Concept
Proving Reasonableness
Commercially reasonable disposition
Proving Reasonableness
A secured party that sues for a deficiency must be ready to prove how it ran the sale, because the burden of showing reasonableness sits with the creditor. Courts hold that the secured creditor must show, as part of its burden of proof in an action for a deficiency judgment, that the sale or disposition was performed in a commercially reasonable manner.1 The debtor need not raise unreasonableness and carry it; the creditor's own case is incomplete without it.
Evidence of work actually done satisfies that burden. In a dispute over resold truck rigs, the record was replete with evidence of the creditor's extensive marketing efforts to elicit a fair price or bid, and the debtor's assertions about what the market price should have been could not raise a genuine issue of material fact on reasonableness.2 The court also applied the Ohio rule that a better price at a different time or by a different method is not, by itself, enough to show an unreasonable sale, and it distinguished cases in which there is little or no evidence tending to prove the value of the collateral.3
A creditor's explanations need the same evidentiary support. In Otten, a South Dakota case that a later court distinguished as clearly outside the Code's requirements, the collateral was sold some thirteen months after the co-signer took possession. No proceedings were ever taken for its sale under the UCC, and the court found the excuses for the delay “either immaterial or not supported by the evidence.”4
A safe harbor lightens the load. Article 9 deems three kinds of disposition per se commercially reasonable: one made in the usual manner on a recognized market or at the price current there, one that complies with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of collateral, and one approved by a court, a creditors' committee, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, or a representative of creditors.5 A creditor that proves its sale fits a harbor need not prove that each detail was reasonable. What a harbor cannot do is answer questions it never asks, and the next subsection takes those up.
Other Duties Remain
Each harbor answers one question: whether the disposition met the requirement that every aspect of it, including its method, manner, time, place, and terms, be commercially reasonable.6 If every aspect is reasonable, the secured party may sell publicly or privately, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, at any time and place and on any terms.7 The dealer-practices harbor asks whether the disposition was otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold.8 The two recognized-market harbors ask whether the sale was made in the usual manner on any recognized market9 or at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition.10 A harbor therefore sorts how a sale was run and licenses no step the Code forbids. A creditor can sell exactly as dealers in the trade sell and still violate Article 9, because the violation may lie in who bought the collateral, in whether notice went out, or in some other rule that never touches the method of sale.
Bruce v. Cauthen shows the distinction in a case where the harbor argument looked attractive. A partnership agreement let the partnership or the non-defaulting partner, as secured parties, foreclose the lien on a defaulting partner's interest in the manner the Texas Business and Commerce Code provides.11 It also recited that a private sale might bring prices or terms less favorable to the seller than a public sale, and it stated the partners' agreement that a private sale is commercially reasonable.12 Bruce, as the secured party, acquired Cauthen's minority interest in the partnership. The court did not test the method of the sale. It called the argument about commercial reasonableness irrelevant, because the dispute was whether Bruce, as the secured party, had acquired the interest in violation of the UCC.13 The agreement contained no express language modifying § 9.610(c) of the Texas Code. It also said nothing that permitted a secured party to acquire the defaulting partner's interest at a private sale, or that allowed the buyer to be the limited partner who was also the secured party.14 (Texas numbers its sections with a dot, so § 9.610 there is § 9-610 in the uniform text.)
The rule Bruce ran into is § 9-610(c). It lets a secured party buy at a public disposition, but at a private disposition it may buy only collateral of a kind customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.15 A secured party that buys any other collateral at its own private sale is in effect keeping it, so it must follow the strict foreclosure route, which requires the debtor's consent. The debtor consents by agreeing to the terms in a record authenticated after default, or by failing to object within 20 days to the secured party's proposal; silence is not consent to an acceptance in partial satisfaction.16
The phrase “recognized market” does double duty in Article 9. Earlier in the chapter it gave the creditor an advance answer on reasonableness, and here it decides who may buy. A recognized market is one with standardized prices for essentially fungible property.17 When the price comes from a market quotation, a secured party that buys has no room to shade it. A minority interest in a closely held partnership has no quotation, so a secured party that buys it privately fixes its own price, and a low price enlarges the deficiency. A dealer-practices harbor cannot close that gap, because the harbor tests how the sale was run and the restriction tests who bought.
The same separation governs notice. Before a disposition the secured party must send the debtor a reasonable authenticated notice of it, and the content, manner, and timing of the notice must each be reasonable.18 The duty does not apply when the collateral is perishable, threatens to decline in value quickly, or is of a type ordinarily sold in a recognized market, and law other than Article 9 may require further notifications.19 Article 2 on sales may also continue to apply to a sale of goods unless a contrary provision of Article 9 displaces it.20 A creditor that sells equipment through an auction lenders customarily use but sends no notice has therefore satisfied the harbor and breached the notice duty in the same sale. The harbor speaks to the manner of the sale, and the notice rule carries its own exceptions, which the harbor does not enlarge.
An exam stem that recites that a sale followed trade practice is asking whether the problem lies in the method of sale or somewhere else. The clause in Bruce reciting that private sales are commercially reasonable did not change who could buy, and what parties may agree about commercial reasonableness is the subject of the next subsection.
Agreed Standards
Two rules decide what a loan agreement may say about the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Section 9-602(7) provides that the debtor or an obligor may not waive the duty, while § 9-603(a) lets the secured party and the debtor or obligor agree on standards for measuring whether the duty was met, so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.22 The first rule keeps the obligation out of the contract, and the second lets the contract describe what performance of that obligation looks like. The rules on repossession pair the two ideas in the same way. The parties cannot agree on what counts as a breach of the peace, yet they may agree on standards for assembling collateral or for disabling equipment and disposing of it on the debtor's premises, again so long as the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.23
Each rule has its own logic. The ban on waiver answers a problem of timing. A borrower signs the loan documents at the start of the relationship, when it needs the money and cannot know how a sale after default will be run. If a signature at that point could surrender the protection, lenders would put the clause in every form, and borrowers would give up the duty before anyone could tell what it was worth. The cost would surface later as a larger deficiency, because a badly run sale depresses the price and the debtor owes the difference. Agreed standards serve a different interest. Parties who know the collateral can write down in advance how long it will be advertised or whom the lender will solicit, and both sides then know what a reasonable sale looks like. The limit against manifestly unreasonable standards keeps that benefit from becoming a back door to waiver. The agreement works as a measuring stick for the duty and cannot replace the duty, so a standard so lax that no sale could fail it measures nothing.
The line between the two rules therefore runs between a clause that surrenders the duty and a clause that defines how performance of the duty is judged. A clause in which the borrower gives up any objection to the manner of sale is a waiver, and the Code does not honor it. A clause that fixes concrete procedures is an agreed standard, and the only question it faces is whether the procedures are manifestly unreasonable. Because the creditor carries the burden on reasonableness, a creditor that relies on an agreed standard should be ready to prove it followed the procedure it wrote.
The protection reaches guarantors and other obligors as well as the borrower. A guarantor answers for another's debt, so a low sale price enlarges the deficiency the guarantor may be called on to pay, and the guarantor has the same stake in how the sale is run. A federal court applying Utah law faced a creditor's argument that the debtors had validly waived the commercially reasonable disposition requirement. The court found that the Utah decisions the creditor cited did not decide whether guarantors can waive their rights under the former disposition provision. In three of them the courts considered guarantors' waivers but never reached the relevant former sections. The court concluded that the Utah Supreme Court would treat a guarantor as a “debtor” who could not waive the right to a commercially reasonable disposition.24 Because that decision rests on former Utah law, it is consistent support for the current rule, which reaches an obligor as well as a debtor, and it is not direct authority on revised Article 9.
Bruce shows how a clause about reasonableness is read. The partners agreed that a private sale of a defaulting partner's interest would be commercially reasonable even if it brought less favorable prices, and they relieved the partnership and the non-defaulting partner of any obligation to take steps toward a public sale.25 The court read the clause as consistent with the Code's allowance of private dispositions and as reflecting the parties' view that a public sale of a partnership interest would be problematic, since a private sale would go to a restricted group of purchasers taking the interest as an investment.26 It would not stretch the clause past its words, however. Nothing in the agreement modified § 9.610(c), and nothing said the secured party could be the buyer, so the absence of express language counted against the secured partner.27 The court had no occasion to decide how far such a recital could go as an agreed standard, because the clause addressed the method of sale and the claim concerned who bought.
An exam stem that quotes a clause from the loan documents is asking whether the clause waives the duty or defines how the duty is measured. A release of any complaint about the manner of sale fails against a debtor and against a guarantor, while a clause fixing specific, ordinary procedures can govern the measurement. A clause declaring every sale reasonable whatever the advertising, the buyer, or the price does not measure reasonableness at all, because it removes the inquiry the duty requires, and it is manifestly unreasonable for that reason.