Concept
Defining Conversion
Trespass to chattels and conversion
Defining Conversion
Conversion is the more serious of the two torts that protect a possessor's hold on a chattel. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) defines it in one sentence: an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.1 The definition has two halves. The first describes the actor's conduct, which must be an intentional exercise of dominion or control, as though the actor had the right to decide what becomes of the chattel. The second describes what that conduct did to the owner, and it separates conversion from trespass to chattels: the interference must be serious enough that full value is a just price.
Seriousness matters because conversion carries a stringent measure of damages, the full value of the chattel. For that reason, courts have long recognized that not every wrongful interference with another's personal property is a conversion. Intermeddling that falls short of a complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights does not qualify.2 The Second Restatement concedes that the line between trespass to chattels and conversion is hazy, and it offers no single bright line. It lists factors instead, introduced by the instruction to weigh the seriousness of the interference and the justice of requiring the actor to pay the full value, and the first factor is the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control.3 The Restatement's illustrations show where the low end lies: a dispossession that is brief and does no damage to the property is not conversion.4 A later section works through the factors one at a time.
In Pearson v. Dodd, the D.C. Circuit applied the seriousness requirement to documents taken from a senator's files. The columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson had exposed the alleged misdeeds of Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut, and the district court granted the senator partial summary judgment on a theory of conversion. The court of appeals reversed that ruling.5 On the agreed facts, the documents were removed from the files at night, photocopied, and returned undamaged before the office resumed operations in the morning. Their value to the senator lay in their use as records of his office's business, and he was clearly not substantially deprived of that use. The court therefore found no conversion of the physical documents.6 Conversion turns on how seriously the taking deprived the owner of control, and a one-night absence that left the papers undamaged did not.
The court then asked whether the information in the documents was property that conversion protects, and on this record it found none. The information consisted of letters from supplicants and office records of other kinds. As far as the court could tell, none of it was literary property, scientific invention, or secret plans for conducting commerce, and none was held for sale like the fresh news copy of a wire service.7 The law does protect information gathered and arranged at some cost and sold as a commodity, ideas formulated with labor and inventive genius, as in literary works and scientific research, and ideas that serve as instruments of fair and effective commercial competition.8 Pearson thus shows two independent ways to lose a conversion claim: the interference with the object may be too slight, or the thing taken may not be property the tort protects. The last subsection below returns to the second.
Zaslow v. Kroenert applies the first point outside the newsroom. Two tenants in common were disputing ownership of their house, and the defendant warned the plaintiff that she would have his furniture removed unless he took it out himself. She then had it removed and told him where it was. The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no claim for conversion. He had trespass to chattels, for which he could recover only the actual damages caused by the loss of use of the furniture.9
The intent half of the definition is narrower than students expect, and it cuts both ways. Negligent interference does not suffice: an actor who does not intentionally exercise dominion or control over a chattel is not liable for conversion even though the act or omission was negligent.10 But the intent required is only intent to exercise dominion. The act constituting conversion must be intentionally done, yet the defendant need not know that the property belongs to another or intend to dispossess the true owner of its use and enjoyment, and wrongful purpose is no part of the tort.11
Horton's hat shows how little the intent half demands. In two of the Restatement's illustrations Horton is a tortfeasor though he acted without malice. He meant to assert dominion over the hat, and he did, by taking it. He was mistaken about the character of his act, but tort law places the consequence of that mistake on him.12 Because neither ignorance of the owner's title nor lack of good faith is required, some sources call conversion technically a strict liability tort, though the actor must still intend to control the property.13 Dominion also need not begin with a wrongful taking. Wrongful withholding can be actual interference even where the defendant lawfully acquired the property, and an unjustified refusal to return property to a person entitled to possession who demands it is conversion.14
A mistake about the actor's right to act does not change the result. A belief that the actor has possession of the chattel or is entitled to its immediate possession, that the actor has the consent of the owner or of one with power to consent for the owner, or that the actor is otherwise privileged to act does not relieve the actor of liability for conversion, so long as the belief rests on a mistake of law or fact that the owner did not induce.15
Seriousness, not good faith, does the sheltering work for an innocent actor. A diner who picks up the wrong hat and returns it at once has met the intent half completely, because the diner meant to take that very hat, yet escapes conversion because the dispossession was brief and caused no damage.16 An answer on conversion should therefore test seriousness and should not try to defeat intent by showing good faith. Good faith returns later in the analysis as one of the seriousness factors.
The Plaintiff's Interest
Conversion protects the right to control a chattel, so the plaintiff must hold that right when the tort occurs. Traditionally the action belongs to the person in actual possession of the property at the time of the tort, or at least to the person entitled to immediate possession, such as a bailor at will.18 The law protects possession so firmly that it is no defense that the plaintiff's possession is wrongful, so long as the plaintiff holds the property under some colorable claim of right superior to the defendant's. The defense of jus tertii, that someone other than the plaintiff has title or a superior right to possession, is ordinarily unavailable unless the defendant can connect himself with that third person's right.19
A plaintiff with nothing to control has nothing for the defendant to interfere with. In Popov v. Hayashi, the baseball case, the court stated that one who has neither title nor possession, nor any right to possession, cannot sue for conversion.20 The ball became intentionally abandoned property when it was hit, and the first person to come into possession of it became its new owner, so the decisive question was whether the plaintiff held any of those interests.21
Stressing possession this heavily could leave a true owner empty-handed, because a person in possession of the chattel, whether lessee, bailee, mortgagee, pledgee, finder, or otherwise, is always a proper plaintiff. A good many courts and the Restatement now permit an owner who has parted with possession to sue for trespass or conversion for the damage to the owner's reversion.22 The earlier discussion of who may sue for trespass to chattels applies here with the same logic: the plaintiff's claim rests on a right to control the chattel, whether the plaintiff holds that right now or will hold it later.
Property Subject to Conversion
Conversion reaches personal property, and real property cannot be converted. The boundary between land and chattels moves with the thing's physical state. Earth, sand, gravel, and timber count as part of the real estate only while they remain in their natural position in the ground, but once wrongly severed and removed they become personalty for which a conversion action is available. Fully matured crops can be converted, while growing crops cannot, because they cannot profitably be severed from the soil.24 Money that can be described, identified, or segregated can also be converted, as can checks, promissory notes, and life insurance policies.25
Some things of real value fall outside the tort because the law does not treat them as property that a stranger can take. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the court held there was no conversion of cells from a patient's removed spleen that doctors used to develop a patented cell line, and in Culpepper v. Pearl Street Building, Inc., a Colorado court found no property right in a body that would support a conversion claim.26 Property that was purposefully thrown away is likewise unprotected. In Greenpeace, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., a person who took a company's papers from the trash in a building's common area was held to have taken nothing in which the company retained a recognized property interest.27 The abandonment rule follows from the definition: discarding a thing gives up the right to control it, so no right remains to be interfered with. The baseball in Popov went to the first person who took possession of it for the same reason.28
Intangibles raise the hardest question. In Kremen v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit, applying California law, held that a complaint stated a conversion claim for the Internet domain name sex.com.29 That result sits comfortably beside Pearson, which turned away a claim over ordinary office information while recognizing that information gathered at cost and sold, like a wire service's fresh news copy, can be protected property.30 For an intangible, the question to ask is whether the law already treats the thing as property that its holder can control and exclude others from.