Concept
Means of Confinement
False imprisonment
Means of Confinement
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes four ways to impose confinement: actual or apparent physical barriers (§ 38); overpowering physical force, or submission to physical force (§ 39); submission to a threat to apply physical force to the plaintiff immediately upon the plaintiff’s going or attempting to go beyond the area the actor intends to confine him to (§ 40); and taking a person into custody under an asserted legal authority (§ 41).1 The general test asks whether the defendant’s act directly or indirectly results in a confinement of the plaintiff;2 these four rules say how that result can come about.
The four means look different but share a logic. A barrier confines whether it is actual or only apparent. Force confines whether it overpowers the plaintiff or the plaintiff yields to it. Authority confines when the person believes it valid, or doubts it, and submits.3 Duress works the same way when the defendant threatens another person or the plaintiff’s valuable property, or restrains that property.4 In each version the defendant’s conduct leaves the plaintiff no real choice but to stay, and a lock is only one way of doing that.
The same idea marks the tort’s outer edge. Merely moral or social pressure does not confine: a plaintiff who stays to clear his name or to avoid public humiliation may have some other claim, but not false imprisonment.5 The last subsection works out that boundary. This one starts with the most familiar means, the physical barrier.
Physical Barriers
Section 38 provides that confinement may be by actual or apparent physical barriers.6 The locked door is the plainest case. In Whittaker v. Sandford, the court called turning a key without right on a person in a room “the simplest form of unlawful imprisonment,” because the restraint is physical.7 The case matters more for how far it carried the idea of a barrier.
The defendant controlled a yacht at anchor within practical rowing distance of shore and had agreed that a guest on board could leave. The only way off was by rowboat, and he wrongfully refused her the use of one. The court reasoned: “The boat is the key. By refusing the boat he turns the key. The guest is as effectually locked up as if there were walls along the sides of the vessel. The restraint is physical. The impassable sea is the physical barrier.”8 The jury was told that the plaintiff had to show physical restraint rather than moral influence, that no one had to lay a hand on her, and that if she could not leave the yacht because the defendant intentionally refused the agreed transportation, and had no other way to escape, the restraint was physical and the imprisonment unlawful.9
The sea alone confines no one. The barrier was the water combined with the defendant’s control of the only way across it, and withholding the boat did what a turned key does. That is why people who control the way out of a vessel or a building can imprison without a lock. The instruction also shows the limit: the plaintiff had to have no other way off. A guest with a launch of her own would be differently placed, because the rule on a known means of escape would then decide the case.10
The same mechanism works on a smaller scale. Amil, up high and enjoying the view, asked Logan to put the ladder back up, and Logan refused and told him to “just jump.”11 The missing ladder was the barrier, and Logan’s refusal turned the key. Like the yacht owner, Logan used no force; he controlled the one thing that made leaving possible.
A person can serve as the barrier. In Buckel v. Rodrigues, a security guard questioning a grocery clerk about suspected theft positioned himself between her and the only door of the room and told her he would decide whether she went to jail that evening. A jury imposed liability on the security-services owner who joined the detention and continued the interrogation over three hours.12 The guard’s position did the work of a lock. His words about jail also point toward the threats and the asserted authority taken up below.
Section 38 reaches apparent barriers as well as actual ones. A defendant who makes a door look locked in order to hold someone has done what a lock would do if the plaintiff takes the barrier to be real and stays, and a person does not ordinarily test a door that looks locked.
The driver’s ignorance of the unfastened shackle matters because confinement is complete although a reasonable means of escape exists, unless the plaintiff knows of it.13 An exit she does not know about gives her no freedom to use it.
The limit of the concept appears when nothing physical, real or apparent, stands between the plaintiff and the exit.
A request, a sign, or a sense of obligation presses on conscience and leaves the plaintiff’s ability to go untouched. That is why the jury in Whittaker was told that moral influence is not enough14 and why merely moral or social pressure is generally held insufficient to confine.15
Two misreadings of the barrier requirement are common. One hunts for a wall and a lock and so overlooks the removed ladder or the withheld boat, where the closed exit is just as real. The other treats any obstacle as a barrier, which ignores the rule that preventing a person from going in one particular direction is not confinement.16 The test in both directions is whether the plaintiff was left, as a practical matter, with a way out.
Physical Force
Section 39 names two routes to confinement by force: the plaintiff is overpowered, or the plaintiff submits to physical force.18 Under the first, the defendant’s strength holds the plaintiff in place, as when a person is pinned, bound, or marched along, and the plaintiff’s choices make no difference. Under the second, the plaintiff could resist and does not. The second route matters more on an exam, because it decides what a seized plaintiff must do to keep a claim: nothing.
Overpowering force needs the least explanation. A nursing home patient who tried to escape five or six times was caught and brought back against his will each time, then carried to the wing where he was locked and taped into a restraint chair for more than five hours, and put back in it on later occasions. The court called false imprisonment the direct restraint of one person’s physical liberty without adequate legal justification and found ample evidence to sustain the verdict.19 The patient wanted to leave, tried to leave, and was stopped by the strength of the people holding him.
The harder question is what happens when the plaintiff could have overcome the force. The Restatement gives a plaintiff who is grabbed a choice. A grab is a battery, and if it amounts to false imprisonment, the common law also recognizes a privilege to use self-defense to prevent it, so the plaintiff may use force. The Restatement gives him the choice not to: he may submit and sue for false imprisonment, and the defendant cannot argue that no imprisonment occurred because the plaintiff could have broken loose.20 A privilege is a permission and carries no command. Submission to the force completes the confinement.21
The choice is sound policy. Without it, the victim of even a frail assailant would have to break loose by force, because submitting and suing would be unavailable, and that requirement would encourage escalation of the conflict. The battery claim exists on either path, but battery and false imprisonment protect different invasions: one the contact, the other the freedom to move.22
Two inferences tempt students whenever a stem describes a plaintiff who was seized and did not struggle: that the stillness shows consent, and that a strong plaintiff was never really held. Stillness in response to force is a reaction to the force, and a consent extracted under duress does not bar the action.23 What the facts must show is force applied to the plaintiff’s person to hold the plaintiff in place that either overpowered the plaintiff or was yielded to. Where the defendant lays no hand on the plaintiff and the plaintiff yields to words alone, force is no longer the means, and the next subsection takes up the threat of immediate force that can fill that gap.
Threats of Force
Section 40 provides that confinement may be by submission to a threat to apply physical force to the other’s person immediately upon the other’s going or attempting to go beyond the area in which the actor intends to confine him.25 The rule extends § 39: a plaintiff who yields to a hand on the arm is confined without fighting, and a plaintiff who yields to a credible threat of an immediate blow is in the same position, because the words have done what the hands would have done.26
Two features carry the rule, submission and immediacy. Submission matters because someone told that force will follow upon leaving cannot learn whether the threat is real without taking the blow, so the law lets the plaintiff treat the threat as genuine, and the staying that results is the confinement. Immediacy matters because force promised for the moment the plaintiff moves removes the present ability to go, while harm promised for later leaves the plaintiff free to walk out now. The threat resembles the one that supports assault, which turns on apprehension of imminent harmful contact,27 but confinement adds two conditions: the threat must be tied to the plaintiff’s leaving, and the plaintiff must submit to it.
Confinement by threat needs no locked door. Store personnel who confront a customer in an aisle, accuse her of theft, and threaten physical harm if she leaves have confined her even though the door stands open.28 Dupler v. Seabert frames the point this way: restraint may be by physical barriers or by threats of force which intimidate the plaintiff into compliance with orders.29 The threat may be express or implied,30 and the threatened force never has to materialize. The tort is complete when the plaintiff submits, so a defendant who was bluffing is liable just as one who would have struck.
Immediacy most often defeats a claim built on words. The threat must promise force upon the plaintiff’s going or attempting to go, so the harm must be tied to the leaving and due at once. A threat to call the police and have the plaintiff arrested unless the plaintiff stays promises later action by someone else, and it has been held insufficient even where the plaintiff stayed because of it.31 Sweeney v. F.W. Woolworth Co. is an example. The same promised injury can confine or fail to confine depending on when it is to arrive.
The threatened force need not fall on the plaintiff’s own body. The Restatement illustrations treat a threat to shoot a person’s child if the person leaves the room as a form of duress that creates an imprisonment.32 A plaintiff can reasonably submit to threats of physical force, threats to her property, or threats to a member of her family.33 A parent who cannot leave without exposing a child to a gunshot has no more real choice than a parent facing the gun, but the threat must still be tied to the leaving, which keeps these cases within the immediacy requirement.
Property belongs in the same family. A customer who believes store personnel will keep her purse or her purchases if she leaves, and stays for that reason, is confined: staying to avoid the loss of personal property constitutes confinement.34 The suitcase example based on Griffin v. Clark makes the point from the plaintiff’s side. The plaintiff skipped her train to retrieve her bag, and the defendant could not answer that she was free to skip the retrieval, because coercion through seizure of personal property can constitute false imprisonment.35 A customer who goes to a store office after security guards confiscate her purse has likewise not consented, since submission under duress is no consent.36 Store cases such as Fischer v. Famous-Barr Co. fit this pattern, in which a customer is made to stay by the seizure of her purchases.
The cases that hold property without confining the owner turn on one fact: whether the defendant used the property to make the plaintiff stay or come along. In Marcano v. Northwestern Chrysler-Plymouth Sales, Inc., a customer stayed at a dealership after the dealer kept her keys, and the court found no false imprisonment. The example based on Warrem v. Parrish works the same way. Clevinger was prevented from driving home but not from going home some other way or from going anywhere else, so he was not confined, and his remedy lies in conversion of the car or infliction of emotional distress.37 An exam stem about seized property therefore turns on what the defendant did with it. Demanding that the plaintiff stay or come along confines; holding an object the plaintiff can leave behind does not.
Asserted Legal Authority
Section 41 adds a fourth means of confinement: taking a person into custody under an asserted legal authority.39 The custody is complete if the person against whom and in whose presence the authority is asserted believes it to be valid, or is in doubt as to its validity, and submits to it.40 Nothing in that language calls for a lock, a grip, or a threatened blow. The only instrument is a claim of the right to hold the person, and the confinement is finished when the person yields to the claim.
The rule turns on belief or doubt, and on submission, because of how people respond to official claims. A person told by someone who seems to speak for the law to come along or stay put usually obeys, since resisting invites force and a criminal charge whether or not the claim is genuine. If liability required the person to defy the claim and test it, the tort would punish reasonable deference and shelter the defendants whose false claims are most convincing. Each half of the rule answers part of that problem. The belief-or-doubt half asks whether the claim worked on the plaintiff’s will: a person certain the authority is genuine and a person who suspects otherwise but cannot be sure both face a choice between obeying and finding out the hard way. The submission half asks whether the plaintiff yielded, since a person who hears the claim and walks away has not been confined by it.
The wrong in these cases lies in the absence of real authority. Section 41 describes how the confinement is imposed and says nothing yet about whether the power claimed existed. Custody under genuine authority defeats a claim of false arrest: the claim will not lie if the officer has a valid warrant or probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested committed it, and conviction of the crime for which a person is specifically arrested is a complete defense.41 If instead the defendant has or asserts the legal power to detain, the plaintiff believes he has or may have it and submits against his will, and the arrest is in fact without legal authority, the result is false arrest and therefore false imprisonment.42 A footnote in California v. Hodari D. quotes the same point: an officer who undertakes an arrest without being privileged to make it is liable for false imprisonment if the other submits, even without physical contact.43 When an arrest is privileged is a question this chapter takes up at its close.
Enright v. Groves shows the two halves together. The officer arrested Mrs. Enright for refusing to produce her driver’s license, not for the dog leash violation that had drawn his attention, and he told her she would either produce the license or go to jail. The court found no statute or case requiring a citizen to show a license on demand unless, for example, she is driving, so the demand was not a lawful order, her refusal was no offense, and the officer was not entitled to use force in arresting her.44 The officer’s defense, an arrest for and conviction of a specific offense, failed as a matter of law, because the conviction defense covers only the crime for which the person was specifically arrested.45 The authority he asserted did not exist, so the arrest was a false imprisonment.
The person who asserts the authority need not be a police officer. The cases of a railroad conductor (Whitman v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co.) and a filling station attendant (Daniel v. Phillips Petroleum Co.) applied the rule to private actors who claimed a legal power to hold the plaintiff.46 What they share is the claim of legal power, and the claimant’s job title adds nothing to it. The same logic reaches institutions: a patient who has not been lawfully committed to an appropriate facility has no obligation to stay, and coercive efforts to restrict that patient’s movement may constitute false imprisonment.47 Who answers for an arrest when a private person only calls the police is a question for the section on participation in confinement.
The missing authority explains why Lin has a claim, and the missing belief or doubt explains why Okoro has none. Submission to a claim of authority differs from consent. In Parvi v. City of Kingston, the plaintiff told officers he had no place to go and was left with one alternative, arrest, which the court called “hardly the stuff of which consent is formed,” particularly since he was, to a degree for the jury to measure, under the influence of alcohol and his request to be released at a place he designated was refused.48 A plaintiff who went along because arrest was the only alternative offered has yielded to the claim. Consent as a defense is taken up at the end of the chapter.
Running the steps in this order keeps the plaintiff’s belief and submission, which complete the confinement under § 41, apart from the question whether the authority was real, which is the question privilege answers.
Pressure That Falls Short
Many people stay put for reasons that fit none of the four means: to avoid a scene, to clear a name, to resolve a dispute, to keep a job, or because the other person has threatened to call the police or tell others about an accusation. These are responses to moral, social, or future pressure. Section 40 draws the line sharply for pressure delivered by words, because a threat confines only when it promises physical force to the plaintiff’s person immediately upon the plaintiff’s going or attempting to go.50 Where the plaintiff stays to clear his name or to avoid attracting attention or public humiliation, there may be some tort, but it is not false imprisonment.51 Nor does persuasion suffice. False imprisonment has not been extended beyond direct duress to person or property, and a plaintiff who accompanies the defendant to clear himself of suspicion, without any implied threat of force, has no action.52
The line reflects two separate ideas. The first concerns the plaintiff: a person who stays because every available option is unattractive has still kept the freedom of movement the tort protects, so the presence in the room is the product of her own decision, however reluctant. The second concerns the defendant. Calling the police, reporting a suspicion, and discharging an employee are steps a defendant ordinarily has a right to take, and remaining because of pressure the defendant has a right to use generally does not constitute confinement.53 If announcing a lawful step could turn a conversation into an imprisonment, every accusation in a store office and every workplace investigation would become a lawsuit. Reserving the tort for coercion the law counts, meaning force, the threat of immediate force, and the seizure of valuable property, keeps it aimed at real restraint.
Hardy v. LaBelle’s Distributing Co. shows the first side of the line on facts that sound alarming. Hardy followed an assistant manager into the showroom manager’s office under the pretense of a tour, and two policemen were in the room. The court found ample evidence that she was not unlawfully restrained: she felt compelled to stay, but admitted she wanted to stay and clarify the situation, did not ask to leave, was not told she could not leave, and faced no threat of force or otherwise. She testified that she would have followed the assistant manager voluntarily had she known the true purpose of the meeting and that police officers were present.54 Her sense of compulsion was real, but it came from her wish to answer the accusation, and that wish was her own reason for staying.
Employer interrogations produce the most common versions of this claim. Courts agree that the compulsion an employee feels to stay and answer accusations does not establish false imprisonment, and even a threat to call the police if the employee does not remain has been held insufficient.55 Staying to avoid dismissal from employment is likewise a reason other than the confinement the tort requires.56 Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. reached a similar result for an employee who went along out of fear of losing her job.
The threat to call the police is easy to confuse with the claim of legal authority that § 41 treats as a means of confinement, and the two can sound alike in an exam stem. A person who announces an arrest, or invokes a law requiring the plaintiff to stay, asserts a power to hold the plaintiff now, and a plaintiff who believes that power valid or is in doubt about it, and submits, is in custody.57 A person who says the police will be called if the plaintiff walks out has announced a step that someone else will take later, and nothing in those words asserts custody. Read the words for which of the two they carry.
Social pressure falls on the same side of the line as job pressure: staying to avoid the prospect of “a scene” does not suffice to constitute confinement.58 What the staying plaintiffs in these cases lack is coercion the law counts. A customer who stays in the store office because she believes personnel will keep her purse if she leaves is confined, while a customer in the same office who stays because personnel will call the police or tell others she is a thief is not.59
Pressure becomes confinement when the defendant adds one of the means the earlier subsections described, such as physical restraint of an employee who tries to rise and leave, or the seizure of valuable property. Defendants have prevailed where the questioning was done in a reasonable manner, the plaintiff showed no apprehension or fear, the employee was questioned during business hours in familiar surroundings, and the defendant acted in good faith.60
These cases often turn on why the plaintiff stayed, which makes them questions of fact for the jury: whether the plaintiff reasonably apprehended physical force or the loss of valuable property, or stayed to clear matters up or to avoid arrest or dismissal.61 On an exam, test each pressure described in the stem against a short list. Is it a barrier, force, a threat of immediate force, a seizure of valuable property, or an assertion of custody, or is it a lawful or future consequence the plaintiff chose to avoid? The first group supports confinement and the second does not, however uncomfortable the choice felt to the plaintiff.
Whether a merchant may detain a suspected thief at all is a separate question from whether confinement occurred. The Restatement privileges one who reasonably believes that another has tortiously taken a chattel, or has not paid for a chattel purchased or a service rendered there, to detain him on the premises, without arresting him, for the time necessary for a reasonable investigation of the facts.62 The section on consent and privilege takes that up.