Concept
Anti-Assignment Terms
Discharge of the account debtor and effect of notification
Anti-Assignment Terms
When a notification arrives, an account debtor has one more objection to try: the assignment was never allowed. Its purchase contract may say that the right to payment cannot be transferred, or a statute or regulation may restrict transfers of that kind. If the objection worked, the account debtor could disregard the notification, keep paying the assignor, and leave the assignee with a right that exists only on paper. Section 9-406(a) anticipates the problem by stating the discharge rule subject to the later subsections, among them (b) through (i) and (l),1 and two of those subsections, (d) and (f), take the objection away from the account debtor in most settings.
The reason is commercial. Debtors would like to keep their creditors from assigning contract rights, because it is easier not to deal with an assignee. But the power to assign contract rights is a major source of financing for businesses, so Article 9 promotes assignability, and attempts to restrict it are usually ineffective.2 The account debtor also gives up little. When its only duty is to pay money, a change in the person to be paid is not ordinarily material,3 and the discharge rule already tells it when and to whom to pay.4
The restrictions come in two kinds. Subsection (d) governs private terms, written into the account debtor's own agreement with the assignor. Subsection (f) governs restrictions imposed by law, through a statute, regulation, or other rule of law. Both answer the same practical question: when the account debtor points to a restriction, does the notification still bind it? The last two topics in this unit mark where the notification rule stops applying at all.
Contractual Restrictions
Section 9-406(d) disposes of the objection an account debtor is most likely to raise: its contract with the assignor forbids assignment. A term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor, or in a promissory note, is ineffective to the extent that it prohibits, restricts, or requires the account debtor's consent to the assignment or transfer of the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or note, or to the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in it.5 A term is equally ineffective to the extent that it provides that the assignment or security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy.6 For this purpose, a promissory note includes a negotiable instrument that evidences chattel paper.7 A drafter who wants to discourage assignment has two techniques, a direct bar or consent requirement and a penalty for assigning, and the statute neutralizes both.
Ineffective means what it says: the clause has no effect whatsoever. It does not prevent the assignment from taking effect between the assignor and the assignee, and the prohibited assignment is not a default under the agreement between the account debtor and the assignor.8 The discharge rule does the rest. After the account debtor receives an effective notification, it may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge it by paying the assignor,9 and a clause with no effect gives it no reason to do otherwise. A payment to the assignor made in reliance on the clause discharges nothing. A student who treats the clause as a reason the notification does not bind has skipped the subsection that removes the clause from the analysis.
The two halves of subsection (d) answer different worries. The flat prohibition or consent requirement gives way because the account debtor's stake in who receives its money is small and the commercial need to assign receivables is large. Under prior law such a prohibition was in theory given effect, but most courts construed purported prohibitions so that they accomplished nothing, and the current rule completes that development.10 The penalty clauses are covered for a reason of their own. If only the flat prohibition were ineffective, a customer could reach nearly the same result by providing that any assignment is a default or entitles it to terminate, and an assignor facing that threat would hesitate to assign. Removing the penalty along with the ban makes the removal of the ban real.
Article 2 points the same way for rights to payment for goods sold. Its general rules on assignment are subject to § 9-406, which makes those rights to payment, whether or not earned, freely alienable notwithstanding a contrary agreement or rule of law.11
The override reaches only the rights that subsection (d) names, accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, and only to the extent stated.12 A right to receive goods is a different matter. It falls outside (d), and Article 2's general test governs: unless otherwise agreed, a right may be assigned unless the assignment would materially change the other party's duty, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on it by its contract, or materially impair its chance of obtaining return performance.13 The line tracks the reason for the rule. A party whose only duty is to pay money is not ordinarily affected by who receives it; a party that must deliver goods or services to whoever holds the right may be.
Three limits narrow subsection (d) even for rights to payment. Subsection (e) provides that (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale made through a disposition under § 9-610 or an acceptance of collateral under § 9-620; the earlier treatment of sold payment intangibles explains that carve-out.14 Subsection (k) provides that (d) does not apply to a security interest in an ownership interest in a general partnership, limited partnership, or limited liability company.15 And the opening clause of (d) yields to §§ 2A-303 and 9-407 and is subject to subsection (h), provisions this unit does not develop.16
On an exam, when a problem quotes an anti-assignment clause and asks whether the notification binds the account debtor, classify the right and the transaction first. For an account or chattel paper, the clause is ineffective, and the analysis returns to the signature, content, and timing questions of subsection (a).
Statutory Restrictions
Section 9-406(f) carries the override from private contracts into public law. Subject to subsection (k), to §§ 2A-303 and 9-407, and to subsections (h) and (i), a rule of law, statute, or regulation is ineffective to the extent that it prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper.18 The rule mirrors the two halves of subsection (d). One clause reaches a rule that bars the assignment, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest, or conditions any of them on someone's consent.19 The other reaches a rule providing that the assignment or security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account or chattel paper.20
The reasons that disarm contract clauses apply equally to legislation and regulation. The account debtor's stake in who receives its money is small, and the commercial need to assign receivables is large. The list of consents in the text also includes that of the account debtor itself, so a statute cannot hand the account debtor a veto over its own creditor's financing. A rule that made the act of assigning a ground for termination or a defense would discourage assignment as effectively as a flat ban, which is why the second clause is there.
The effect on discharge follows directly. An account debtor stands where every account debtor stands under § 9-406(a): it may pay the assignor until it receives an effective notification, and after receipt it may discharge its obligation only by paying the assignee.21 An account debtor that cites the statute as a reason to ignore the notification, and keeps paying the assignor, has made a payment that discharges nothing. Removing the restriction removes only the objection to the assignment itself. The notification must still be signed, must state the assignment, and must direct payment to the assignee, so the earlier sections of this chapter still govern what makes it effective.
The words to the extent limit how much of a restrictive rule falls away. Only the part that prohibits, conditions, or penalizes the assignment or the security interest drops out; the statute or regulation stays in force for every other purpose it serves. A regulation governing how the agency processes invoices is untouched, while its sentence requiring consent to assignment is ineffective. The source of the restriction also does not change the result. A statute carries more authority than a clause in a purchasing form, but for this purpose both restrict assignment, and § 9-406 treats them alike.
Subsection (j) approaches the problem from another direction. In the uniform text it provides that § 9-406 prevails over any inconsistent provision of the statutes, rules, and regulations that follow, and what follows is a bracketed instruction to list them.22 The bracket is a placeholder: each enacting state fills it with its own inconsistent laws, so the contents of the list vary by jurisdiction. Subsection (f) states the general principle, and a state's list names particular laws that conflict with it. Unless a problem hands you a state's list, subsection (f) does the work; if it does, the question is whether the named statute yields to § 9-406.
Subsection (k) marks the limit of the override. Subsections (d), (f), and (j) do not apply to a security interest in an ownership interest in a general partnership, limited partnership, or limited liability company.23 The text does not say why. The likely reason is that an ownership interest in such an entity is more than a right to be paid, so a restriction on who may become an owner serves interests that a restriction on an account does not. Whatever the reason, a lender holding a security interest in a borrower's LLC membership interest cannot invoke subsection (f) against a statute restricting who may become a member.
The collateral categories also matter on the face of the two subsections. Subsection (f) names accounts and chattel paper, while subsection (d) also names payment intangibles and promissory notes.24 An examinee should not assume that (f) reaches every right to payment.
Controllable Accounts
Section 9-406(l), added by the 2022 amendments, switches off subsections (a), (b), (c), and (g) for a controllable account or controllable payment intangible.26 Subsection (a) is the discharge rule at the center of this chapter, and its opening clause already states that it is subject to (l).27 For a controllable account, the question whom the account debtor must pay leaves Article 9 and is answered in Article 12.
Article 12 governs the transfer of property rights in intangible digital assets such as bitcoin and other virtual currency, and it gives a purchaser of a controllable electronic record attributes of negotiability.28 Its discharge rule, § 12-106, applies to an account debtor that has undertaken to pay the person that has control of the controllable electronic record evidencing the obligation.29 Control is the operative fact, because control of the record affords the right to collect from the account debtor.30 A rule keyed to notice of assignment would ask the account debtor to track a fact other than the one that decides who may collect.
The two regimes therefore ask different questions. Under § 9-406 the account debtor asks whether it has received a notification that the right to payment was assigned. Under § 12-106 it asks who has control of the record and whether it has received an effective notification that control was transferred. The rule has the same shape as the Article 9 rule. The account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the person having control, and may also discharge it by paying a person that formerly had control. It may not discharge it by paying the former controller once it receives an effective notification that control was transferred, and after receipt it discharges its obligation in accordance with the notification.31
A notification is effective under § 12-106(b) only if it meets all five of these requirements:32
- It is signed by the person that formerly had control or by the transferee.
- It reasonably identifies the controllable account.
- It notifies the account debtor that control of the controllable electronic record evidencing the account was transferred.
- It identifies the transferee in any reasonable way.
- It provides a commercially reasonable method by which the account debtor is to make payments to the transferee.
The third requirement shows where the notification is aimed. A notification under § 9-406(a) reports an assignment and directs payment to the assignee; this one reports a transfer of control. The fifth gives the account debtor a workable way to carry out the instruction, since it is being asked to redirect payment to a party it may never have dealt with. The rules on when a notification is ineffective, on proof of the transfer of control, on what counts as reasonable proof, and on non-waiver appear in § 12-106(d) through (h).33
An ordinary account sits on the other side of the line. A retailer that buys goods on open account, with its obligation shown on invoices and on no controllable electronic record, owes an account that is not a controllable account. Section 9-406(a) governs: the retailer may pay the seller until it receives a signed notification of assignment, and after receipt it may discharge its obligation only by paying the assignee.34 The retailer and the distributor are treated differently because only the distributor owes a right to payment evidenced by a record that directs payment to the person in control.
The usual error is to apply the notice-of-assignment test whenever a fact pattern uses the word assigned. A second error is to assume that any digital record brings Article 12 into play, when the account must be evidenced by a controllable electronic record under which the account debtor undertakes to pay the person in control. Subsection (l) also names only four subsections, so the remaining subsections of § 9-406 are not switched off by it.35
Instruments and Other Obligors
Section 9-406(a) protects an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible, and the rest of the rule is written for payors of those three kinds of rights.37 The safe harbor before notification, the cutoff on receipt, and the contents of an effective notification apply to no one else. The maker of a negotiable note is outside the list. Its discharge by payment is governed by Article 3, which asks whether the payment went to the person entitled to enforce the instrument.38 The controlling fact is the status of the person who receives the money, and a notification of assignment is not part of the test.
The two systems use different tests because the two kinds of rights move differently. An account passes by assignment, which the account debtor may never see, so § 9-406(a) makes the notification the line between safe and unsafe payment. An instrument is paid to the person entitled to enforce it, so Article 3 tests the payee.
The Article 3 rule is simple to state. A party obliged to pay an instrument is discharged by paying a person entitled to enforce it, and two narrow exceptions qualify that result. The payor is not discharged if it knows of an injunction against payment or has accepted indemnity against loss, and it is not discharged if it knows the instrument has been stolen and pays a person it knows to be in wrongful possession.39 Absent one of those exceptions, the payor is discharged even if it knows another person claims the instrument. The full catalogue of Article 3 discharge rules belongs to a separate reading.
Article 3 also offers a second route to discharge that resembles the Article 9 result. Amended § 3-602(b) (2002) deals with a person entitled to enforce an instrument who transfers it without notifying the parties obligated to pay. If one of those parties then pays the transferor, the payment is effective even though it was not made to the person entitled to enforce the instrument.40 For a payor never told of the transfer, the outcome looks like the protection § 9-406(a) gives an account debtor that pays the assignor before notification. The rule operates under Article 3, however, and only for instruments.
The same boundary reaches obligors on other kinds of collateral. The rights of such an obligor against the secured party depend on the terms of the contract or right assigned, the rules of Article 9, and the other law governing assignment of that type of obligation.41 Controllable accounts and controllable payment intangibles show the pattern from the other direction: § 9-406 does not apply to them, and § 12-106 supplies the rule for paying the person who has control of the controllable electronic record.42 Where a right is evidenced or transferred in a way that carries its own payment rules, Article 9 imposes no second set.
The restaurant's position is the one the cornerstone rule describes: after receipt of the notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge it by paying the assignor.43 The usual error is to carry that rule to every obligor on a promise to pay money. A note signed by the buyer looks like a debt, and the debt has been assigned, but the classification of the right decides which body of law answers the discharge question. Before applying the signed-notification analysis, identify the type of right the obligor owes. An account, chattel paper, or payment intangible sends the problem to § 9-406(a), an instrument sends it to Article 3, and any other collateral sends it to the law that governs that obligor.