Concept
Continuing Trespass
Trespass to land
Continuing Trespass
A trespass can outlast the act that began it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160 states the premise: a trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing that the actor, or the actor’s predecessor in legal interest, has placed there.1 The wrong then lies in the thing’s staying. A sign that overhangs a neighbor’s property makes the point. It went up once, but it fills the neighbor’s space on every day after, and the law calls such a permanent invasion a continuing trespass.2
How the thing came to be on the land sorts the rules. When it arrived lawfully, with the possessor’s consent or under a privilege that operates without that consent, the placement was no trespass, and the trespass begins when the actor fails to remove the thing after the permission has ended.3 When it arrived wrongfully, the placement was itself a trespass, and the thing’s continued presence extends the wrong for as long as it stays. That holds for the person who placed the thing and, in defined circumstances, for a successor who takes it over.4 All four rules apply the failure-to-remove trespass of § 158(c), and each says when the duty to remove exists.5
Thing Placed With Consent
A thing that sits on another’s land with the possessor’s consent is lawfully there, and it stays lawful until the consent ends. Section 160(a) makes the next step a trespass: the actor placed the thing “with the consent of the person then in possession of the land,” and the actor “fails to remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated.”6 Three things must be true. The placement was lawful when made, the consent had an end, and the actor failed to take the thing away once the end came. Because the actor did nothing wrong at the start, a fact pattern that describes only the lawful placement can hide the claim, and the question to ask is what happened to the consent.
Consent to leave a thing on land is a grant for a period or a purpose, and such a grant is temporary. When it runs out, a presence the possessor allowed becomes an occupation the possessor no longer permits. The person who placed the thing knows where it is and can usually remove it more cheaply than anyone else, so the rule puts the duty on that person.
The consent is a license, which may be oral or implied; once it expires or is revoked, failure to leave within a reasonable time is a trespass, and the same timing sensibly governs a thing left behind.7 Clements’s trunk illustrates expiry. She left a trunk full of textbooks at Kobe’s house for the summer, decided not to return to school, and never came back for it. She became a trespasser by failing to remove the trunk at the end of the agreed time, and the trespassory act was the leaving of the trunk, her not coming for it, although one might argue that it is no act at all.8 Revocation ends consent only when it is effective, and a possessor’s undisclosed change of heart gives the actor nothing to respond to.
Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners applied § 160(a) to a field and a fence. The county road commissioners had a farmer’s permission to put a fence in for the winter. In the spring they did not remove the anchor pipe, and the farmer’s survivors sued them for wrongful death on theories of trespass and negligence.10 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a claim for trespass: the commissioners had permission to put the fence in for the winter, but by leaving the anchor pipe in the ground in the spring they committed a trespass.11
The result teaches two things. First, the trespass claim did not ask whether leaving the pipe was careless. It asked whether the pipe was placed with permission, whether the permission ended, and whether the pipe stayed. Second, the label mattered. Cities and towns often have limited liability or immunity for the negligent acts of their employees, and the commissioners moved to dismiss on governmental immunity. The court held that, whether or not a negligence claim could be brought, public immunity did not bar the claim for intentional tort.12 The same facts can be pleaded under two labels that carry different elements and different defenses, and a theory that fits the facts can succeed where its alternative would stall.
The pipe’s presence also bears on liability for harm. A trespasser answers for physical harm to the possessor, to the land or his things, or to members of his household, caused by any act done, activity carried on, or condition created by the trespasser, whether or not his conduct would be actionable if he were not a trespasser.13 The pipe and Clements’s trunk are therefore the same trespass with different consequences. The trunk harms nothing, yet Clements is a trespasser, because trespass does not turn on harm.14 The survivors tied the pipe to a death, and the later section on liability for resulting harm explains how far that liability reaches.
The calendar decides these cases. While the fence stood under the winter permission, the pipe was where the farmer had allowed it to be, and a trespass claim based on it would have failed because no duty to remove had yet arisen. The identical pipe after the permission ended is a trespass. A fact pattern that describes a lawful placement and a lapse of time is asking whether the consent has ended, and the actor’s original good conduct does not answer that.
Thing Placed Under Privilege
Section 160(b) reaches a thing placed “pursuant to a privilege conferred on the actor irrespective of the possessor’s consent,” where the actor “fails to remove it after the privilege has been terminated, by the accomplishment of its purpose or otherwise.”16 Subsection (a) covers a placement the possessor agreed to, and the possessor controls when that agreement ends. Subsection (b) covers a placement the law allowed whether or not the possessor agreed, so the possessor’s wishes neither start nor stop the clock. The right to leave the thing ends when the reason the law gave the actor ends.
Necessity is the privilege that fits. A defendant who acts to prevent a threatened injury from nature or some other independent cause not connected with the plaintiff acts under necessity, and may use another’s property to save life or more valuable property.17 That right is measured by what it protects. When the danger passes, the reason for using the possessor’s land is gone, and a thing that stays has no justification left. Otherwise a temporary privilege would harden into a permanent occupation.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. shows the privilege at work on the water. A boat moored at a dock to unload remained there after the unloading was finished because of a severe storm. As the lines securing it became damaged, the defendant’s employees replaced them, and wind and waves still threw the boat against the dock and damaged it. The dock owner alleged that the damage resulted from the defendant’s trespass to land, and the court held there was no trespass because the employees were acting under necessity.18 What explained the boat’s presence changed over time. Unloading explained why it came, and once the cargo was off, only the storm explained why it stayed. A justification made of a storm lasts as long as the storm, so the reasoning that excused the boat while the weather raged would stop excusing it once the weather cleared and it could cast off. That is the situation § 160(b) addresses.
The pilot differs from Clements’s trunk only in what ends the lawful presence. The trunk stayed lawfully until the agreed time ran out.20 The plane has no agreed time to run out, because the privilege came from the danger and not from the possessor. The question is therefore always whether the danger that justified the placement still exists.
The words “or otherwise” mean that accomplishing the purpose is the usual way a privilege ends but not the only way. Any event that removes the justification ends it. Privileges grounded in a property interest follow the same pattern: such a right is not a general license to wander about but is limited to such entry as is necessary to protect the interest.21
Two consequences should be kept apart. While the privilege runs, neither the placement nor the stay is a trespass, as Vincent held for the boat. Once the privilege ends, the thing’s continued presence is itself a trespass, and an intentional trespass is actionable although it causes no harm.22 A fact pattern that opens with an emergency invites you to stop at “privileged, so no trespass.” That answer is right for the placement and for the stay during the emergency, and it is incomplete when the stem goes on to say that the danger has passed and the thing is still there.
Thing Tortiously Placed
Section 161(1) makes the continued presence on land of a structure, chattel, or other thing a trespass when the actor has tortiously placed it there, “whether or not the actor has the ability to remove it.”24 A thing is tortiously placed when the placement was wrongful from the start: the actor had neither the possessor’s consent nor a privilege, so putting the thing there was itself a trespass. That timing separates this rule from the two before it. In the consent and privilege cases the placement was lawful, and the wrong arrives when the permission ends and the actor fails to remove the thing.25 Under § 161(1) the wrong exists on the day of placement, and it does not stop when the actor walks away, because the thing stays and keeps occupying the possessor’s land.
The sign that overhangs a neighbor’s property is the familiar illustration, a trespass in the nature of a permanent invasion of another’s rights.26 The possessor’s rights run upward as well as along the ground: a building, wire, or other object that intrudes into the airspace is a trespass and may lead to the acquisition of prescriptive rights of possession or use.27 A sign hung over the line without permission was therefore wrongful on the first day, and each later day it continues to fill space the possessor controls. The possessor need not wait for some new act by the sign’s owner. The sign keeps the invasion going.
The closing phrase of the rule, that the actor’s ability to remove the thing is irrelevant, follows from whose choice created the problem. The placement was the actor’s own wrongful act, and the thing’s presence is its direct product. If liability depended on the actor’s capacity to undo it, difficulty would become a defense: a structure sunk into the ground or a pipe buried under plantings would shelter the one who put it there, and the more thoroughly the actor entrenched the invasion, the safer he would be. Difficulty of removal still matters, but to the remedy a court orders and not to whether a trespass exists.
The two walls look alike in the ground, and they differ in when the wrong began. When a fact pattern describes a thing still on the land, ask first how it arrived. A thing that arrived wrongfully is a trespass for as long as it stays, and a thing that arrived lawfully becomes one only when the consent or privilege ends and the actor fails to remove it.
The Zarvas and Fox problem puts the rule on facts that favor the defendant. Zarvas decides to sell his lot and has it surveyed, and the surveyor tells him that Fox’s pipe runs under a corner of his property.30 The pipe does no harm down there and may even keep Zarvas’s lot dry, but it is on his property.31 Removing it would be quite expensive, especially since Fox has put expensive plantings above it.32 Suppose Fox laid the pipe believing the line lay elsewhere, so that he thought the land was his. A mistaken belief of that kind, however reasonable and not induced by the possessor, is no defense to an intentional entry,33 and placing a thing on another’s land is an entry by causing a thing to enter.34 The placement was tortious, so the pipe’s presence is a continuing trespass under § 161(1). That the pipe does no harm, or even helps, changes nothing, because an intentional trespass is actionable though it causes no harm.35
Because the pipe stays, the invasion continues, and the remedy follows from that. In Brown v. Voss, a dispute over misuse of an easement, the court held that the misuse was a trespass to real property and that where a continuing condition would result in frequent trespasses, damages are not a sufficient remedy and injunctive relief is far superior.36 The reasoning carries to a thing left in place. Damages for one stretch of time leave the invasion where it is, while an order directing removal ends it. The cost to the defendant enters at this stage. The court noted that balancing the equities, or relative hardship, is reserved for the innocent defendant who proceeds without knowledge or warning that his structure encroaches on another’s property or property rights.37 Fox’s expensive plantings are the sort of cost that figures in that balance, but they bear on whether a court orders the pipe dug up and do not bear on whether the pipe is a trespass.
Predecessor's Tortious Placement
Section 161(2) carries continuing trespass to a person who did not put the thing on the land. Subsection (1), just above, reaches the actor who wrongfully placed a thing and leaves it there. Subsection (2) reaches the next holder: a trespass may be committed by the continued presence of a thing that the actor’s predecessor in legal interest tortiously placed on the land, when the actor, “having acquired his legal interest in the thing with knowledge of such tortious conduct or having thereafter learned of it, fails to remove the thing.”39 The predecessor is whoever held the thing before the actor and passed it on, such as a seller, a donor, or the earlier owner of a lot on which a building stands. The successor takes whatever the predecessor had, and that can include a structure sitting where it should not.
The rule is needed because the invasion does not stop when the thing changes hands. The same object occupies the possessor’s land on the day after a sale as on the day before. If a transfer ended the wrong, someone who built across the line could sell and leave the neighbor to start over against a buyer who had no part in the placement. The successor is also the only person now in a position to take the thing away. Subsection (2) therefore puts liability on the person who holds the thing and can end the invasion, but only once that person knows what the thing is doing.
Knowledge is the condition because the successor’s only possible wrong is an omission. He did not choose where the thing went, so nothing he did produced the invasion, and he can be charged only with leaving it there, the failure-to-remove trespass of § 158(c).40 A failure to act is a choice only for someone who knows what he is failing to do. The text names two moments when the choice begins. A buyer who takes the thing knowing of the wrongful placement takes on the invasion with open eyes, and a buyer who learns afterward and leaves the thing in place decides, on a particular day, to let it continue. A buyer with no notice has made neither choice, and holding him liable would charge him with the predecessor’s act.
The person who placed the thing stands differently. Someone who sets a pipe or a wall on a neighbor’s land under an honest mistake about the boundary is liable from the day of placement, because he chose where the thing went and a reasonable mistake is no defense to an intentional entry.41 The successor differs in the one respect that matters: he chose nothing about the placement. The inquiry is therefore what he actually knew when he acquired the thing and what he learned afterward.
The timeline is what a fact pattern tests. A buyer who never ordered a survey, or who could easily have found the encroachment, is an innocent successor, and the possessor has no claim against him until notice arrives. A letter, a survey report, or a conversation that tells the buyer the thing is over the line, followed by inaction, supplies the knowledge. Once it does, the claim is an ordinary intentional trespass, and the neighbor can sue without showing harm to the land.43 The cost of taking down a built structure bears on the choice of remedy, as the Zarvas problem showed, and leaves the trespass in place. The successor answers for his own failure to remove, because the placement itself was another person’s act.