Concept
Remedies After Default
Including secured party’s collection rights (§ 9-607)
Default Remedies and Collection Rights
Remedies After Default
Section 9-601(a) opens every post-default remedy in Article 9, and its first sentence says when those remedies arrive: after default, a secured party has the rights provided in Part 6 and, except as § 9-602 provides otherwise, the rights provided by agreement of the parties.1 Three questions follow from that sentence. What counts as default? Where do the secured party's rights come from, and how far may a contract reshape them? And must the secured party have perfected before it may use them? The three subsections below take those questions in order.
The answers matter because Part 6 (§§ 9-601 through 9-628) contains the rights that distinguish a secured lender from an unsecured one.2 After default, the secured party may:
- repossess the collateral (§ 9-609);
- collect directly from an account debtor or from an obligor on an instrument, and take control of any proceeds to which it is entitled (§§ 9-607, 9-608);
- sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral (§§ 9-610, 9-611, 9-615, 9-617, 9-618, 9-624); or
- propose to take the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, the remedy called strict foreclosure (§§ 9-620 through 9-622, 9-624).3
Judicial enforcement stays open beside these remedies. Section 9-601(a)(1) lets a secured party reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim or security interest by any available judicial procedure,4 and when the collateral is documents, § 9-601(a)(2) lets it proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods they cover.5 When one security agreement covers both real and personal property, the secured party may use Article 9's default procedures for the personal property or proceed exclusively under real estate law for both.6
Many of these remedies carry conditions that run in the debtor's favor. A proposal to keep the collateral, for example, works only with the debtor's consent. The debtor consents by agreeing to the terms in a record authenticated after default, or by failing to object within 20 days after the secured party sends the proposal. Silence is never consent to a partial satisfaction, so a secured party that wants a partial strict foreclosure must obtain the debtor's authenticated agreement.7 The collection remedy of § 9-607 is the subject of the sections that follow.
Default as the Trigger
Part 6 turns on a single event, default. Before it, none of the rights listed above is available, so a creditor that repossesses, collects, or sells under Part 6 must be able to point to a default that has already happened.8
Article 9 never says what a default is. Contract law generally governs whether one has occurred, and it follows that the debtor's breach of any term of the security agreement is a default.9 As one treatise puts it, default is "whatever the security agreement says it is," limited only modestly by the unconscionability doctrine and the requirement of good faith.10
The Code leaves the term open because the risks differ from one financing to the next. When the collateral is goods, default clauses commonly cover the loss, damage, destruction, or removal of the goods and the debtor's failure to maintain insurance on them, and a careful lawyer studies the transaction and writes in whatever protects the creditor against risks to its interest in the collateral.11 The most typical default is failure to pay when due, but the agreement may, and often does, name other events.12
Compass Bank v. Kone shows how detailed these lists can get. The security agreement there listed as events of default the loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale, or encumbrance of any collateral and the making of any levy, seizure, or attachment on it. It also listed the death, dissolution, termination of existence, insolvency, or business failure of the debtor or any guarantor or surety, the appointment of a receiver, an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and the commencement of bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. Upon default, the agreement gave Kone the immediate right to possession of the collateral.13
The agreement's control cuts both ways. A secured party may invoke the default provisions only when an event of default set out in the agreement has occurred, and taking default action without one may expose it to liability to the debtor.14 Suppose a debtor dies immediately after making a monthly payment, nothing is in arrears, and the agreement does not make death an event of default. A creditor that repossesses at once acts improperly and may owe the debtor's executor, administrator, or heirs damages for the losses the repossession caused, and possibly punitive damages.15 Had the agreement resembled the one in Kone, which lists death, the same event would have opened the remedies.
The same freedom works at the other end. If the agreement defines no events of default, a failure to pay is probably the only one. If it defines default narrowly, as a payment more than ten days overdue, for instance, a payment five days late is not a default, because the parties may define default in any way they choose and the definition is an enforceable contract term.16
A listed event can also fail as a trigger when the creditor's own conduct has made it unusable. A creditor that routinely accepts late payments teaches the debtor that lateness is tolerable, and the law holds the creditor to that lesson until it announces a change. Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau held that a creditor with the contractual right to repossess, having repeatedly accepted late payments, must notify the debtor that strict compliance will be required before it may lawfully repossess.17 The court followed Nevada National Bank v. Huff, a case it called remarkably similar on its facts, in which the debtor had been late on every payment and at times two or three payments behind.18
Estoppel supplies the reason. By repeatedly accepting late payments, and occasionally assessing late charges, the secured party induced the debtor's justified reliance on the belief that late payments were acceptable, and the debtor's continued pattern of irregular payments shows that reliance.19 The default clause survives the pattern of tolerance; the pattern adds a duty to warn before the clause is used. Other authority describes the same result as waiver of the right to enforce on recurrence of the same events, a waiver the secured party reverses by notifying the debtor that strict compliance will be required in the future.20
The rule costs the creditor something. A letter restores strict compliance, but if the creditor then accepts another late payment, that acceptance can again operate as a waiver of the rights the letter asserted, and a second notice is required.21
An exam stem that recites months of late payments accepted without protest invites the answer that the debtor is in default because the agreement says late payment is a default. That answer skips the step that decides the problem, which is whether the creditor has since warned the debtor that strict compliance is required. Well-drafted agreements usually say that a failure to enforce a default does not waive the right to call future defaults, but courts do not always enforce such clauses, so a non-waiver clause is a point to raise in the analysis and not a guaranteed answer.22
Statutory and Contractual Rights
After default, each side holds rights from two sources. The secured party has the rights Part 6 provides and, except as § 9-602 provides otherwise, those provided by agreement.24 The debtor and any obligor, such as a guarantor, hold the same pair: the rights Part 6 provides and those provided by agreement, subject to exceptions in § 9-601(g) and § 9-605.25 All of these rights are cumulative, and although the parties' agreement may speak to enforcement, Article 9 restricts their ability to alter some of its provisions on the subject.26 That restriction is the subject of this subsection.
The agreement counts as a source because Article 9 lets the parties decide matters such as what amounts to default. It stops counting where a clause cuts down a right Part 6 gives the debtor. Section 9-602 lists the Part 6 provisions that give rights to a debtor or obligor and impose duties on a secured party, and the debtor cannot waive or vary any of them in the security agreement, except as § 9-624 permits.27 The list runs to thirteen subsections that cross-reference twenty-one provisions, most of which protect debtors when their property is seized and sold.28 The protected rights include:
- the duty of a secured party that repossesses without judicial process to do so without a breach of the peace (§ 9-609);
- the rules on disposition of collateral, including notice (§§ 9-610(b), 9-611, 9-613, 9-614);
- the duty to account for or pay surplus proceeds (§§ 9-608(a), 9-615(d));
- the rules on applying or paying noncash proceeds (§§ 9-608(a), 9-615(c)); and
- the rules on collection and enforcement of collateral (§ 9-607(c)).29
Courts have long distrusted agreements that cut back the debtor's rights after default. A comment to the pre-revision Code observed that the legal system has traditionally looked with suspicion on agreements that cut down the debtor's rights and free the secured party of its duties, because the default situation offers great scope for overreaching. No mortgage clause, it noted, has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption, the mortgagor's right to get the property back by paying the debt. The 1999 Code has no such comment, but the same policy underlies its non-waiver provisions.30 The list rests on a deeply rooted attitude that debtors need protection from their creditors when default rules are drafted.31
Courts police the protected duties by looking at a disposition as a whole. A low price is not by itself enough to establish a violation of Part 6, but it suggests that a court should scrutinize every aspect of the disposition to be sure each was commercially reasonable.32
The prohibition would be too rigid if it froze every detail of performance, and § 9-603(a) supplies the first safety valve. It lets the parties agree on the standards measuring how a secured party fulfills its duties, so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.33 Where the Code requires a reasonable action, the agreement can say in advance what counts as reasonable. The duty stays in place, and only its measure is agreed. The debtor cannot waive its right to notice of the sale, but the agreement may supply reasonable details about how and when notice will be given.34 The statute gives no guidance on when a merely unreasonable standard becomes manifestly unreasonable. In practice the standards that appear in security agreements concern how notice is given, how much time must pass between notice and sale, and what counts as a commercially reasonable resale, and these rarely cause trouble.35
One subject is closed to agreed standards altogether. Section 9-603(b) bars the parties from setting any standard for what amounts to a breach of the peace in a self-help repossession.36 A breach of the peace may create public safety problems for people who never signed the agreement, so the contracting parties have no authority to decide in advance where the line falls.
The second safety valve is § 9-624, which lets the debtor waive some of the protected rights, but only after default. After default the debtor may waive the right to notification of the disposition of the collateral, the requirement of mandatory disposition when the collateral is consumer goods, and, except as to consumer goods, the right to redeem. The waiver must be made in an authenticated record.37 Timing fits the policy behind § 9-602, since the protections apply before default and the permitted waivers come only afterward.38 Section 9-624 names only these three rights, so the other protected rights, such as the breach-of-the-peace rule and the rules on collection, are not among those the debtor may waive.
Because these rules interlock, a problem that presents a contract clause about post-default rights is best run as a short sequence that sorts the clause into the right category.
Enforcement Without Perfection
Section 9-601(a) gives its post-default rights to a secured party and attaches no condition of perfection or priority.40 The status the secured party needs is a security interest created through a security agreement, which lawyers call attachment. Perfection, often accomplished by filing a financing statement, is a separate second step, and a secured party can exercise its Article 9 remedies with only the first.41
The debtor's own signature on the security agreement is what exposes the debtor to the remedies. Perfection works on a different relationship, the one between the secured party and others who may claim the same collateral, so a missing filing gives the defaulting debtor no excuse. The rules for achieving perfection and for ranking competing claimants belong to other readings.
The bankruptcy court in re ProvideRx of Grapevine, LLC applied this reasoning. CERx's liens on some of its collateral, which included patent applications and the source code and other intellectual property related to them, were unperfected when it held its December 13, 2012 public sale. The court held that this did not affect the validity of the liens as between CERx and PM, or CERx's ability to dispose of its collateral under the Texas UCC.42 It began from the statutory text. The relevant Texas provisions speak in terms of a secured party, defined as a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement.43
The missing filing also did not remove the notice question. The court went on to examine what CERx had sent, and it held as a matter of law that the transmittal letter and notice of disposition gave PM actual notice of the claimed lien and of the proposed disposition.44 An unperfected secured party therefore keeps its remedies, and its conduct is still tested under the rules that accompany them.
The question to ask first is whether the interest was created through a security agreement, not whether the lender filed, because that status decides whether any Part 6 right exists at all.
An exam stem that stresses the lender's failure to file is therefore asking whether a competing claimant is present. Where none appears, the missing filing changes nothing about the remedy against the debtor.