Concept
Scope of Consent
Consent
Scope of Consent
Consent protects an actor only as far as it reaches. A plaintiff who says yes to one thing has said nothing about another, and a defendant who pleads consent must show that the conduct complained of lies inside what the plaintiff accepted. Four rules from the Restatement (Second) of Torts mark out that territory. The first asks how closely the defendant’s conduct must match the conduct agreed to. The second lets a consent carry conditions or restrictions and holds it to them. The third deals with the actor who goes past the agreement, and the fourth with the harm that follows conduct that stayed within it.
The first three rules hold the actor to the terms of the agreement, and the fourth holds the plaintiff to the same terms. A plaintiff who accepted a contact cannot recover for the bruise that follows it, but keeps a claim for any contact beyond what was accepted. Each rule asks what the plaintiff agreed to and compares the answer with what the defendant did.
Same or Substantially Same Conduct
Consent is effective only if it is to the particular conduct or to substantially the same conduct.1 The Restatement applies that rule to intentional invasions of interests of personality.2 Consent is always consent to something definite, such as a touch, an operation, or a fight, and a plaintiff who accepted one thing has not accepted whatever lies near it.
Common sense draws the line. Smith’s acceptance of a “kiss in the moonlight” does not authorize Torres to have intercourse with her, and Vega’s agreement to a fist fight with Jones does not authorize Jones to use a shotgun if he fares poorly.3 In each pair the plaintiff did say yes, and the yes was genuine as far as it went. What changed was the kind and seriousness of the invasion: an affectionate gesture became sexual intimacy, and a brawl with fists became gunfire. The plaintiff weighed the first invasion and never weighed the second.
The word “substantially” keeps the rule workable. No one can specify an operation or an encounter in every detail, so a variation the plaintiff would not have cared about stays inside the consent. A change in the kind or seriousness of the invasion does not.
Medicine tests the rule hardest, because the actor’s motive is so often good. Consent to right ear surgery does not authorize surgery on the left, absent an unforeseen emergency.4 In Mohr v. Williams, the classic example, a surgeon with consent to operate on one ear found the other in worse condition and operated on that one, and the court held the operation a battery. The surgeon’s good motive and the operation’s success did not matter, because the patient decides which contacts she will accept, and the surgeon does not.
Social settings pose the same question. Romeo, who considers himself irresistible and flirts with the girls at will, greets a new student on her first day with a hug, and she sues him for battery. At a track meet Romeo is nosed out by the visiting star, slaps him heartily on the back, and says “great run, Mercutio!”, only to learn that Mercutio is very sensitive about being touched by strangers and reacts with rage.5 In both problems the useful question is the one this section teaches: what contact had the other person accepted, and was Romeo’s contact that one or substantially the same?
A surgeon who performs the agreed operation badly has not changed what the patient accepted. Consent to an operation does not create a privilege to perform it negligently,6 but the patient’s remedy is then a claim in negligence, and battery stays in reserve for conduct that departs from the consent. The section on exceeding the consent, below, develops that boundary.
On an exam, write two descriptions side by side: the conduct the plaintiff accepted, drawn from the plaintiff’s words and the setting, and the conduct the defendant performed. If the second is the first, or a variation the plaintiff would not have cared about, consent covers it. If the second is a different procedure, a different part of the body, or a more serious kind of invasion, consent does not reach it, however well meant or successful the conduct was.
Conditions and Limits
Conditional consent, or consent restricted as to time, area, or in other respects, is effective only within the limits of the condition or restriction.8 A plaintiff may limit a consent as to time, place, duration, area, and extent, and the defendant is liable to the extent that he fails to conform. A patient, for example, may refuse consent to the nature, type, or extent of physical contact during medical treatment.9 The consent is genuine, so the defense is available, but it has edges. Conduct inside them is protected. Conduct outside them gets nothing from the consent, however closely it resembles what was allowed.
The rule follows from the plaintiff’s control over her own interests. A person may open an interest partly and keep the rest closed, and the law lets her do so because people would otherwise hesitate to agree to anything. A patient or player who feared that one yes would be read as open-ended might refuse every activity that carries some contact. Honoring the limits people set makes narrow grants of permission safe to give.
Horton v. Suzuki applies the rule to time. Horton took a karate class from Suzuki, and the court recognized that he may have consented to a certain amount of harmful or offensive contact during his instruction. Nothing in the record, however, indicated that he consented to being struck on the cheek by his instructor after class had been dismissed.10 The court affirmed the finding of battery and an award of $7,500 in compensatory damages, made up of $1,500 for medical expenses and $6,000 for pain and suffering.11 The case marks the line cleanly. A blow in class, as part of the rough training Horton expected, sits inside his consent, and a blow after dismissal sits outside the time the consent covered. The same reasoning separates a hit taken during a paintball game from a joke shot fired before the game begins.
A limit does not have to be wise to bind the actor. The emergency privilege lets a doctor treat when an emergency makes treatment necessary before consent can be obtained and she has no reason to believe the patient would decline.12 It rests on the thought that most people would accept the treatment. When a patient’s bracelet announces that he refuses transfusions, though, the bracelet rejects the touching as clearly as if he had sat up and said so. The doctor must honor that choice despite her disagreement with it, even if she expects it to prove fatal, and if she does not she is liable for battery.13
Disputes over limits tend to turn on two questions, as in other consent cases: whether there was true consent as opposed to coercion, and whether the defendant exceeded the scope of the consent freely given.14 This section addresses the second, and the later sections on fraud and duress address the first. Duration shows the point. Suppose a person agrees to stay in a residential treatment program for three weeks. Her presence during those three weeks is consented to, and the facility’s holding her afterward is not, because her consent was restricted as to duration.
On an exam, a stem that reports a consent invites a question about its terms: what the plaintiff said, or the setting implied, about when, where, how long, and in what manner the conduct could occur. The defendant’s good motive does not widen those terms, and neither does the plaintiff’s consent to something else nearby. A plaintiff who accepted part of what happened has not accepted the rest, so the defense defeats the claim for the conduct inside the limits and leaves it alive for the conduct outside them.
Exceeding the Consent
If the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.16 The rule has two halves that students often run together. As to the excess, consent is no defense, because the plaintiff never accepted that conduct. As to everything that stayed within the agreement, consent remains fully effective, because one who effectively consents to conduct cannot recover for that conduct or for harm resulting from it.17 The result is a liability sized to the overstep and no larger.
Each half has its own reason. Intentional torts are eminently avoidable, because an actor who has been given limits need only restrain herself to stay inside them. Where she fails to do so, the law puts the consequences on her and not on the plaintiff.18 The protection that remains for the agreed conduct rests on the plaintiff’s real choice about that part. If one forbidden step erased the defense for the whole encounter, a participant could accept a bout, absorb its ordinary blows, and then recast every one of them as a battery because of a single illegal blow.
The clearest excesses differ in kind. Vega’s agreement to a fist fight does not authorize Jones to use a shotgun,19 so Vega cannot recover for the bruise from a fair punch but keeps his claim for the gunshot wound. A difference in intensity inside the same activity produces the same split.
The medical cases show where an excess ends and mere carelessness begins. The court in Mayr v. Osborne held that, without evidence of intentionally tortious conduct, negligence in performing a properly consented medical procedure will not support a battery claim. The plaintiff must prove that the procedure was performed against the patient’s will or substantially diverged from the scope of the consent, and battery lies only if the contact was deliberately against the patient’s will or at such substantial variance with the consent as to vitiate it.20 In Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678 (2007), the defendants were found to have committed battery by inserting cadaver bone into the plaintiff’s spine contrary to the plaintiff’s instructions.21 The left-ear operation in Mohr is the same kind of excess, since the consent covered one ear and the surgeon operated on the other. In a Mayr-type case the agreed procedure was performed, only badly, so the variance lies in the quality of the performance and not in what was done.
The line has practical stakes. A negligence claim ordinarily requires expert testimony to establish the standard of care and its breach, but in battery the critical element is intent, and expert testimony is usually not probative on that issue.22 If every slip during a consented operation counted as an excess, plaintiffs could escape the negligence requirements by relabeling their claims.
Consent and Consequences
Consent to conduct of another is effective for all consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any interests resulting from it.24 Once conduct falls inside the consent, the plaintiff cannot recover for it or for harm resulting from it,25 however large that harm turns out to be. Consent attaches to what the actor does, so every result that flows from that conduct comes within it, including a result the plaintiff never pictured.
The rule mirrors the one that governs the intentional tortfeasor. Because intentional torts are eminently avoidable, it seems appropriate to impose all resulting damages, even unintended ones, on the actor who fails to restrain herself and not on the innocent victim.26 Cases such as Lambertson apply that allocation. Consent applies it in reverse. The plaintiff alone decided whether to accept the contact, so a plaintiff who accepted it also accepted the uncertainty about how far it would go.
The rule also protects the actor. The extent of harm from any contact is uncertain: a shove may leave no mark, a bruise, or a broken wrist, and no one can say in advance which. If consent covered only the harm the plaintiff expected, an actor who relied on it would in effect guarantee the outcome against every unforeseeable result, and sensible people would decline almost any physical activity.
One exception limits the rule, and the later sections on fraud develop it. If the person consenting is induced to consent by a substantial mistake about the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm to be expected, and the other person knows of the mistake or induced it by misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.27 The standard illustration is a punch for pay. Consent to be punched in the nose for fifty dollars stays effective even though the money is counterfeit and the puncher knows it, but not if he is secretly wearing brass knuckles. The counterfeit money may support an action for deceit or on the contract, but not for battery.28 The exception follows the rule’s own logic: the rule leaves the uncertainty with the plaintiff on the assumption that both sides share it, and an actor who created the misunderstanding about the harm to expect cannot claim the benefit of that assumption.
On an exam, the order of questions matters. First ask whether the conduct that caused the harm was the conduct the plaintiff accepted, using the rules on scope, conditions, and excess from the preceding sections. If it was, the plaintiff’s surprise at the severity of the injury is irrelevant, and the claim fails for the injury as it fails for the contact. Then check whether the actor knew of or created a mistake about the nature of the invasion or the harm to expect, because only that fact reopens liability for the unexpected harm.