Concept
Who May Sue
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Who May Sue
Trespass to a chattel gives a claim to three kinds of plaintiff, and which kind is suing determines what harm must be shown. The possessor sues under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 218, which makes the trespasser liable “to the possessor of the chattel” if, but only if, the trespasser dispossesses the possessor, impairs the chattel, deprives the possessor of its use for a substantial time, or causes bodily harm or harm to a legally protected interest.1 A person who is, or may by demand become, entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel sues under § 219, and a person entitled to its future possession sues under § 220.2 Each description fixes the plaintiff by a relationship to the chattel when the interference occurs: holding it, being able to call for it now, or being due to get it back later. Title appears in none of them.
The three sections grew out of a narrower rule. The traditional action had to be brought by the person who actually possessed the property when the tort occurred, or at least by one entitled to immediate possession, such as a bailor at will, and at one time only the possessor could sue at all.3 An owner who had leased the chattel, or a chattel mortgagee, could be harmed and still have no claim in trespass. Courts came to see that denying the true owner the preferred remedies merely because someone else held the chattel gave possession far too much weight. Many courts, and the Restatement, now let that owner sue for damage to his reversion, which is his interest in getting the chattel back.4 The possessor was not displaced. A lessee, bailee, mortgagee, pledgee, or finder remains a proper plaintiff, and the owner behind the possessor now has a claim of his own.
The possessor comes first, because the other two plaintiffs are defined by how they differ from the person who holds the chattel.
Possessors and Bailees
Section 218 gives its claim to the possessor of the chattel, and possession means actual control of the chattel when the tort occurs.5 Ownership is not required. A bailee, a person entrusted with another’s goods for a limited purpose such as loan, storage, or repair, qualifies, as does a lessee, mortgagee, pledgee, or finder: whoever holds the chattel is always a proper plaintiff.6 The painter in Mirela’s case may sue the stranger although the painter owns no part of the ladder.
Standing opens the courthouse door but does not win the case. Unlike trespass to land, trespass to a chattel is not actionable without resulting harm. If Puso sits down on the bumper of Carter’s car, he has intermeddled with Carter’s personal property under § 217, but he is not liable if he causes no damage. Likewise, a defendant who releases the brake on P’s car and pushes it forward a few feet to make room to park behind it is not liable if no harm is done, because he neither dispossessed P nor damaged the car.7 A possessor must therefore bring the case within one of the four consequences. The painter does: a cracked rail impairs the ladder’s condition and value.
Letting the possessor sue has a cost, and the law accepts it. A possessor who wins may recover far more than the value of the possessor’s own interest, the owner must look to the possessor for the owner’s share however irresponsible that possessor may be, and the possessor may mishandle the suit to the owner’s prejudice. Still, the owner is the one who parted with possession, and the possessor is the one who must account to the owner for the chattel’s return, so there is something to be said for letting the mere possessor sue for the full amount of the damage.8
The plaintiff need not be the best claimant in the world, only a better one than the defendant. A possessor who holds under some colorable claim of right superior to the defendant’s may sue even if the possession is wrongful as against someone else. The defendant ordinarily cannot answer with jus tertii, the argument that a third person holds title or a superior right to possession, unless the defendant can connect himself with that third person’s right.9 The comparison runs between plaintiff and defendant, and an absent owner’s title is not the defendant’s to borrow.
Possession is control, and good intentions do not supply it. In Popov v. Hayashi, the court found that the plaintiff had “clearly evidenced an intent to possess the baseball,” and it still treated the decisive question as whether he had done enough to reduce the ball to his exclusive dominion and control, so as to create a legally cognizable interest in it.10 Sections 218, 219, and 220 begin from the same place: each reaches a plaintiff only through possession or a right to possession, now or later.11 A claimant with neither has no interest in the chattel for the tort to protect.
Entitled to Immediate Possession
Section 219 protects the person who stands one step behind the possessor: one who is, or may by demand become, entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel.13 The standard example is the bailor at will, an owner who has handed the chattel to someone else on terms that let the owner take it back whenever the owner asks.14 This plaintiff does not hold the chattel, so § 218 does not describe him, yet he can call it home at once, and the law treats that present right as worth protecting. A rule that left every non-possessor without a remedy would give possession far too much weight and could leave the owner empty-handed.15
Because the bailor at will never holds the chattel, § 219 drops dispossession from the list. A stranger who carries the chattel out of the bailee’s hands dispossesses the bailee, and the bailor was never in possession to lose. Three consequences remain. The chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value;16 the person entitled to immediate possession is deprived of its use for a substantial time;17 or bodily harm is caused to that person, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which he has a legally protected interest.18 These track § 218(b) through (d), and the earlier subsections on impairment, loss of use, and bodily or protected harm explain what each requires.
Whether an owner sues under § 219 depends on the terms of the arrangement. An owner who lends at will can call for the chattel at any time and is entitled to immediate possession. An owner who lends for a fixed period cannot reclaim it until the period ends, is entitled only to future possession, and sues under § 220, the subject of the next subsection.19
Entitled to Future Possession
Section 220 reaches the owner who must wait. One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to another who is entitled to its future possession “for harm thereby caused to such other’s interest in the chattel.”21 A right to future possession is a right to have the chattel back later, with no right to take it now. The typical holder is an owner who lent or leased the chattel for a fixed period, and that owner’s stake is the thing that will return when the period ends.
Mirela’s week-long loan puts her here. She cannot demand the ladder before the week is over, so § 219 does not describe her. The stranger’s cracked rail nonetheless harms the very ladder she will get back, and § 220 gives her a claim for that harm. The painter sues under § 218 for the harm to his possession, and Mirela sues under § 220 for the harm to her interest in what returns to her. One act supports both claims because it injures two different interests.
The owner needs a claim of her own because the possessor’s suit is a poor substitute. A possessor who wins may recover more than the value of his own interest, and the owner must then look to him for a share, however irresponsible he may be. A possessor may also mishandle the suit to the owner’s prejudice.22 A separate claim means the owner’s protection no longer depends on the borrower’s diligence or honesty.
The claim requires harm, as the text of § 220 says: the harm must be “thereby caused to such other’s interest.” The bumper illustration shows the same principle in § 218. Puso, who sits on Carter’s bumper, has intermeddled but is not liable if he causes no damage.23 The owner’s interest lies in what will come back, so the working question is whether the trespass harmed that.
Together, §§ 218, 219, and 220 sort claimants by where each stands in relation to the chattel when the stranger acts. The possessor holds it now and may sue for dispossession as well as for the other three harms. The bailor at will can demand it now and must show one of those other three. The owner under a term will have it later and must show harm to that interest.24 When a problem names several people connected to one chattel, identify each person’s relationship first, then ask which listed harm reached him.