring Assignment
A restriction on assignment does not always come from a contract. Some bodies of law outside Article 9 have developed principles that prohibit assignment of certain types of rights even where no agreement says anything about it. Section 9-401(a) respects that law only in small part, and Article 9 then supplies a very large set of exceptions.11
For most rights the exception is stated flatly. If a legal rule prohibits or conditions assignment of the debtor's rights in accounts, chattel paper (including a lease), promissory notes, or general intangibles, that rule is not effective to prevent attachment of a security interest in those rights. The provisions are §§ 9-406(f), 9-407, and 9-408(c).12 The rule operates even where the contract says nothing about assignment, so no clause need appear for the restriction to exist. Article 9 nonetheless treats the legal rule like the contract term at attachment: neither prevents it.
The override settles attachment only. What D may demand from S belongs to the later treatment of enforcement, and a reader who takes attaches despite the legal bar to mean that S must perform for D has merged two questions. The example itself shows how they come apart: creating a security interest in a general intangible is on the list of transactions in which the obligor need not render performance to the secured party when a legal rule would otherwise make the assignment unenforceable, so S need not perform for D.13 Letter-of-credit rights receive the same attachment rule, which the last subsection below develops.
The override carries the same qualification as the contract-term rule. It may be subject to other law that establishes a different rule for an obligor who incurred the obligation primarily for family, personal, or household purposes, as § 9-406(h) provides.14
The two accounts differ in one fact, the purpose for which the obligor incurred the debt, and that fact decides whether Article 9's override or the other law controls. A stem that mentions a statute or doctrine against assignment is testing whether you ask who the obligor is and why the obligation was incurred before you apply the override.
Lease Terms
Section 9-407(a) carries the override into leases. A lease term that prohibits the creation of a security interest in either party's rights under the lease, or requires the other party's consent to the creation of one, is not effective to prevent attachment of the security interest to the debtor's rights under the lease or to the debtor's residual rights in the leased property.16
Because the rule speaks of either party's rights, either side of the lease may be the debtor. A lessee may grant a security interest in its rights as lessee, and a lessor may grant one in its residual rights in the leased property. In each case the clause is overridden for attachment, and the lender's interest reaches the rights the debtor actually holds. Without the override, a consent clause in the lease would give the other party a veto over the debtor's borrowing, even though the security interest attaches only to the debtor's own rights.
Keep § 9-407 apart from § 9-401(b), which answers a similar question about a different document. Section 9-401(b) governs an agreement between the debtor and its secured party: a term that prohibits a transfer of the debtor's rights in collateral, or makes the transfer a default, does not prevent the transfer from taking effect.17 Section 9-407 governs a term in a lease, which binds the debtor and the other party to the lease and not the lender. Both sections defeat the clause, but the correct one depends on which document contains it.
Had the same words appeared in the bakery's agreement with its own lender instead of in the lease, § 9-401(b) rather than § 9-407 would govern. As elsewhere in this family, the override concerns attachment. What the secured party may then do against the other party to the lease is a matter for the later treatment of enforcement.18
Letter-of-Credit Rights
Section 9-409(a) applies the same pattern to letters of credit. A beneficiary waiting for payment under a letter of credit may want to borrow against its right to be paid, a letter-of-credit right, and the letter may name the issuer (the bank that issues it), the applicant (the customer who requested it), or a nominated person as someone whose consent is required. A term in the letter that purports to prohibit the creation of a security interest in the right, or to require the consent of the issuer, applicant, or nominated person, is ineffective to prevent attachment.20
The restriction may also come from letter-of-credit law, customs, and practices that prohibit or condition assignment of the right on the consent of the issuer, applicant, or nominated person. Those rules, customs, and practices are likewise ineffective to prevent attachment under § 9-409(a).21 A lender taking a letter-of-credit right as collateral would otherwise need agreement from every person the term or the practice names.
Attachment settles the lender's interest in the right, not what the issuer owes the lender. Letter-of-credit rights appear on the list of assignments in which the obligor need not render performance to the secured party when a term or rule would otherwise make the assignment unenforceable, so the issuer in this hypothetical need not pay the lender.22
The overrides cover only the assets the statute lists. A restriction on any other asset returns to § 9-401(a), under which other law decides whether the debtor's rights may be transferred.23
The overrides also leave untouched a separate question, whether the secured party has authorized a disposition free of its interest. A right to proceeds is not such an authorization: the fact that the secured party has a right to the proceeds obtained upon disposition of the collateral under § 9-315(a)(2) is not an express or implied authorization to dispose of the collateral free of the security interest.24