Concept
The Voluntary Act
Threshold: act, volition, and intent
The Voluntary Act
An intentional tort begins with an act, and an act begins with the actor's will. The Restatement (Second) of Torts says so flatly: there cannot be an act without volition.1 In tort law, an act is a bodily movement through which the actor's will shows itself, and that includes the muscular contractions that produce speech.2 Some outward manifestation of the defendant's own will must exist before conduct can subject the defendant to liability. The analysis therefore opens with a question of ownership: did this movement belong to the defendant?3
The question is narrow. It asks only whether the defendant's will produced the movement, and it does not ask what the defendant wanted the movement to accomplish. That belongs to intent, the next requirement, and a plaintiff cannot satisfy it by showing mere causation: a defendant sued for battery must intend an offensive contact, not just cause one.4
Two questions fall under the act requirement. The first is which bodily movements count as products of the will at all, since some muscular contractions drop out of the analysis before any tort is considered. The second is how much outside pressure an actor can face and still act, because a defendant pushed toward a movement by circumstances may be excused without ceasing to be its author. Volition comes first.
Volition and Involuntary Movement
Volition means that the person's own will produced the movement. A muscular contraction that is purely a reaction to some outside force fails that test. The Restatement's examples are the knee jerk, the blink of the eyelids in defense against an approaching missile, the convulsive movements of an epileptic, and movements of the body during sleep, when the will is in abeyance.5 None of these is an act of the person whose body moved. They are not acts that the law excuses; they are not acts at all, so the inquiry ends before any question of excuse or defense arises.
The inquiry looks to the will's part in the movement and ignores the actor's feelings about the result. A convulsion that lands a blow on someone the sufferer despises is still no act, and a deliberate swing that the swinger instantly regrets is still an act.
The same logic governs a body that someone else operates. Because some outward manifestation of the defendant's own will is necessary, it is not enough that a third person has used part of the defendant's body to carry out the third person's plan to harm the plaintiff. In that case the third person is the actor, just as in the knee-jerk case the actor is whoever struck the leg.6 If a stronger person seizes your hand and forces it against a victim's shoulder, you are not liable for battery, because your act in striking was not voluntary. Likewise, a defendant in the midst of a seizure who cannot control her muscles and strikes a victim is not liable.7 Liability follows the person whose will produced the movement.
One blow can produce a battery in one scene and nothing at all in another. The difference lies in whose will, if anyone's, moved the arm.
Only in the third scene is the act requirement met, and a battery then turns on intent, the subject of the next part of the chapter. The bus case shows what happens when the act is present but intent is not. Chu's contact with Munoz was not intentional in the tort sense: she did not act for the purpose of hitting Munoz, and she was not substantially certain that she would. The contact resulted from her failure to take proper precautions, such as looking where she was going. Chu may be liable for negligence, but she has not committed a battery.8
Criminal law draws the same line at the act. With very few exceptions, it punishes only voluntary acts, a principle known as the voluntary act requirement, and most jurisdictions follow it. John's pressing his accelerator and turning his wheel were voluntary acts, so he should be punished. Jane's pressing her accelerator and turning her wheel resulted from involuntary spasms, so she should not.9
The category is narrow. It reaches only movements in which mind and will have no share, so the test asks whether the will operated, not whether it operated wisely.10 The next subsection takes up the opposite pole, where outside pressure bears heavily on the actor and the will is still at work.
Pressure Versus Reflex
A defendant who acts under pressure still acts. The Restatement's comment on the freedom of the actor's will says so directly: if the will is in fact manifested by a muscular contraction, including those that produce speech, it need not operate freely and without pressure from outside circumstances.12 Even pressure so strong that reasonable people cannot be expected to resist it does not prevent the movement from being an act, though it may make the act excusable. Only one kind of movement falls outside the category: a muscular reaction “is always an act unless it is a purely reflexive reaction in which the mind and will have no share.”13
The comment's own illustration shows how far this reaches. A person about to fall stretches out a hand and seizes the nearest object, whether a fellow human being or an inanimate thing. The reach and the grasp are an act, because the person's mind has grasped the situation and has dictated a muscular contraction that a rapidly formed judgment says will help prevent the fall.14 The decision comes in an instant, yet the hand still answers a will exerted by a mind that has settled on a course of action. The urgency, the need to decide at once, and the near-universal tendency to do the same may be enough to relieve the person of liability, but none of them prevents the grasp from being his act.
A split-second reaction that nearly everyone shares is not therefore a reflex. Speed and universality describe the circumstances, while the test asks about the mind. The blink in defense against an approaching missile is no act because the eyelids respond to the stimulus without any decision at all.15 The falling person's hand, by contrast, goes to an object that the person has judged likely to help.
Keeping pressure out of the definition of an act leaves two questions standing, each with its own work. The act question asks whether the defendant's mind engaged and directed the movement. The excuse question asks whether circumstances relieve a defendant who did direct it, and the Restatement assigns pressure that reasonable people cannot be expected to resist to that second question.16 If a threat or emergency erased the act, the law could never ask whether the pressure was one that reasonable people could be expected to resist, and a movement the defendant plainly directed would be described as one the defendant never made.
Two seventeenth-century trespass cases mark the same line. In Smith v. Stone the defendant was carried onto the plaintiff's land by force and was not liable, because the entry was not his act. In Gilbert v. Stone twelve armed men compelled the defendant to enter the plaintiff's land and steal a horse, and the report treats his entry as intentional, though excused if he acted under duress.17 What separates the two is whose will moved the legs. The man who is carried contributes nothing. The man who is threatened still directs his own legs, and the threat is argued as an excuse once the act is established.
Establishing the act answers only the first threshold question. Whether the defendant intended the contact or harm that the movement produced comes next, and the chapter turns to it now. For a reported suit of the kind these requirements govern, see the 1937 Massachusetts action for assault and battery brought by a registered nurse employed to care for the defendant; the only question of law reported was whether the judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant.18