Concept
Discharge Requires Payment
Discharge of the account debtor and effect of notification
Discharge Requires Payment
Section 9-406(a) rewards one act: paying. Subject to the statute's other subsections, an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until, but not after, it receives a notification signed by the assignor or the assignee. The notification must say that the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt, the account debtor discharges its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge it by paying the assignor.1 The earlier sections of this chapter worked on the timing half of that rule, the moment of receipt that divides safe payments from unsafe ones. The rule has a second half, which asks what the account debtor must have done before that moment to earn a discharge. The statute names a single act, payment. It does not say that any dealing with the assignor that happens to precede notification will do, and that omission decides cases.
The two limits answer different problems. Until a notification arrives, nothing in the account debtor's dealings tells it that its creditor has changed, so the timing limit protects it while it remains in the dark. The payment limit protects the assignee. A payment puts money in the hands of the party who was left collecting. A cancellation or similar arrangement moves no money at all; it extinguishes the right the assignee acquired, in a transaction the assignee has no way to observe. If such dealings discharged the account debtor, an assignor and an account debtor could together dissolve the assignee's right at will.
In Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. B.C.B.U., the account debtor was the lessee under an equipment lease assigned to Wells Fargo. The lease had been cancelled before B.C.B.U. received any notification of the assignment, and B.C.B.U. learned of the assignment only when Wells Fargo sued. B.C.B.U. argued that an account debtor may discharge its obligation by dealing with the assignor before notification, so that the cancellation stood. The court rejected the argument on the statute's own terms. Under California's version of § 9-406, the defense is discharge by paying the assignor before notice of the assignment, not by other dealings such as cancelling the lease. B.C.B.U. had paid nothing, so the discharge provision did not help it.2 The judgment rested on a different provision. The lease's waiver-of-defenses clause was enforceable by Wells Fargo as assignee under California's counterpart to § 9-403, and B.C.B.U. had established no defense cognizable under that statute.3 That provision is a subject for another reading.
Discharge therefore has two requirements, and either can fail alone. A payment to the assignor after notification meets the act requirement but fails on timing. A cancellation before notification, as in Wells Fargo, meets the timing requirement but fails on the act. Only a payment made before notification earns the discharge.
A dealing short of payment may still affect the assignee under other provisions, even though it discharges nothing here. The defense "I have paid that" is not a defense arising from the transaction that gave rise to the contract. A defense that does arise there is, for example, a claim that the contract may be avoided for the assignor's fraud, and Article 9 gives that kind of defense more leeway in its rules on defenses against an assignee.4 Likewise, whether an account debtor and an assignor may change the assigned contract in good faith, as by renegotiating the price term of a contract whose payment right has been assigned, is a question for the modification rule in § 9-405. That rule looks to good faith and to how much of the right to payment has been earned by performance.5 Those provisions belong to neighboring readings. The discharge rule in § 9-406(a) asks only whether the account debtor paid.
On an exam, the tempting move is to see the words "before notification" and stop. Timing is half of the inquiry, and the facts must supply the other half.