Concept
Civil Versus Criminal Assault
Assault
Civil Versus Criminal Assault
Assault is both a tort and a crime, and the two are not built the same way. The tort, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines it, requires that the defendant act intending a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and that the plaintiff be thereby put in imminent apprehension of it.1 Because the plaintiff's apprehension is an element, an attempt the plaintiff does not learn of before it ends is not tortious assault.2
The crime grew from a different root. Since the early days of the common law, criminal assault was usually defined as an attempt to commit a battery, and a New York decision, Pope v. State, described it as an "unlawful offer or attempt with force or violence to do corporal hurt to another."3 That definition asks what the defendant tried to do. It does not require the victim to anticipate the blow, because the mere attempt suffices.
Two javelin throws show how far apart the definitions sit. Haines throws a javelin at Mathias intending to injure him, and Mathias never sees it coming. Under the traditional criminal definition Haines has committed assault, because he attempted a battery. No tort assault has occurred, because Mathias had no apprehension of the blow.4 Owens, by contrast, pretends to throw the javelin at Mathias only to frighten him and never means to release it. If Mathias sees the gesture, Owens has committed tort assault, since the display would doubtless put Mathias in fear of being skewered. Under the traditional approach it is not criminal assault, because Owens attempted no battery.5 Haines's throw is a crime without a tort, and Owens's pretense is a tort without a crime.
The outcomes diverge because each definition has a different center of gravity. The tort is built around the plaintiff's apprehension, so a plaintiff who never perceives the threat has no claim. The traditional crime is built around the defendant's attempt, so the victim's awareness does not matter. A single event can therefore satisfy one definition without satisfying the other.
The same split appears when the defendant cannot actually carry out the threat. Some criminal statutes demand a present ability, as California's does in defining assault as an "unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another."6 Tort law has no such requirement. The defendant need not have, or even believe he has, the ability to inflict the contact his act apparently threatens.7
Criminal law has classically recognized two types of assault, overlapping but not identical:
- Attempted battery, meaning a serious effort to commit a battery that fails, as when a defendant shoots a loaded gun at another person's back and misses without the victim knowing.
- Intentionally causing another to fear an immediate battery, as when a defendant threatens another with a gun the defendant knows is unloaded, for the purpose of frightening.8
The first type matches the traditional criminal definition and does not depend on the victim's awareness. The second matches the tort and does depend on it. Jurisdictions differ in which they punish: some punish only attempted battery, and others punish both.9 Many states have amended their criminal statutes so that conduct amounting to tort assault is punishable as well, and a majority now make either act a crime.10 The Model Penal Code extends criminal assault to conduct that arouses fear, but only under limited circumstances.11 Some jurisdictions go further and use "assault" as a generic term for assault or battery, so a defendant who intentionally injures someone may be convicted of assault.12 The label on a criminal statute therefore says little about its elements, and the definition varies by state.
On a tort question, the tort elements control, which are intent and a reasonable apprehension of an imminent contact. A fact pattern that mentions a prosecution, a conviction, or a statute does not change them. When the question is about criminal liability, apply the statute the problem supplies.
The mismatch also explains an old statement that survives in the cases, that every battery includes an assault. It descends from the criminal view of assault as an attempted battery, and it is untrue in tort. A defendant who kicks a sleeping plaintiff commits battery but not assault, because he has not put the plaintiff in fear of the contact.13 The relationship runs the other way too. A defendant who escapes criminal liability for want of an attempt or a present ability may still owe damages.