Concept
Awareness or Harm
False imprisonment
Awareness or Harm
Two requirements of false imprisonment look at the defendant: the actor must intend to confine, and the actor's act must directly or indirectly result in a confinement.1 The third looks at the plaintiff. Under § 35(1)(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the other must be conscious of the confinement or harmed by it.2 Section 42 states the same rule as a limit on liability: there is none for intentionally confining another unless the person physically restrained knows of the confinement or is harmed by it.3 Because an actor is liable only when every requirement is met,4 a defendant who intended a confinement and caused one still escapes liability if the plaintiff neither knew of it nor suffered from it.
The requirement follows from what the tort protects. False imprisonment enforces the right to be free from wrongful confinement, and its essence is the mental harm of knowing that one is not free to move about at will.5 Assault offers a parallel: it compensates the fright a victim feels before a punch connects, and so it depends on what the victim perceives.6 A plaintiff who is held and knows it has felt the injury the tort exists to remedy. A plaintiff who is held without knowing has not, unless the confinement hurt in some other way.
The word or in both provisions opens two routes. Knowledge stands in for the injury to dignity, and harm supplies an injury by a different path. The plaintiff needs one, not both. The next subsection takes up the plaintiff who knew of the confinement, and the one after it the plaintiff who did not know but was harmed by it.
Awareness of Confinement
Awareness is the alternative most plaintiffs rely on, and the rule is simple to state: unless the confinement caused some other harm, the plaintiff must have been aware of it at the time, or there is no tort.7 A person shut in and released without learning of it has felt no loss of freedom, because freedom that is never tested is never experienced as taken. Awareness therefore carries the plaintiff through this element with nothing else to prove. No physical injury or lost earnings is required, because the knowledge is itself the injury the tort protects.
Authorities have divided on whether awareness should be required at all. New York settled the question in Broughton v. State of New York, which recognizes that false imprisonment, as a dignitary tort, is not suffered unless its victim knows of the dignitary invasion, and the Restatement takes the same position.8
The harder question is what proves awareness, and Parvi v. City of Kingston answers it. Parvi had been drinking and, he claimed, was put into a police car against his will. Within an hour, he had wandered 350 feet onto the New York State Thruway, where a car struck and severely injured him.9 At trial he conceded on cross-examination that he no longer recalled the confinement, and the Appellate Division, affirming dismissal of his false imprisonment claim, relied on that concession.10
The Court of Appeals found the dismissal erroneous. It accepted the premise that awareness is required, but it held that the Appellate Division had failed to distinguish between a later recollection of consciousness and the existence of that consciousness when the imprisonment took place.11 Consciousness is the event that completes the element, and recollection is one kind of evidence that the event occurred. The event can be proved even though the person who experienced it can no longer describe it, whether from lapse of memory, incompetency, death, or another cause.12 Alcohol or injuries may well have erased Parvi's memory of the ride, but that is a far cry from showing that he was unconscious of the confinement while it took place. It was for the jury, in the first instance, to weigh credibility, evaluate inconsistencies, and decide whether the burden of proof had been met.13 A rule that confused memory with consciousness would defeat every claim by a plaintiff whose memory later failed, whatever the plaintiff felt at the time.
The opposing view had force on this record. Parvi admitted that he had no independent recollection of the day and knew how he came to enter the police car only from later conversations. On that showing, his bare statement that he was ordered into the car against his will was said to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to make a prima facie case.14 The disagreement went to proof, not to the rule.
The claim changes the moment the sleeper stirs. A worker who wakes at one o'clock, tries the handle, and finds it locked is conscious of the confinement from that discovery on, and the element is satisfied however the rest of the night unfolds.15 A plaintiff who was insensible for the entire confinement stands where the sleeper stands, because no moment of awareness exists to be proved.
Step three is what Parvi adds. A plaintiff's failure to remember a confinement leaves a gap in one source of proof, and the question remains whether the whole record would let a jury find that the plaintiff knew at the time.
Harm Without Awareness
The second alternative asks a different question: not what the plaintiff knew, but what the confinement did. Section 42 allows liability when the person confined is harmed by the confinement, and the Court of Appeals in Parvi recited § 42 with both halves intact even though that case turned on awareness.17
The two alternatives answer to different injuries. Awareness protects against the mental harm of knowing one is not free to move. A confinement can also injure in other ways, and the plaintiff may recover for physical harm and other consequential damages caused by it. Where such damages are incurred there is a cause of action even though, because of mental incapacity or some other reason, the plaintiff was incapable of realizing that he or she was confined.18 The reason for this route follows from who is likely to need it. Infants, people who are unconscious, and people who are asleep or otherwise incapacitated are the least able to perceive a confinement and are often the most exposed to injury from being shut in. If awareness were the only route, an intentional confiner would owe nothing to a victim too young or too ill to understand what was done. Harm therefore supplies a basis for liability that does not depend on mental distress at all.
The casebook tests the rule with a harder case. A diabetic, unconscious from insulin shock, is wrongfully arrested on the belief that he is drunk and is held in jail overnight, then released before he regains consciousness. Is there a tort?19 By hypothesis he cannot have been aware of the cell, so the answer under § 42 turns entirely on harm. If the night in custody injured him or worsened his condition, the harm alternative is met. If the confinement did nothing but hold him, neither alternative is satisfied.
The harm must come from the confinement itself, and that link is what to check on an exam. The harm alternative asks what the lock did to the plaintiff, and a plaintiff whose injury would have happened just the same with the door open was harmed by something else.
On an exam, a stem in which the plaintiff was asleep, drugged, unconscious, very young, or mentally incapacitated should not end the analysis at the plaintiff's lack of knowledge. The next question is whether the confinement physically injured the plaintiff or caused some other harm, because an affirmative answer satisfies the third requirement without any proof that the plaintiff understood what was happening.