Concept
Words and Conditions
Assault
Words and Conditions
A raised fist means one thing from a speaker who promises the listener a beating and another from a speaker who says, “If you were not an old man, I would knock you senseless.”1 The fist is the same in both scenes. The words decide whether the listener has any reason to expect a blow, because the listener's apprehension is built from everything the listener sees and hears.
An actionable assault requires an intentional, unlawful offer to touch another in a rude or angry manner, made in circumstances that create in the other a well-founded fear of an imminent battery, together with the apparent present ability to carry it out.2 Speech adds no element to that definition and removes none. It matters because it can help or hurt the plaintiff on one element: apprehension of an imminent contact.3 This unit takes three questions in turn. When can words support an assault? When can words undo a threat that conduct would otherwise make? And what becomes of a threat that offers the plaintiff a way out by obeying?
Words Alone
Section 31 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives speech a two-part rule. Words do not make the actor liable for assault unless, together with other acts or circumstances, they put the other in reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person.4 The first half confines speech. The second half admits whatever else in the situation helps the words along, and courts differ over how much help they require, from a strict insistence on an overt act to a willingness to rely on the surrounding circumstances.5
The strict view holds that mere words cannot constitute an assault, because words do not sufficiently show the defendant's purpose to batter the victim immediately.6 A defendant who growls, “I'm going to wring your neck!” might therefore commit no assault, while one who pulls a rope from his pocket and winds it around his hands supplies the missing evidence of an imminent intent to batter.7 The formula aims to keep out intemperate or insulting speech that injures feelings or arouses apprehension, and the demand for an act is meant to separate bluster from real aggression.8 The problem of assault by words alone has nonetheless proved intractable.
Cucinotti v. Ortmann, a 1960 decision, shows the strict view at its firmest. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants confronted them and threatened “immediate bodily harm,” saying they would strike the plaintiffs with blackjacks and otherwise hit them with great force and violence. The court held that the complaint stated no assault because it alleged no threatening act, and it said the same would be true of an allegation that the defendants produced the blackjacks and showed them to the plaintiffs.9
Critics of the strict view say it overlooks the subtle, and not-so-subtle, ways the voice alone can convey a threat of immediate or future force.10 Some courts accordingly allow recovery on the words and the surrounding circumstances alone, if those circumstances are compelling enough, and courts relying on § 31 would probably allow recovery on the facts of Cucinotti.11 In Gouin v. Gouin, the words “you can either do it my way or I can beat you half to death” sufficed, and in Vetter v. Morgan, a threat to pull the plaintiff from a van sufficed under the circumstances.12 Neither decision required an obvious aggressive act. The Gouin words also contain an ultimatum, a form the last subsection takes up.
Words can also give an ambiguous movement its meaning. A movement that is otherwise innocuous, such as reaching into a pocket or resting a hand on a holstered gun, and perhaps even a stance, can become an assault when threatening words lead a reasonable person to apprehend a battery.14 Suppose a defendant in a quarrel reaches toward his hip pocket. If he says, “I'll blow your brains out,” the reach reads as the start of an attack. If he says, “Pardon me, I need a handkerchief,” it reads as nothing. The movement is the same in both versions, and the words decide what it means. The second version previews how words can drain a threat, a subject the next subsection takes up.
Brown v. Orr shows a court keeping a thin claim alive. The record contained two alleged incidents: a threat, and a second alleged assault the next day. The court acknowledged that the facts were not as strong as those in Holmes, yet it could not say as a matter of law that Orr's acts and threats were incapable of creating a reasonable or well-founded apprehension of imminent physical harm. Brown had walked away after the first threat, and that evidence was not conclusive: she might have discounted the threat, or she might have left to avoid the harm. She also testified that after the second incident she had to leave work because she was so frightened and upset.15
Surrounding events can carry even more of the load. In a decision involving the journalist Miller, Trapp had just punched Nina Pender in the face and broken her camera, and he was pushing journalists and photographers out of his way, all while Miller watched. He then threatened to “beat the hell” out of Miller and raised his arm as if to hit her. The opinion said Miller could have formed a well-founded fear that Trapp was about to batter her, and it added that Trapp's criminal record included an assault and battery of his former bodyguard, which indicated a willingness to engage in violence.16
A fact pattern that says the defendant “only spoke” therefore calls for an inventory of what else the plaintiff could perceive. Did the defendant hold a weapon, move toward the plaintiff, raise a hand, or just turn violent in front of the plaintiff? If the inventory comes up empty and the words describe what the speaker will do later, the claim fails for want of imminence.17 If it shows a speaker visibly about to act, the words complete the assault, and the lack of a conventional gesture does not matter.18
Words That Negate Threats
Words work against the plaintiff as readily as for the plaintiff. A threatening gesture accompanied by words that negate any present intent to make a tortious contact may not be an assault, if a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would perceive no immediate danger of a battery.20 The explanation lies in the apprehension element. The speaker's words are among the circumstances the plaintiff perceives, and the plaintiff's fear must be well founded.21 A speaker who announces that the blow is being withheld gives a reasonable listener nothing to expect.
Negating words take three common forms, and each drains the threat by a different route:
- Words showing that the speaker jests turn a raised fist into play, because a reasonable listener who hears the joke expects no blow.22
- Words that make the threat conditional or hypothetical, such as “If you were not an old man, I would knock you senseless,” tell the listener the blow is being withheld.23
- Words that place the contact in the future, as in “The next time I see you I will hit you,” describe a later blow and so fall short of imminence.24
The second form is easiest to see when the named condition is contrary to fact. Suppose Oda snarls at Rudolph, “If you hadn't fouled out of the hundred-meter competition, I'd beat you to a pulp.” Oda's own words defeat the assault, because they show that she does not plan to carry it out. The comment is still unpleasant and unwelcome, but it is unlikely to make Rudolph anticipate an immediate invasion of physical security.25 Rudolph did foul out, so Oda's sentence describes a blow that would have fallen in a situation that no longer exists.
Tuberville v. Savage supplies the classic version. The speaker said, “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.” Those words announce that the speaker is holding back because of the occasion, which is the pattern of a threatening gesture whose accompanying words negate it, and the usual treatment of the example is that no assault occurs.26 The case also marks the limit of the rule. A disclaimer helps the speaker only if the listener can believe it, and a casebook note asks why the court took the speaker's words as an accurate statement of intention rather than a ruse to catch the other party off guard.27
The rope and the stare are identical in the two scenes, and the words alone decide which one carries a threat. The words still do not work in isolation. Section 31 weighs them together with the other acts and circumstances, so a disclaimer that the speaker's conduct contradicts leaves the plaintiff's expectation intact.29 A listener who hears an advancing speaker with a fist drawn back say that he would never strike has reason to credit the conduct over the words, and whether that expectation is reasonable is a question a fact-finder ordinarily answers.30
An if-clause in a fact pattern may be doing either of two jobs, and the sorting matters. Negating words describe a condition that has failed or a reason that already prevents the blow, so the threat is hypothetical and the plaintiff has nothing to avoid. A conditional threat under § 30 is a real threat with an exit attached. Oda says, “If you don't get off this track, I'll kick your tail into next week,” and the blow will fall unless Rudolph obeys.31 The fouled-out remark offers no choice, because its condition belongs to the past. The track threat leaves the outcome in the listener's hands, and the next subsection explains why it can remain an assault.32
Conditional Threats
A defendant who threatens a blow unless the plaintiff obeys a command commits an assault anyway, unless the defendant is privileged to enforce the command by the contact threatened or by threatening it. That is the rule of § 30: an actor who intentionally puts another in apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact is liable although he gives the other the option of escaping the contact by obeying a command.34 A condition the actor has no right to impose is disregarded.35 The negating words of the last subsection say the blow is being withheld, while a conditional threat says the blow will come unless the listener complies.
The tempting defense says the plaintiff holds the key. A listener who can avoid the contact by obeying, the argument runs, cannot truly expect to be touched. The Restatement's definition of apprehension answers it: the plaintiff must believe the act may result in imminent contact unless prevented by the plaintiff's own self-defensive action, by flight, or by the intervention of some outside force.36 Obeying a command is one more way of avoiding the contact, and it differs from flight only in what it costs the plaintiff.
The track threat shows the result. Oda tells Rudolph to get off the track or be kicked into next week. Rudolph can avoid the kick by leaving, so in theory Rudolph need not fear a blow, because Rudolph holds the means of avoiding it. If that were enough to defeat an assault, Rudolph could be forced to abandon the right to run the track, or to walk the streets, in order to avoid battery, and bullies could impose their will by threat of force while incurring no liability.37 A slightly more extreme hypothetical makes the point plain: “If you don't go to bed with me, I'll throw you out this window.” The condition is one the assailant has no right to impose, so it does not defeat the assault, even though the plaintiff could avoid being struck by complying with the unlawful demand.38 See, e.g., Holcombe v. Whitaker, 318 So. 2d 289, 294 (Ala. 1975) (liability for conditional threat where no right to impose the condition).
A casebook example runs the same way. Wilson threatens the U.S. track coach with physical violence if the coach does not comply with Wilson's demands about who runs in the relays. Wilson has no right to tell the coach whom to run, so the fact that the coach can avoid the threat by doing as told does not prevent an assault.39 That answers only the question about the condition. The threat must still put the coach in apprehension of an imminent contact.40
The exception begins from the opposite fact. A landowner who tells a trespasser, “If you don't get off my land, I will put you off,” threatens physical force, but the owner has a right to use reasonable force to eject a trespasser. Even if the statement frightens the trespasser, it is not an assault, because it is privileged.41 Section 30 states the point generally: the threat is not an assault when the command is one the actor is privileged to enforce by inflicting the threatened contact or by threatening to inflict it.42 The privilege reaches only as far as the contact the actor could lawfully inflict.
A conditional threat must still satisfy every other element, and imminence is the one most likely to fail. Removing obedience as a defense does not supply a contact that is not imminent. A caller who says he will beat a coworker tomorrow unless the coworker drops a complaint has no right to impose that condition, but the beating lies in the future, and the coworker is not in apprehension of an imminent contact.44
Step two screens out future threats before any question about rights arises, and step four is the only step that can rescue a speaker whose threat is otherwise complete. An unless-clause in a fact pattern has therefore not yet told you the answer. The same clause can sit inside an assault, a privileged warning, or a threat that fails for lateness.