Concept
The Act Requirement
Battery
The Act Requirement
Before a court asks what the defendant was thinking, it asks whether the defendant did anything that brought the contact about. The Restatement (Second) of Torts answers with a threshold rule: to make the actor liable for a battery, the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act done by the person whose liability is in question.1 The Restatement defines an act as "an external manifestation of the actor's will" and excludes its results, "even the most direct, immediate, and intended."2 The act is the movement, and the contact is what the movement produces.
Two Restatement illustrations fix the line. When an actor points a pistol at another person and pulls the trigger, the act is the pulling of the trigger, and the consequence is the impingement of the bullet on the other's person. Calling the act "the shooting" would conflate the act with its consequence. When an actor intentionally strikes another with a fist, the act is only the movement of the hand, not the contact with the other's body that the movement immediately establishes.3
The requirement rests on fairness. No contact is intentional if it is not the result of a voluntary act. If Lopez faints and falls on Jones, Lopez is not liable for battery, because she did not cause the touching by a voluntary act. It hardly seems fair to make her pay for something she did not "do" in any meaningful sense.4
The same result follows when another person supplies the force or an illness removes control. If a strong person seizes your hand and forces it against a victim's shoulder, your striking the victim was not voluntary, and you are not liable. A defendant in the midst of a seizure who cannot control her muscular movements, and who strikes a victim, is likewise not liable.5
In Wagner v. State, the court observed that no one alleged the attacker's conduct was an involuntary muscular movement or spasm. The plaintiffs conceded that Mr. Giese affirmatively attacked her, and they did not argue that his muscular movements had inadvertently or accidentally brought him into contact with her. The voluntariness of the movement was therefore not in doubt.6
A voluntary act is not, by itself, an intent to touch, and the two are easy to run together. Presuming the movement was voluntary rather than spastic, whether the actor committed an intentional or a negligent contact, and so a battery or negligence, depends not on whether the actor intended to move a hand but on whether the actor intended to make contact by moving it.7 A joker who throws a snowball at a tree acts voluntarily. If a pedestrian unexpectedly steps into the snowball's path, the joker still lacked the state of mind an intentional tort requires, which is purpose or substantial certainty that a harmful or offensive contact would result. The throw may be negligent if the joker failed to exercise due care, but the claim sounds in negligence and not in battery.8
The act requirement therefore screens out only the contacts the defendant did not will: the faint, the convulsion, the shove from someone else. A contact that follows from a movement the defendant chose to make passes the threshold, and whether it is battery or negligence is decided at the intent element, which comes next.