Concept
Real Estate Parallel
Subordination (§ 9-339)
Real Estate Parallel
Section 9-339 governs priority in personal property and does not reach a mortgage on land, but real estate finance arrives at the same idea by its own route: a lienholder that ranks first may agree to rank behind one that ranks second. Real estate lawyers call the arrangement a subordination, because a senior interest holder voluntarily subordinates its rights to those of a junior interest holder.1 The structure matches the Article 9 rule, which leaves the person entitled to priority free to subordinate by agreement.2
Mortgage priority starts from the first-in-time principle: the lien that comes first ranks ahead of those that follow. Exceptions exist. In most states a purchase money mortgage, one given to acquire the property itself, can outrank other liens even if they were recorded before it, a status usually called superpriority. In many states a mechanics' lien can outrank a later-recorded mortgage.3 Lienholders can also agree among themselves to change the order that would otherwise apply. The textbook case is a construction loan on undeveloped land. A bank will not lend to build unless it ranks ahead of the bank that financed the purchase of the land, so the owner negotiates a subordination agreement that reverses the two lenders' priorities in a foreclosure.4
Three questions follow, and the subsections below take them in order. How precisely must a seller's advance promise to subordinate describe the loan? What does a valid agreement override? How far does it reach when loan money leaves the project?
Specific Terms Required
The commonest setting for a real estate subordination is a developer who buys raw land with seller financing. The seller conveys the land for a down payment and takes a note for the balance, secured by a purchase money mortgage. The developer then needs construction money, and a construction lender normally demands a first lien, because its mortgage could otherwise be extinguished if the purchase money mortgagee foreclosed.5 The seller must therefore agree to rank behind the construction loan before the project can be financed. Sellers accept that position because the development is expected to raise the land's value, which makes a second mortgage on improved land better security than a first mortgage on unimproved land. The seller can usually demand a higher purchase price as compensation.6
The seller makes its promise in advance, before any construction loan exists, and the promise takes one of two forms. In the first, the parties agree that subordination occurs automatically when the construction mortgage is executed. In the second, the seller agrees to sign a formal subordination on request once the loan is obtained.7 Under the first form the ranking changes at the moment the construction mortgage is signed, with no further act by the seller. Under the second, the ranking changes only when the seller signs, so until then it rests on a promise still to be performed. Either way, the seller commits to a loan that has not yet been made.
Because of that, the agreement must describe the construction loan adequately, and courts refuse to enforce one that does not, since it is impossible to tell what has been promised.8 The rule serves both sides of the bargain. Every dollar of construction debt that ranks ahead of the seller's mortgage reduces what is left for the seller at a sale, and a seller who was never told how large the prior loan would be cannot measure the priority it surrendered. A judge asked to enforce the promise, for her part, must be able to say what it covers, and an agreement that names no amount and no terms gives her nothing to enforce.
Courts generally agree that the maximum amount of the construction loan must be stated, and many also require a cap on the interest rate. They disagree about whether the maturity, the use of proceeds, or other loan details must be spelled out.9 The two terms on which courts converge are the ones that bound the size of the prior claim: the maximum amount limits the principal that will rank ahead of the seller, and the rate cap limits how fast interest can add to it. Some courts will enforce a less detailed agreement when the missing terms are left to an institutional construction lender, reasoning that institutional lenders are bound by regulation, custom, and usage to impose reasonable loan terms.10 That reasoning depends on who will fill the gaps, so it offers little support to an agreement that leaves the terms to a lender without such constraints.
The second contract does not settle every jurisdiction's answer. A court that also demands a maturity date or a statement of the use of proceeds may find even that contract too thin, and a court that defers to institutional lenders may enforce less. On an exam, state the amount, and often the rate cap, as the common core, then note that courts split on the rest.
Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina v. Smith shows how far such an agreement reaches. A purchase money mortgage ordinarily carries superpriority, and the parties may subordinate it by agreement, but the express terms are strictly construed because the agreement eliminates the superpriority usually attributed to such mortgages.12 The seller surrenders what the words clearly surrender and nothing more. The same decision supports a second proposition: the superpriority of the subordinated purchase money mortgage is reinstated if the debt terms are materially changed without first obtaining the subordinated mortgagee's consent.13 Reinstatement applies the logic of the description requirement. The seller consented to rank behind a loan on stated terms, and a materially different loan is one the seller never agreed to rank behind.
Conshohocken Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Period & Country Homes, Inc. marks the limit of reinstatement. The court there refused to nullify a subordination agreement and restore the purchase money mortgage's priority merely because the construction loan failed to achieve its intended purpose and the infusion of capital did not save the project.14 The two decisions divide along a line the seller's own bargain draws. A material change in the debt terms departs from the loan the seller agreed to, so superpriority returns. The failure of a project financed on the agreed terms is a risk the seller accepted when it subordinated, one it could price into the sale, so the subordination stands.
Agreement Over Recording Acts
Mortgage priority begins from default rules, so the useful question in a mortgage problem is what the agreement displaces. The power to subordinate belongs to the senior lienholder, as § 9-339 leaves it to the person entitled to priority.16 The defaults come in layers. The base layer is chronological: priority usually follows the order of recording, and a junior lienholder collects from foreclosure proceeds only after the senior debt is paid.17 Recording acts add a second layer, protecting a later taker against an earlier interest that was never recorded, in one of three forms. A race statute gives priority to whichever claimant records first, whatever it knew. A notice statute protects a later purchaser who paid value without notice of the earlier interest. A race-notice statute protects a later purchaser who paid value, lacked notice, and recorded first. The purchase money rule is the third layer: a mortgage given to acquire the property can, in most states, take priority over other liens even if they were recorded beforehand.18
A subordination agreement displaces all three layers. Lienholders may agree among themselves to change the order of priorities that would otherwise apply, and the agreed order governs in a foreclosure.19 The reason lies in whom each default rule protects. A recording act protects a later taker who relied on a clean public record, and the purchase money rule protects the party who financed the acquisition, so each shields someone who never bargained with the claimant it outranks. A subordination agreement is a bargain among the very parties whose ranking it changes, which leaves nothing for the default rules to protect. When a stem supplies a recording statute, an unrecorded mortgage, and a signed subordination agreement, the agreement controls.
The recording act rewards a later taker that was innocent of the earlier interest, and in March the bank qualified: it paid value, lacked knowledge, and recorded. In June its position changed. It signed an agreement that names the credit union's mortgage, so it could no longer present itself as an innocent taker, and it voluntarily placed itself behind the credit union. The credit union's failure to record also drops out of the analysis, because its June priority rests on the bank's promise and not on the public record. The result is the same under a notice statute or a race statute, since each is a default rule for ordering creditors who have not dealt with each other.
The agreement also overrides purchase money priority. A purchase money mortgage ordinarily outranks other liens, and its holder may nevertheless agree to rank behind another lender.20 The override reaches only as far as the agreement's express terms, which courts read strictly, and it binds only those who made it. The subordinating lienholder gives up its own place in line; a creditor that never joined the agreement keeps the position the default rules gave it, just as under § 9-339 the power belongs to the person entitled to priority.
Diverted Loan Funds
A seller who subordinates a purchase money mortgage in advance consents to rank behind a particular construction loan used for a particular job, and a subordination by agreement reaches only as far as the agreement does.22 Trouble starts when some of the loan money goes somewhere else. Project failure, as the reinstatement discussion showed, leaves the seller's subordination intact. Diversion is different, because the seller never agreed to rank behind money that left the project.
Miller v. Citizens Savings & Loan Ass'n is the leading illustration. The sellers there sold several lots to Westglen Corp. and took a purchase money mortgage containing a subordination agreement.23 A purpose clause stated the reason for the subordination and the uses to which the disbursed loan funds could be put, among them improving the land and paying hazard insurance. Westglen borrowed a total of $349,500 from Citizens Savings & Loan Association, gave it a deed of trust, and built houses on the lots. Most of what Citizens paid out satisfied the purpose clause, but about $26,341 went to other purposes. The houses did not sell, Westglen defaulted and gave the property back to the sellers, and the court had to decide whether the sellers' mortgage was subordinate to that $26,341.
The court read the agreement to subordinate the purchase money mortgage only to loan funds used for a purpose the agreement outlined, and it held that the $26,341 did not have priority over the sellers' mortgage because its use fell outside the purpose clause.24 The reasoning follows from what the seller gave and received. The seller accepted second position in exchange for improvements that raise the land's value, and the purpose clause writes that exchange into the agreement. Money spent on improvements delivers what the seller bargained for. Money spent elsewhere strengthens the lender's claim against the property while adding nothing to it, so the seller would lose rank and receive nothing in return. The reading also leaves the risk of diversion with the construction lender, which controls the disbursements and decides when and to whom its money is paid.
One loan thus produces two kinds of dollars, and the lender's deed of trust ranks on both sides of the seller's mortgage. The order is as follows:
- The construction lender is paid first, for the funds properly applied to the project.
- The seller's purchase money mortgage is paid second, for its full amount.
- The construction lender is paid last, for the funds that were diverted.25
The seller keeps the whole of its mortgage in the middle position. As to the diverted portion the seller never subordinated, so the lender's claim for those dollars ranks behind the seller's. As to the properly applied funds the seller did subordinate, and the diversion does not undo that.
The $20,000 difference between those two outcomes is the whole effect of the rule. It moves a loss that diversion would have laid on the seller onto the lender, which was in a position to prevent it. The rule also has a limit that matters on an exam. Diversion changes the ranking only as to the diverted dollars, so the lender still outranks the seller for every dollar that went into the project, even if the project later failed. In Miller itself the houses did not sell, yet the contest concerned only the $26,341 that fell outside the purpose clause.26 A stem that says a project failed has not told you the seller regained priority. A stem that says part of the proceeds was spent outside the stated purposes has told you the seller outranks the lender for that part.
Some authority goes further and restores the seller to first-lien priority across the board when the construction lender breaches an express condition to subordination.27 That remedy fits a different kind of term. A purpose clause marks out what the loan money may be used for, and the remedy tracks it dollar by dollar. A condition to subordination goes to whether the subordination takes effect at all, so its breach can reasonably cost the lender its whole position. When an exam question involves diverted proceeds, state the proportional rule first, and mention the broader remedy only where the agreement makes a stated condition a prerequisite to the subordination.