Concept
Dispositions Outside the Safe Harbors
Commercially reasonable disposition
Dispositions Outside the Safe Harbors
A creditor that sells collateral “in the usual manner on any recognized market,”1 “at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition,”2 or “otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition”3 has an answer ready when the debtor attacks the sale. Those are the § 9-627(b) safe harbors, and Comment 3 calls them neither “required nor exclusive.”4 A creditor that fits none of them loses nothing by that fact alone. The court turns instead to the general command of § 9-610(b): every aspect of the disposition, “including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms,” must be commercially reasonable.5
One court made the same point, observing that the statute specifically provides that its list of commercially reasonable dispositions is not exclusive.6 In practice the harbors are narrow. Most repossessed collateral is used goods, which almost never have a current price on a recognized market; gold bullion, shares of publicly traded stock, and commodities in ordinary commercial units may qualify, but they are the exceptions.7 A creditor selling used goods will usually have to prove reasonableness the long way.
The long way is a factual inquiry in which the creditor carries the burden. Whether a sale was commercially reasonable is a question of fact, and the secured creditor must show, as part of its case for a deficiency judgment, that the disposition met that standard.8 On business collateral, the creditor need not prove compliance with Article 9 unless the debtor raises the issue, but once the debtor does, the burden of proof is the creditor’s.9 A harbor eases that burden. Under Minnesota’s pre-revision statute, a creditor that sold at a well-recognized dealers’ auction and showed compliance with § 336.9-507 received a presumption of commercial reasonableness, and the debtor then had to raise a genuine issue for trial.10 Outside a harbor, the creditor must build the record itself.
The court then weighs all the relevant factors together and treats the sale as one transaction.11 No single list of factors is canonical. One catalogue includes whether the secured party tried to obtain the best price possible, whether the sale was private or public, the condition of the collateral and any efforts to improve it, the advertising undertaken, the number of bids received, and the method used to solicit bids.12 In re Frazier began in Tennessee state court as claims by James and Linda Chavers against Frank Frazier and his businesses and reached federal court by removal after bankruptcy petitions were filed.13 It supplies a second list. The court observed that “commercially reasonable” gives little guidance by itself and applied six factors, among them the type of collateral, its condition, and the number of bids solicited.14
Price matters, but not by itself. A better price available at a different time or by a different method does not alone show that a sale was unreasonable.15 Reasonableness is assessed primarily by the procedures employed, although “a sufficient resale price is the logical focus of the protection given debtors.”16 A price gap therefore sends the court to the procedure behind it. In Frazier, the great disparity between a Lear jet’s purchase price and its sale price about a year later raised the question whether the creditors had taken all steps that prevailing practices consider reasonable to bring a fair price.17 Because the procedures for selling small jet aircraft lie within the knowledge of a small group of experts, the court weighed competing expert testimony and called the expert offered by Jamie, Inc. and Mrs. Frazier “by far the pre-eminent expert.”18 The cases that follow ask about procedure along two lines: when the creditor sold, and whom it told.
Outcomes outside the harbors follow the record. The bank in First Nat’l Bank v. Beug held its collateral a long time and still prevailed because the record explained the wait, while the creditor in re Kelaidis and the bank in City National Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc. lost because their marketing was thin or their proof was missing.
Timing and Delay
Section 9-610(b) makes time one of the aspects of a disposition that must be commercially reasonable, and a creditor can miss in either direction.20 The sale may come “too quickly” after notice or “too long” after repossession.21 The text sets no single deadline: if a disposition is commercially reasonable, the secured party may make it “at any time and place and on any terms.”22 Because the right moment depends on the collateral, the court asks whether the time the creditor chose suited the goods actually sold.
A sale held too soon gives buyers no chance to learn of it. A creditor who sells a business’s inventory, where comparable sales normally follow two or three weeks of advertising and notice, is in trouble if it advertises a public sale for five days later.23 Speed can also collide with publicity: if the best advertising medium publishes only biweekly or monthly, the creditor’s need for a prompt sale conflicts with its need to advertise.24 Collateral that is highly valuable and not easy to sell, or that is customarily offered with an extended period of inspection, should likewise not be sold too soon.25
Perishable collateral, and collateral subject to rapid depreciation, calls for the opposite approach: the sale should be made immediately.26 If goods depreciate and the creditor waits any appreciable time, the sale will be attacked as untimely, so a creditor who repossesses an automobile in winter dares not wait for spring in hope of a better market.27
Because the standard cuts both ways, a long hold is not fatal in itself. What matters is whether the creditor can show a good reason for it, and the creditor should record that reason when it decides to wait. If delay is justified by the need to advertise in infrequently published journals or for other good reasons, those reasons should be memorialized so they can be proved at a deficiency trial.28 The advice follows from the burden of proof. On business collateral, the secured party need not prove compliance with Article 9 unless the debtor raises the issue, but once the debtor does, the burden of proving compliance falls on the secured party.29
First National Bank v. Beug shows recorded reasons carrying a long hold. A bank kept repossessed farm equipment for about sixteen months before selling it, and the debtor argued that the delay made the sale commercially unreasonable. The South Dakota Supreme Court looked to the circumstances and found that they accounted for the time: the debtor had vigorously contested the legality of the repossessions and repeatedly moved for return of the collateral, the parties had negotiated, some of the equipment sat on a private farm-machinery sales lot, and the bank pointed to the season best suited to selling farm items. The court distinguished an earlier decision, Otten, in which the collateral was sold about thirteen months after possession, no proceedings were ever taken for its sale or other disposition, and the excuses for delay were immaterial or unsupported by the evidence.30
Beug and the winter automobile are consistent. The automobile creditor has only a hope for a better market while the car loses value, and the Beug bank had reasons that appeared in the record. A reason tied to the trade is easiest to defend, because a disposition otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold is commercially reasonable.31 If dealers in used farm machinery customarily sell it in the spring, a lender that waits for spring can argue that its timing followed the trade, although the lender must prove the practice and cannot assume it.
Preserving the collateral during the hold belongs to the same inquiry. Once it has repossessed collateral, the secured party must preserve it and take reasonable steps to lessen its depreciation, and it must repair or prepare the goods for sale if it would be commercially unreasonable not to.32 The statute lets the secured party sell the collateral in its then condition or after any commercially reasonable preparation or processing, so preparation is a judgment bounded by commercial reasonableness.33
City National Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc. shows what happens when the creditor’s records say nothing about that period. A bank sought a deficiency after repossessing and selling a group of mobile homes that had deteriorated by the time of sale. It offered little beyond a bank officer’s testimony about its normal procedures, and nothing in the record showed when the bank took control of the homes, what condition they were in, or whether the bank tried to protect them. The court could not decide whether the bank had preserved the homes, sold them promptly, or should have cleaned and repaired them first, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the deficiency. The duty to preserve that the case applies arises once the secured party has repossessed the collateral.34
The two decisions rest on the same evidentiary logic. The Beug bank could point to events and steps that explained its delay, while the City National bank could point only to its usual practice, so the court had nothing against which to measure how long the homes sat or how they were treated. A fact pattern that reports a long gap between repossession and sale is therefore asking what reason the record gives for the wait, and one that reports a short gap is asking whether buyers could have been reached in that time. The creditor’s records of when it took possession and what it did afterward mark the period for which it must account.
Marketing and Bidders
Publicity is the second aspect courts probe most closely: did the creditor put the collateral in front of the people who would pay for it? The creditor must properly advertise or use other measures to find the best market and the best buyers, and the measures must fit the collateral. Advertising a drilling rig in the county newspaper will not do where every other seller advertises in trade journals. The surest way to learn where buyers look is to consult the debtor, if the two are on speaking terms, or to ask an expert about the market.36
Marketing carries so much weight because buyers who never hear of a sale cannot bid, and the price then reflects only those who did. A creditor that exposed the collateral to its usual buyers can answer a complaint about price, since the fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or by a different method “is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.”37 A creditor that reached no one has nothing to explain its price except its own convenience.
K.B. Oil shows the creditor’s side of the line. The creditor, ITT, resold truck rigs, and the debtor complained of the price. The court found the record “replete with evidence of ITT’s extensive marketing efforts to elicit a fair price or bid for the trucks,” and it held that the debtor’s assertions about what the market price should have been raised no genuine issue of material fact.38
A sale to a single buyer can also stand when the creditor shows why it chose that buyer. In a Minnesota dispute, a finance company sold vehicles with mileage problems to a dealer who knew how to deal with such vehicles, because an auction would not have yielded a good price for them. The court held that the company’s prior relationship with the dealer, without more, did not make the disposal commercially unreasonable.39 The choice of buyer matched the goods, and that match is what a thin marketing effort lacks.
re Kelaidis sits at the other end. Community had made a loan to a restaurant, Dad’s, and later sold the restaurant’s personal property. Its only effort to sell that property was to list it with the real property through agents who would receive no commission on the sale. When the real property sold, the buyers did not want the personal property, yet Community sold it to them “in place, installed, ready to go” for less than 25 percent of the liquidation value an appraiser had estimated, and that estimate covered only part of the property.40 Community’s explanation was that the sale spared it the cost of removal. The bankruptcy court called that “simply not a justifiable excuse for what amounts to giving this property away,” and said it was instead an argument for a more extensive attempt to market the property.41
The appraisals deepened the problem. Before Community made its loan in 1996, an appraiser valued the restaurant’s then-existing personal property at $70,000, and in March 1999 an appraiser valued the personal property at $105,000. Community’s own appraiser, Erkelens, then valued it at $25,000 in place and $7,700 if removed and auctioned, but he was never given a list of the property and omitted a number of items.42 Community’s officer was disappointed by that figure yet made no effort to learn whether the appraisal was flawed, and the court called the creditor’s blind reliance on an appraisal “curiously out of sync” with at least two others a further reason to find the sale unreasonable.43 The appellate court agreed that the bankruptcy court could have found the sale commercially unreasonable on inadequate marketing alone, and it held that even if the limited marketing did not make the sale unreasonable as a matter of law, the finding of unreasonableness was not clearly erroneous.44
Two Utah Supreme Court decisions supported that view. In Pioneer Dodge, the creditor took a truck to a few local dealers for oral bids, placed it on its own lot for a few days, and announced the auction over its loudspeaker just before it began. In Haggis Management, the court held a private sale of a restaurant and private liquor club commercially unreasonable as a matter of law where the creditor had not advertised or given other public notice, had at most contacted a few potential buyers, and had received no firm bids.45 Both Kelaidis and K.B. Oil applied pre-revision statutes, but the § 9-610(b) standard comes directly from former § 9-504, so most cases decided under that section remain good law, subject to limited changes in the commentary to § 9-610 and the text of § 9-627.46
On the number of bids, a sale is not invalid as a matter of law where only one or two bids were received, but such a sale must receive the closest scrutiny and should be declared invalid on evidence of collusion, self-dealing, or bad faith. The same court added that the time and place of a sale must be reasonably calculated to bring a satisfactory turnout of bidders, particularly at a public sale.47 Courts weigh the advertising undertaken, the number of bids received, and the method of soliciting bids together.48
Thin bidding draws scrutiny rather than automatic condemnation because a small field is ambiguous. Competing bids are the evidence that buyers, and not the creditor, set the price, so one or two bids leave little proof of competition. A thin field can also reflect a small market, as it does for specialized equipment that only a few firms buy, and a creditor that solicited the whole trade and heard from one has an answer. The court therefore asks how the field came to be thin and who the lone bidder was. A buyer with ties to the creditor is where collusion and self-dealing arise, because the two can settle on a low price and the buyer can keep the gain from resale. The Frazier factors count the number of bids solicited, which shifts the question from how many buyers answered to how many the creditor tried to reach.49
A fact pattern that reports one bid or a low price asks what marketing stands behind the number and who the bidder was. Advertising in the medium where buyers look, bids solicited from the trade, a bidder unconnected to the creditor, and a record of each step point toward reasonableness. A listing through agents with no incentive, a sale to the only buyer at hand, and a quick resale at a much higher price point the other way. The creditors in these cases lost where they never tested the market, and they won where they tested it and the result still disappointed the debtor.