Concept
Three Safe Harbors
Commercially reasonable disposition
Three Safe Harbors
Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including its method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.1 The secured party acts under § 9-610(a), which lets it sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.2 Given the uncertainty involved in dispositions, creditors look for ways to minimize their risk, and § 9-627(b) appears to offer them three “safe harbors” into which they may sail.3
The subsection provides that a disposition is made in a commercially reasonable manner if it is made4 in the usual manner on any recognized market,5 at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition,6 or otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.7 Article 9 deems a disposition that fits any of these categories per se commercially reasonable,8 so the creditor holds its answer before a court examines the sale.
The harbors are narrower than they first appear. Comment 3 calls them neither “required nor exclusive,” so a sale that fits none of them is not unreasonable for that reason alone.9 Two of the three depend on a recognized market, which Comment 4 confines to settings with standardized price quotations for essentially fungible property, such as stock exchanges. Most repossessed collateral is used goods, which almost never have a current price on a recognized market, so by far the most important category is the third, the harbor for reasonable dealer practices.10
Each harbor measures the sale against something outside the creditor's own judgment: how a market ordinarily transacts, what a market is currently paying, or what dealers in that kind of property customarily do. The sections below take the three in that order.
Usual Manner on a Recognized Market
Section 9-627(b)(1) protects a disposition made “in the usual manner on any recognized market.”11 The creditor must meet two conditions: the sale must occur on a recognized market, and it must proceed the way that market ordinarily works. The second condition is easy to apply once the first is met, so nearly all the difficulty lies in the phrase recognized market. Ordinary speech would stretch it to any established marketplace with regular customers. Comment 4 does not. It calls the concept “quite limited” and confines it to cases where “there are standardized price quotations for property that is essentially fungible, such as [those on] stock exchanges.”12 Property is fungible when any unit can stand in for any other, as one share of a class of stock stands in for another.
Other sources draw the same boundary. A standard summary of the per se rules defines a recognized market as one where there are standardized prices for property that is essentially fungible,13 Comment 9 to § 9-610 excludes markets where prices are “subject to individual negotiation,”14 and § 9-610(c)(2), in the setting of a private disposition, speaks of collateral “of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.”15 Together they give the term three features: standardized price quotations, essentially fungible property, and prices that are not negotiated item by item.
The limit presumably tracks the places where a market can be trusted to set the price. On an exchange the quotations are public and every share is interchangeable, so a seller who transacts in the usual way has little room to depress the result. Where each item is priced through its own negotiation, the seller's choices matter more, and a court has more to examine.
The usual error is to treat any organized auction as a recognized market, since an auction is regular and public and draws many buyers. The Code's test asks how the price is formed, and a crowded room does not answer that question. Presumably the drafters agree with the cases holding that special auctions and other markets where used cars are sold do not qualify.16
The credit union is not without a route to safety. If all or at least many of the financial institutions in the community sell repossessed vehicles in that market, the sale conforms to reasonable commercial practice and is commercially reasonable on that ground.17 What the credit union lacks is only the (b)(1) label, and under (b)(1) the label decides the question.
A creditor that misses this harbor loses only the advance answer. The harbors are neither required nor exclusive, so the sale is judged on its circumstances or under another harbor.18 The next harbor relies on the same definition of recognized market but looks at the price at which the sale closed instead of the manner in which it was conducted.
Price Current in a Recognized Market
Section 9-627(b)(2) protects a disposition made “at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition.”20 Subsection (b)(1) asks how the sale was conducted; subsection (b)(2) asks what price it closed at.21 Both rest on the same narrow meaning of recognized market, so the limits drawn above carry over unchanged.22
Two phrases in the text do the work. Current ties the benchmark to a price the market is actually reporting, and at the time of the disposition fixes the moment of comparison, since a quotation from another day measures another day's market.
Because most repossessed collateral is used goods, and used goods almost never have current prices on recognized markets, this harbor reaches little of what creditors repossess.23 Some collateral may fit, including gold bullion, shares of publicly traded stock, and commodities in ordinary commercial units, but these will usually be exceptions. A Bluebook price for a used automobile or the catalog price of a baseball card does not qualify.24
Had the lender instead sold repossessed gold bullion at the price quoted in the bullion market when the sale closed, the harbor would likely apply. What separates the two sales is the source of the number: a market's quoted price comes from trading in interchangeable units, while a guide figure is an estimate of value.
A sale that misses this harbor is not unreasonable for that reason. The harbors are neither required nor exclusive, so the sale is judged under the dealer-practices harbor or on its circumstances.25
Reasonable Dealer Practices
Section 9-627(b)(3) protects a disposition made “otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.”27 The word otherwise makes this the residual category: the sale need not occur on a recognized market or at a quoted price if it matches what the trade does. Because most repossessed collateral is used goods with no standardized quotations, a creditor seeking an advance answer will usually have to find it here, and subsection (b)(3) is by far the most important of the three.28
The wording raises a question the text leaves open. The statute refers to practices among “dealers in [that] type of property,” not to practices among secured creditors that dispose of repossessed property.29 An automobile dealer, for example, may dispose of cars through direct sales to customers, public auctions, and more limited dealer wholesale auctions. The better view is that the drafters did not intend to hold creditors to retail dealers' standards, because creditors lack the expertise and resources to meet them. The provision requires only that the sale conform to the usual practices involved in selling repossessed property, although the language does not make that entirely clear.30
Cost reinforces that reading. A retail sale usually generates considerably more expense, including reconditioning, advertising, sales commissions, and insurance, and it takes much longer, which can raise storage costs and the interest accruing on the original obligation. One court therefore concluded that a sale to a dealer on the wholesale market will probably be the more reasonable approach in most cases.31 A secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings if the disposition is commercially reasonable, so a private sale to a dealer is not disqualified for being private.32
The used-car auction shows the harbor at work. A weekly used-car auction is not a recognized market, but it can still satisfy the dealer-practices harbor. If all or at least many of the financial institutions in the community sell repossessed vehicles there, the sale conforms to reasonable practice and is commercially reasonable.33 The conformity-to-practice requirement embodies a much broader and more flexible standard than the recognized-market definition, and the decisive fact is what lenders in the community actually do.
A Minnesota decision under former § 9-507 shows how such facts look in practice. Ford Credit sold a repossessed automobile at the Minneapolis Auto Auction, a wholesale auction that only dealers may attend, and established that the auction was a “well-recognized market for hundreds of auto dealers in the Minneapolis area.”34 Once a secured creditor shows that it disposed of the collateral in compliance with the statute, commercial reasonableness is presumed, and the debtor must raise a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. The appellants pointed to a higher price in a later retail sale, but allegations that a better price could have been obtained through a different method of sale, standing alone, did not raise a factual issue about commercial reasonableness.35 The court's phrase “well-recognized market” reads more generously than Comment 4, which presumably excludes markets where used cars are sold at special auctions.36 The same facts, a dealer-only auction that hundreds of area dealers use, fit more naturally here, as a practice among dealers.
What dealers do depends on the property, and the trade's practice is not always an auction. In Automotive Finance Corp. v. Smart Auto Center, Inc., the creditor, AFC, had to dispose of Canadian vehicles with mileage problems. An auction would not have yielded a good price for them, so AFC sold them to someone who knew how to deal with such vehicles, and the court held that AFC acted reasonably.37 That AFC had a prior relationship with the dealer, without more, did not make the disposal commercially unreasonable.38
A creditor also strengthens its position by showing what it did. In a case under Ohio law, the record was “replete with evidence of ITT's extensive marketing efforts to elicit a fair price or bid for the trucks,” and the debtor K.B. Oil's assertions of what the market price should have been could not raise a genuine issue of material fact about the reasonableness of the sale.39 The Ohio statute adds that a better price obtainable at a different time or by a different method is not of itself sufficient to show that a sale was not commercially reasonable.
A creditor that cannot show conformity to a practice loses only the advance answer. The harbors are not exclusive, so the sale is judged on all its circumstances, and a later section takes up how reasonableness is proved.40