Concept
Protecting Possession of Chattels
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Interference with Personal Property
Protecting Possession of Chattels
The law protects a possessor's hold on personal property as well as on bodies and land. Cars, couches, books, and cows are all covered. Property law calls such tangible, movable things chattels, to distinguish them from real property such as land.1 Two intentional torts do most of the protecting. A trespass to a chattel is committed by dispossessing another of the chattel, or by using or intermeddling with a chattel in another's possession.2 Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel that so seriously interferes with another's right to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.3
Possession, not title, anchors both torts. Trespass and trover were both actions founded upon possession.4 The person in possession of the chattel, whether lessee, bailee, mortgagee, pledgee, finder, or whatever, is always a proper plaintiff. The rule can leave the true owner empty-handed. A possessor who sues and wins may recover far more than the value of his own interest, and the owner must look to him for the owner's share, however irresponsible he may be.5 The later section on who may sue returns to the owner who is out of possession.
The two torts differ in how badly the actor interferes with the possessor's control. At the mild end, Carter takes Puso's horse, Flora, for a three-hour ride and returns her to the barn. Puso has Flora back and she is unharmed. Carter has probably committed trespass to chattels but not conversion, because he has neither permanently deprived Puso of the horse nor damaged her.6
The remedy shows why the line matters. In trespass, the plaintiff remains the owner and possession is merely interrupted. When the chattel comes back, the owner must accept it, and recovery is limited to damage to the chattel or reimbursement for the time it was missing. In conversion, the defendant is treated as having appropriated the plaintiff's property, and he must pay for it, generally at its market value at the time and place of the conversion.7 The court in effect requires the defendant to buy the chattel, even though the actual damage to it is less than total, or nil.8
Neither remedy would suit every case. Suppose a diner picks up the wrong hat in a restaurant, notices a block later, and returns it undamaged. A dispossession that is brief and causes no damage is not conversion.9 Full value would make the diner buy a hat the owner already has back. Matching the remedy to the seriousness of the interference spares the brief borrower that result and still makes the person who takes for good pay for what he took.
The old forms of action explain why the vocabulary is split. The writ of trespass de bonis asportatis, trespass for the taking of goods, was the form used for trespass to chattels.10 Conversion is the tort for which trover was the appropriate form of action. Now that the forms of action have been abolished, the word trover is rarely used, and the plaintiff is said to bring a civil action for conversion.11
Both torts require intent, and neither reaches carelessness. The actor must mean to do the act that interferes with the chattel, and negligent interference will not support trespass to chattels.12 One who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion even though his act or omission is negligent.13 Intent is therefore the gate to everything that follows, and the chapter begins there with what the actor must intend and which mistakes do not excuse. It then takes up trespass to chattels: the ways of committing it, the forms dispossession takes, when liability attaches, who may sue, and how the rules apply to computers. Conversion follows, with its definition, the full-value remedy, the factors that measure seriousness, and the ways of committing it. The chapter ends with a method for sorting a fact pattern between the two torts.