Concept
Price and Reasonableness
Commercially reasonable disposition
Price and Reasonableness
Debtors who contest a foreclosure sale usually start with price: the collateral would have brought more. Article 9 answers that complaint twice, and the two answers pull in opposite directions.
The first answer protects the creditor from hindsight. Section 9-627(a) provides that the fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different method from the one the secured party selected is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from establishing that it acted in a commercially reasonable manner.1 The words of itself keep a better-price showing from ending the case alone, although it may still count as one fact among several. The verb preclude makes the provision a shield for the creditor, not a declaration that price is irrelevant. The rule answers a practical problem: only on rare occasions will a repossession sale bring the highest bids or the highest value for the collateral, so a debtor can nearly always say that another date, place, or buyer would have paid more. If that statement were enough, a creditor that sold in good faith and in a commercially acceptable way could still lose its deficiency. One court accordingly held that a secured creditor who has conducted such a sale may not be held liable to the debtor or be deprived of a deficiency judgment, even where the price is low.2
The yardstick debtors favor, the retail price, overstates what the creditor could have collected. A retail sale will in most cases command a much higher price, but it also generates reconditioning, advertising, commission, and insurance expenses and takes much longer, which adds storage expense and lets interest accrue on the debt. Hall v. Owen County State Bank therefore concluded that a sale to a dealer on the wholesale market will probably be the more reasonable approach in most cases.3
The second answer protects the debtor. A low price is not itself sufficient to establish a violation, but the official comment says that “a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable.”4 The instruction follows from what the aspects of a sale are for. The deficiency varies inversely with the sale price, so the tests of method, manner, time, place, and terms are proxies for insufficient price, and their importance lies almost exclusively in how far they protect against an unfairly low price.5 A price far below value is the symptom, and the court's task is to find the aspect that failed, if one did. It must look before it concludes, because a low price may simply reflect a greatly depreciated piece of collateral.6 Price is not itself an aspect of the sale, so reasoning backward from a low price to a finding of unreasonableness is incorrect. Even so, the authors of one treatise suspect that a price lower than the court thinks right is the single most important fact in most of these cases: a high price will likely save the creditor whatever it did, while a low price may put the most scrupulous creditor in trouble.7
A Better Price Is Not Enough
Section 9-610(b) fixes what the court examines: every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable, and if it is, the secured party may sell by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.9 The court therefore studies the choices the creditor actually made. A showing that a different choice would have produced a higher number answers another question, and § 9-627(a) keeps that showing from standing in for proof that the real sale went badly. Decisions under former § 9-507(2), the pre-1999 counterpart, made the same point in slightly different words.10 Most cases decided under former § 9-504 also remain good law, although the commentary to § 9-610 and the text of § 9-627 modify them in limited ways.11
Courts apply the rule by asking what the debtor has offered besides a higher figure. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Russell, the creditor sold the debtors' car at a wholesale auction that only dealers may attend, and it showed that the auction was a well-recognized market for hundreds of area dealers. Once a creditor shows that it disposed of collateral in compliance with the statute, commercial reasonableness is presumed, and the debtor must raise a genuine issue for trial.14 The dealer who bought the car at that auction later resold it, but the retail buyer was not available when the creditor sold, and the debtors offered no specific evidence of unreasonableness in the method of sale. Summary judgment for the creditor was therefore proper.15 A disposition “in the usual manner on any recognized market” also falls within the first of the three safe harbors, which the next section takes up.16
The debtor in K.B. Oil fared no better. Ohio's counterpart to the old rule provides that a better price obtainable by a sale at a different time or in a different method is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not commercially reasonable,17 and the record showed extensive marketing efforts to elicit a fair price or bid for the trucks. The debtor's assertions of what the market price should have been could not raise a genuine issue of material fact, and the court affirmed summary judgment for the creditor.18
The rule also covers a creditor that departs from its usual method for a reason. In Automotive Finance Corp. v. Smart Auto Center, Inc., an auction would not have yielded a good price for certain Canadian vehicles because of their mileage problems, so the creditor sold them to someone who knew how to deal with such vehicles. The court held that the creditor's prior relationship with that dealer, without more, did not make the disposal commercially unreasonable.19
What the debtors in these cases lacked was a fact about the sale itself. The Russell court contrasted an earlier decision, Hertzberg, in which the debtor knew someone who wanted to buy the repossessed truck, and the credit company ignored that buyer and sold at its usual auction. The court found a material fact issue because the creditor followed its usual method even though a willing buyer was available.20 A buyer who was present and willing when the creditor sold bears on how the creditor conducted the sale, while a retail buyer who appeared only after a dealer bought the car at auction does not. A later resale can still carry weight when it follows quickly at a disproportionately higher price, and the next subsection takes up how much.21
Guidebook and catalog figures, the numbers debtors often cite, deserve the same caution. The Code does not treat a Bluebook price for a used automobile or the catalog price of a baseball card as a “current price” on a recognized market, a point developed in the next section.22
An exam fact pattern that lists the debtor's complaints, such as a retail sale would have paid more, a dealer resold the collateral later, or a private sale would have done better, asks whether you stop at the price. The words not of itself sufficient mean that price alone does not decide the dispute, and they do not make price irrelevant. The analysis moves on to what else the record shows about the method, manner, time, place, and terms of the sale.
A Low Price Invites Scrutiny
Whatever § 9-627(a) says about hindsight, price decides these disputes in practice. One treatise concludes that, despite the subsection's disclaimer, “the price received will ultimately be, in fact, the talisman.” The same authors observe that deficiency suits produce most of the law under this part of Article 9, because a debtor who owes no deficiency likely cares little how much the creditor received.23
A low price opens an inquiry and does not end one. The court first asks whether something other than the creditor's conduct explains the number. Hall directs closer attention to sales with a substantial difference between sale price and fair value, to determine whether legitimate causes such as a depressed or nonexistent market explain the gap or whether the secured party's failure to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner produced it.24 A Tennessee court confronted with a Lear jet resold about a year after its purchase treated the great disparity between the two prices as raising the question whether the total circumstances showed that the secured parties took every step prevailing practice considers reasonable to ensure a fair price. The court acknowledged that failure to procure the best price is not in itself unreasonable and that reasonableness is primarily assessed by the procedures employed, but it added that “a sufficient resale price is the logical focus of the protection given debtors.”25
Three features most reliably turn that inquiry into a demand that the creditor prove its process. The first is a quick resale at a much higher price. A showing that the collateral was sold only a short time later, after little or no reconditioning, at a substantially or disproportionately higher price may strongly imply that the secured party failed to receive a fair price.26 The second is thin bidding. A sale that drew only one or two bids is not invalid as a matter of law, but it receives the closest scrutiny and should be declared invalid where the evidence shows collusion, self-dealing, or bad faith, and the time and place of the sale must be reasonably calculated to bring a satisfactory turnout of bidders.27 The third is a buyer with a connection to the seller, which adds the possibility of self-dealing. Where the gap between disposal and sale prices is marked and the possibilities for self-dealing are substantial, courts have required some affirmative showing that the terms of the disposition were in fact commercially reasonable, and without it they will deny recovery of a deficiency.28 Each feature weakens the assumption that competing buyers set the price, and the creditor's own account becomes the main evidence that the price was fair.
Scrutiny reaches every aspect of the sale, including its timing, which a later section treats in full. In Otten, as a later court described it, the collateral was sold some thirteen months after the co-signer took possession, no proceedings were ever taken for sale under the Code, and the excuses offered for the delay were immaterial or unsupported by the evidence. The later court found Otten clearly distinguishable from the case before it.29 Delay can have a good reason. If the best advertising medium is published only biweekly or monthly, the need to advertise may conflict with the need to sell quickly, but the creditor must be able to prove that reason at a deficiency trial, so it should record why it waited.30
The same low price appears in cases that come out opposite ways, and the difference lies in the evidence around it. In K.B. Oil, the record was replete with evidence of the creditor's extensive marketing efforts to elicit a fair price or bid for the trucks, and the debtor's assertions about the market price could not raise a genuine issue.31 In Coxall v. Clover Commercial Corp., a lender sold a Lexus that the debtors had bought about four months earlier for $8,100 for $1,500, which is 18.5% of the purchase price, and the price was all the evidence of commercial reasonableness the court had. The lender offered no evidence that any prospective buyer was contacted other than the original seller, and no evidence of the car's fair market value or of any other reason that would justify the price. The court held that the lender failed to sustain its burden of showing that the sale was commercially reasonable.32
The creditor in K.B. Oil won because its marketing explained the number, and the creditor in Coxall lost because nothing explained the number but the number itself. A debtor who brings only a price and its own valuations stands where the lender in Coxall stood, with the roles reversed. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Lanier is an example: the debtors' showing went no further than the price and their valuations, and the court declined to infer unreasonableness from the price alone, which fits the rule that reasoning backward from a low price to a defective sale is incorrect.33 Coxall and Lanier thus mark the poles, a creditor with nothing but a price and a debtor with nothing but a price. The allocation of the burden of proof gets its own treatment in Proving Reasonableness, and the cases here show how much turns on it: Coxall held the lender to its burden, while Russell presumed reasonableness once the creditor showed compliance with the statute.34
An exam stem that reports a low price and asks whether the sale was commercially reasonable is asking what else the record shows. A wide gap, a connected buyer, a quick resale, or few bids with no evidence of marketing points toward failure. Documented marketing and a debtor who offers only a valuation point toward reasonableness.