Concept
Elements of Trespass
Trespass to land
Intrusion on Another's Land
Elements of Trespass
In its broadest sense, trespass is an unlawful act against another's person or property, and in the law of land it means, above all, wrongful entry on another's real property.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 turns that idea into a working rule. A person is subject to liability for trespass, “irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other,” if he intentionally does any one of three things:2
- enters land in the possession of another, or causes a thing or a third person to do so;3
- remains on the land; or4
- fails to remove from the land a thing he is under a duty to remove.5
The phrase “irrespective of … harm” tells you what the tort protects. The protected interest is the possessor's exclusive control over who and what occupies the land, so the wrong is the unauthorized physical presence itself. Motive, extent, duration, and harm are irrelevant to liability, though they may affect the amount of damages.6 History points the same way. A chief function of the action was to try the land's title, with the technical trespass serving as the vehicle, and the action can also stop a habitual trespasser from acquiring a prescriptive right.7 Because the claim is for exclusive possession, it belongs to the party with the right of possession; if the land is leased, that party is the tenant.8
“Intentionally” has a narrow meaning. The defendant must intend the entry, or intend to cause it, but need not intend a wrong. It is no defense that the defendant mistakenly believed, without any inducement from the possessor, that he was privileged to enter.9 Some entries are in fact privileged, and later sections take them up. The sections after this one also cover who counts as a possessor, how intent is measured, why mistakes do not excuse, why a plaintiff recovers without harm, what happens to things left on the land after the original entry, and where trespass ends and private nuisance begins.
Entry by Person or Thing
Subsection (a) of § 158 reaches an actor who enters land in another's possession personally or who causes a thing or a third person to do so.10 The second route is needed because a possessor loses control as completely when a defendant launches a bullet or sends an employee across the line as when the defendant walks across it. A rule that reached only the defendant's own footsteps would be easy to avoid. On either route the actor must intend the entry, a requirement the next sections measure, so this section asks only what counts as an entry.
Personal entry must be volitional. Trish, carried across Paul's land by kidnappers, is no trespasser, though the kidnappers may be.11 A mistake about where the boundary lies does not make an entry nonvolitional. A neighbor who walks across the line believing the ground is hers moved herself onto the land, and she is a trespasser despite her error.12
The defendant need not enter personally. The intrusion may come through an agent or through physical objects the defendant sets in motion, such as a rolling car or a fired bullet.13 Artillery shells fired onto a neighbor's land are an entry of the same kind, and some states reach the same result when a defendant emits particulates into the air over another's land.14 Older law asked whether the invasion was direct. Throwing water onto another's land was trespass, but building a spout or dam that let the water reach the land of its own accord was not. With the forms of action abolished, direct and indirect entries are generally both actionable.15
Intent still controls the result. Albers, a mediocre golfer, drives a ball that veers into Genet's yard. When he swung, he did not have a purpose to send the ball there, and he did not know to a substantial certainty that it would go there. He may recognize that a stray shot is possible, but possibilities do not make an intentional tort, so he is not liable for trespass.16 A careless intrusion is a different matter. It can be trespass only if it causes harm, a point the section on unintentional entries develops.17
Animals show both sides of the intent line. Shepherdson can say that his sheep trespassed, not he. But if he opened the fence for the purpose of having them enter his neighbor's field, he intended the entry and caused it, and he is liable though he never set foot on the field.18 Animals that wander without the owner's design are another matter. At common law the owner answered for their trespasses, but many states now have statutes requiring landowners to fence their land, and liability generally does not reach dogs, cats, and other animals whose movements are hard to control.19
Words can also cause a third person's entry. Janowski, speaking loosely, tells Menlove that Snobbin lets people pick his strawberries, and Menlove goes and picks them. Janowski's talk led Menlove onto the land, but trespass is an intentional tort, and she neither spoke for the purpose of causing his entry nor was substantially certain that it would follow. She is not liable to Snobbin.20 Had she spoken in order to send Menlove onto the field, she would have caused the entry in the way § 158(a) requires. The physical result is the same in both versions, and only the speaker's state of mind differs.
Possessory rights extend vertically in both directions, so an entry can occur above or below the surface. An underground intrusion such as a slant well is a trespass. So is an intrusion into airspace by a building, wire, or other object, and so is an isolated nonpermanent intrusion such as firing a gun over land. Airplane overflights are governed by special rules.21 Depletion of a migrant resource such as water, oil, or gas from a common basin by a perpendicular well on neighboring land is not a trespass.22
The physical-invasion requirement also marks the outer edge of the tort. Courts tend to hold that smoke, odors, and similar intangible intrusions are not actionable trespasses, whatever the physics. Vibration or concussion waves are still not technically a trespass, though they may cause damage actionable under strict liability or nuisance.25 Anything less would make everyday life an intentional tort. If crossing air molecules were a trespass, a person who shouted at a neighbor would be liable.26 Courts are divided on airborne particles, and an increasing number treat them as a matter for nuisance alone. That question is left to the section on trespass versus nuisance.27
Remaining on the Land
The second form of liability reaches someone who entered lawfully and then stayed: an actor is liable if he intentionally “remains on the land” in another's possession.29 Entry and stay are separate events, and a possessor's permission can cover the first without covering the second. A dinner guest or a restaurant patron enters with consent, and either can become a trespasser by staying after that consent has run out. The possessor's control includes the power to say when an occupant must go, and one who stays after that decision occupies the land against the possessor's will.
Everything turns on what the possessor's consent covered. Entry with consent is not trespass. The invitation creates a license, which may be oral or implied, and once the license expires or is revoked, failure to leave within a reasonable time is a trespass.30 Suppose Trish enters a restaurant to dine. The circumstances impliedly invite the public in, so she is no trespasser. If she refuses to leave after closing time, her presence after the license has ended is a trespass. The allowance of a reasonable time protects an entrant who is actually leaving, such as a diner who is collecting a coat, and gives no cover to one who refuses to go.
A license has limits in place and in time, and the possessor draws them. A store owner who invites customers into his showroom has not consented to their going upstairs to his apartment to watch television. A college student who leaves a trunk at a friend's house for the summer has permission only for the agreed period.31 A fact pattern that mentions an invitation has therefore not finished the analysis. The question is whether this presence, in this place and at this time, falls within what was granted. Decided cases test those limits. Copeland v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. and Brown v. Dellinger turn on the scope of an invitation, and Mitchell v. Mitchell on the withdrawal of one.
Because § 158 requires that the actor intentionally remain, the stay must be a choice.32 A guest who has been told to go and refuses stays by choice, and from that point he is a trespasser. A guest who never learns that his welcome ended stands differently. The rule that mistake is no defense covers by its terms only a belief “not induced by the possessor,” and a belief that he is still welcome, created by the host's own invitation and never corrected, is the possessor's doing.33
An entry under a privilege, which is permission the law supplies without the possessor's agreement, is lawful for the same kind of reason a licensed entry is. Paul's house is on fire, and Trish enters to put the fire out before it spreads to her property. She is privileged to do so.35 A privilege serves a purpose, and what happens when a privileged actor leaves something behind is taken up next.
Failing to Remove a Thing
The third form of liability, § 158(c), reaches an actor who may have done nothing at all: he is liable if he intentionally “fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.”37 Entering and remaining both involve conduct on or toward the land, while subsection (c) covers an omission. The actor may have entered with full permission and may be miles away, yet the thing he left behind keeps occupying the possessor's land and interferes with the possessor's control as much as an object thrown there would.
The simplest illustration is a trunk of textbooks. Clements leaves her trunk at Kobe's house for the summer, decides not to return to school, and never comes for it. She becomes a trespasser by failing to remove the trunk at the end of the agreed time.38 The trespassory act is the leaving of the trunk, her not coming for it, and one might argue that this is no act at all.39 Section 158(c) answers the objection by naming the failure to remove as a form of trespass in its own right. Nothing in Clements's earlier conduct was wrongful, because the placement had Kobe's consent. What changed was the calendar. The consent covered the trunk's presence for the agreed period, and when the period ended, so did the permission that made its presence lawful.
Timing therefore decides the case. While the summer storage is running, no duty to remove has arisen and Clements has committed no trespass. The same trunk in the same hall becomes a trespass once the agreed time has passed. The omission is the act, so an answer that hunts for some fresh wrongful step will miss it. Kobe need not show that the trunk damaged the floor or crowded out anything of his, since § 158 applies irrespective of harm.40
The same pattern holds for a thing placed under a privilege conferred irrespective of the possessor's consent. If the actor fails to remove it after the privilege has been terminated, by the accomplishment of its purpose or otherwise, the failure is a trespass.41
The sections on continuing trespass sort these placements by how the thing came to be there. It may have been placed with consent, under a privilege, wrongfully, or by a predecessor. Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners is a decided case about a thing left on land after permission ended.