Concept
Defects in Consent
Consent
Defects in Consent
Consent that exists in fact can still fail in law when the way it was obtained was corrupt. The earlier sections asked whether the plaintiff consented, who could consent, how far the consent reached, and whether it had ended, and each assumed a willingness that was real and freely formed. This section tests the process that produced the willingness. Four situations put it to the test: a false picture of what is about to happen, a lie about something that merely motivated the plaintiff, a threat, and a false claim of legal right. Three of them can spoil consent. The second, the collateral lie, marks the limit of the first.
Two rules carry most of the weight. If a person is induced to consent by a substantial mistake about the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm to be expected, and the other party knew of the mistake or induced it by misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.1 And consent given under duress is not effective.2 The first rule has a boundary worth learning early, because the law does not undo consent for every falsehood that preceded it: a lie about a collateral matter leaves the consent standing.3 Consent induced by fraud or mistake about the validity of a purported legal authority has a rule of its own.4
These rules protect two ingredients of a genuine choice. The first is information. A holder may accept an invasion of body, land, or goods because the interest belongs to the holder and the holder has chosen, and a person can choose only what he has in view. When the actor has falsified that view, the holder's yes answers a question the holder was never asked. The second ingredient is freedom. A holder who agrees only because a threat leaves no tolerable alternative has not exercised the choice that ownership protects. The actor's side of the account runs the same way. The law protects an actor who relies on what the holder manifested, but not one who created the false picture or applied the pressure, because that actor would be relying on a result he produced himself. The same logic explains why the mistake rule demands that the actor knew of the mistake or caused it: an actor who did neither relied reasonably on what the holder showed, so the consent stands.
The rules reach beyond battery. They govern intentional invasions of interests of personality,5 and they extend to entering or remaining on land, where the misrepresentation and legal-authority rules apply6 and where duress exerted by a third person defeats consent if the actor knew of it.7 When an exam stem reports a consent that looks genuine on its face, put three questions to it: what the plaintiff misunderstood or feared, whether the actor knew of it or caused it, and whether it went to the nature of the invasion.
Fraud About Essential Character
Consent fails for the unexpected invasion when the person agreed to something other than what happened and the actor knew it or caused it. The rule has two conditions and one limit. The mistake must be substantial and must concern the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm to be expected. The actor must have known of the mistake or induced it by misrepresentation. And the rule withdraws only what it must: consent is lost for the unexpected invasion or harm, so whatever the person did understand and accept remains accepted.8
Each condition has its own reason. The mistake condition follows from what consent is. A patient who agrees to an examination she believes is treatment has chosen treatment, not a different act that happens to involve the same touching, and the word substantial keeps trivial misunderstandings from reopening agreements after the fact. The fault condition keeps ordinary consents secure, because a rule that voided consent for any mistake would expose every agreement to attack by a plaintiff who learned something new afterward. It also places the loss where it belongs. An actor who knows of the mistake can correct it with a sentence, and an actor who created the mistake relies on an agreement his own words emptied of content, which is not the reliance the consent rule protects.
A person can be wrong in two ways. A mistake about the nature of the invasion concerns what is being done, as when a person thinks a touching is a medical examination. A mistake about the extent of the harm concerns how bad the contact will be, as when a person agrees to a punch in the nose and the puncher secretly wears brass knuckles.9 The rule reaches mistakes about the harmful or offensive character of a contact, so it governs battery and the related intentional invasions of the person.10 Misrepresentation includes intentional concealment of material facts as well as false statements, so a silent actor can lose the defense just as a liar can.11
In De May v. Roberts, the plaintiff consented to the presence of Scattergood, supposing him to be a physician. When she learned his true character, the court held that her consent did not bar her action: by obtaining admission at such a time and under such circumstances without fully disclosing who he was, both defendants were guilty of deceit, and she could recover damages for the shame and mortification she suffered on discovering the truth.12 A doctor who obtains a patient's agreement to an intimate examination by calling it treatment, while actually seeking sexual gratification, stands in the same position. The patient agreed to a medical act, and the contact performed was another.13
Sexual contact by a partner who knows of a disease produces the same result. Suppose Alvord knows he has a sexually transmitted disease and has relations with Rodriguez without warning her or protecting her. Her consent does not cover the infection, because his silence about a fact central to her choice left her without a true picture of the contact.14 The answer reverses if Alvord does not know of his condition. Rodriguez was ignorant of the facts, but so was he. No misrepresentation passed between them, and what each understood when she consented matched, so a court would very likely find her consent effective and deny recovery for battery.15 A Maine decision of 1998, McPherson v. McPherson, reached that result for a husband who infected his wife without knowing or having reason to know that he was infected.16 The injury is identical in both versions. What moved the answer is whether the actor's knowledge or conduct put the false picture in the plaintiff's mind.
The third step does most of the work. A plaintiff's disappointment, however sincere, does not satisfy it without facts showing that the actor knew of the mistake or caused it. The same conditions govern entry on land, because the rules on consent induced by misrepresentation or mistake apply to entering or remaining there.17
Medicine links these rules to the doctrine of informed consent. A physician who misrepresents the proposed treatment, or who conceals consequences the physician knows will follow while knowing the patient is unaware of them, obtains no effective consent.18 Early decisions went further and treated a failure to disclose risks as battery.19 The prevailing view now treats a failure to disclose mere risks as collateral and therefore as negligence only, which lets a court measure the disclosure against professional standards instead of making full disclosure mandatory in every case.20 The line runs between a patient deceived about the treatment or its certain consequences and a patient who was simply not told of its risks.
Collateral Fraud and Mistake
A lie that does not change what the plaintiff understood the contact to be leaves consent in place. The rule withdrawing consent applies only to a substantial mistake about the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm to be expected, so a plaintiff deceived about anything else still agreed to the contact that took place.22 Fraud or mistake about a collateral matter, one that does not affect the essential character of the conduct, therefore does not defeat consent to an intentional invasion of the person.23 Because the consent survives, it bars recovery for the conduct and for harm resulting from it, even though the plaintiff was deceived.24
The line sits here for two reasons, and they work on different parts of the problem. The first is administrability. People agree to contacts for countless reasons, among them money, affection, flattery, curiosity, and beliefs about the other person's wealth or character, and many of those beliefs are shaded or mistaken. If every falsehood that influenced the decision undid consent, nearly every agreement could be attacked afterward by a plaintiff who testified that the truth would have changed her answer, and no actor could rely on anyone's consent. A suitor who claims an income of $100,000, a Phi Beta Kappa key from Stanford, or a great idea for the next generation of software supplies reasons the other person could later call decisive. To head off a flood of such claims, courts are likely to confine mistaken consent to mistakes central to the transaction itself.25
The second reason concerns remedy. Battery protects against an invasion the plaintiff never accepted, and a plaintiff who accepted the very contact that occurred has no such invasion to complain about. That plaintiff does have a grievance about deception or a broken bargain, and the law of deceit and the law of contract exist to address those grievances.26
One bargain with two different lies shows where the line falls. A person agrees to let another punch him in the nose for fifty dollars, and the puncher pays with a counterfeit bill that he knows is counterfeit. The consent is still effective, and the victim may sue for deceit or on the contract but not for battery.27 Had the puncher instead worn brass knuckles in secret, the consent would fail for the harm that resulted, because that lie goes to the extent of the harm to be expected.28 The punch, the price, and the victim's motive are the same in both versions. What differs is what the lie changed: the payment in one, the force of the blow in the other. The puncher's knowledge that the bill was fake does not help the victim, because the actor's knowledge or inducement matters only when the mistake concerns the nature of the invasion or the extent of the harm in the first place.29
Consent to sexual contact is likewise valid even when the partner induced it with a false claim to be a wealthy lawyer who will take the plaintiff on a European vacation.30 The partner knew what the intimacy was, and nothing about the lie altered the risks it carried. Contrast the pretexts of the preceding section, such as presenting sexual contact as medical treatment or hiding a known disease. There the plaintiff was told that the contact was something other than what it was. The same sorting governs medical disclosure: misrepresenting the treatment or concealing its certain consequences defeats consent, while omitting mere risks is collateral and proceeds in negligence.31
The tempting exam error treats any lie that preceded the contact as defeating consent, and a stem often invites it by saying that the plaintiff 'would never have agreed' had she known the truth. That counterfactual holds for almost every collateral lie, which is why it cannot be the test. Ask what the lie was about. If the plaintiff correctly understood what the contact was and how much harm to expect, the lie is collateral however strongly it influenced her decision, the consent stands, and battery fails, so look next to deceit or contract. If she misunderstood the nature of the contact or the harm to expect, the case belongs to the preceding section.
Duress
Consent is not effective if it is given under duress.33 The rule fills a gap the earlier sections leave open: a plaintiff can say yes, in words any observer would read as consent, to exactly the conduct that followed, and the defense can still fail because a threat extracted the yes. The rule applies to intentional invasions of interests of personality.34 In false imprisonment, a plaintiff may be confined by submission to duress other than threats of physical force, when the duress is enough to make her consent ineffective to bar the action, so the defendant cannot answer that she agreed to stay.35
The doctrine does two jobs that pull against each other. The first is to protect the choice consent is supposed to represent. A person who agrees only because the alternative is a blow or the loss of something valuable has not chosen in that sense, and the actor who made the threat cannot claim to have relied on an agreement he extracted. The second is to keep the doctrine from swallowing consent. Almost every agreement is given under some pressure: a patient agrees to surgery to avoid illness, a player accepts rough contact to keep a place on the team, and an employee accepts a demand to keep a paycheck. If every unattractive alternative defeated consent, hardly any consent would survive.
Duress includes actual physical force, but it is not entirely clear which threats suffice. Threats of immediate harm to the plaintiff, her family, or her valuable property usually do, depending on the nature of the tort. Threats of future harm such as arrest, and economic pressure such as loss of employment, have been held not to make consent ineffective, although some other tort may have been committed.36 An immediate threat leaves no time to seek help or a lawful remedy. A future or economic consequence leaves room to refuse and answer later, and it is often something the actor has a right to do.
Seizure of property shows the rule at work. In a problem modeled on Griffin v. Clark, a woman who rode in the defendant's car may still claim she was imprisoned in it if she went under compulsion. Whether she was coerced is a factual question, and if Clark said he would leave with her things unless she came along, that coerced her and vitiated her consent.37 She is in the same position as the store customer who willingly goes to the office after security guards confiscate her purse. There is no true consent to the detention, because it is done under duress.38 The driver had no right to hold her belongings hostage, so the choice he offered, ride with me or lose your things, was pressure the law does not let an actor apply and then count as agreement.
Pressure the actor may lawfully apply sits on the other side of the line. A customer accused of theft and led to a store's back office may stay for many reasons. Whether she reasonably apprehended physical force or loss of valuable property, or instead stayed to clear matters up, to avoid arrest, or to avoid dismissal from employment, is a question of fact for the jury.39 The first kind of pressure is duress, and the second generally is not.
Defeating the consent defense does not end the inquiry in a store case. A merchant who reasonably believes a customer has taken goods or failed to pay may have an independent privilege to detain her for the time necessary for a reasonable investigation, so a coerced customer's claim can still fail on that ground.40
Duress also bears on the plaintiff who says yes and means no. Courts have treated feigned consent as coerced where the defendants themselves created the threatening circumstances. In Meints v. Huntington, the Eighth Circuit held that the defendants' words and acts had coerced the plaintiff into consenting to his confinement, and Eilers v. Coy, a deprogramming case, reached a similar result.41 Those results sit uneasily beside the rule that words reasonably understood as consent operate as consent.42 The tension disappears once the defendants' role is counted. They created the threatening circumstances and should have understood that the plaintiffs would feign agreement, so the yes is not one a defendant could reasonably take at face value.
For land, consent obtained by duress upon the possessor, exerted by the actor or by a third person to the actor's knowledge, is not effective as consent to the actor's entry.43 The knowledge requirement does for a third person's threat what the actor's own conduct does in the other cases. An actor who threatens the possessor is plainly responsible for the pressure, and an actor who watches someone else apply it cannot say he relied on the invitation, because he knows what produced it. An actor who knows nothing of the threat has only the possessor's visible words to go on.
A stem that places the plaintiff in a subordinate position to a more powerful actor may tempt you to treat the relationship alone as duress. The prospect of losing a job remains economic pressure, and the idea that unequal power by itself can make consent ineffective is a prediction, not settled law.44
Purported Legal Authority
A person who yields to a false claim of legal right has not consented, even though she knew what would happen. Consent induced by fraud or mistake about the validity of a purported legal authority is not effective, and the rule applies both to intentional invasions of interests of personality and to entry on or remaining on land.46 This defect differs from the ones before it. The person understands what the contact is and how much harm to expect, and no one threatens a blow. The mistake concerns whether the law gives the actor any right to act at all, as when the actor announces a warrant or court order that does not exist or does not reach the conduct. The person's yes reflects a belief that the law has already settled the question, and the actor supplied that belief.
A person told that the law requires submission has been commanded, not asked, while consent is willingness in fact for the conduct to occur.47 Compliance shows that the person believed the claim, and belief in a command says nothing about willingness. The rule also allocates risk. The actor who asserts the authority is positioned to know whether it is valid and can check before acting, while the person facing the claim usually cannot verify a warrant or an order on the spot. The risk that the claim is false falls on the party who made it. That fits the reliance reasoning behind the consent defense: an actor is protected for relying on what the other person manifested, and cannot rely on an agreement that the actor's own claim produced.
Search law faces the same problem and shows the reasoning at work, though what follows is an analogy from criminal procedure and not tort authority. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a search cannot rest on consent given only after officials asserted that they held a search warrant when there was no warrant or an invalid one. The assertion announces that the occupant has no right to resist, and acquiescence in that setting cannot be construed as consent.48 The same body of law marks the line this section needs. Consent given in response to an officer's statement that a warrant will be sought stands, because no false or overstated claim of authority has occurred, although even that statement taints the consent if no grounds for a warrant existed.49 The analogy teaches that the question is what the actor claimed. A claim that the law compels submission removes the choice, and a request leaves it in place.
The two scenes share a gate, a survey, and an owner who said yes. The difference lies in what produced the yes: a statement that the law compelled it in the first scene and a question in the second. The same sorting applies to contact with the body. A person who yields to a false claim that a court order or statute requires a pat-down or a blood sample has not consented to it, while a person who agrees after a polite request has.
When an exam stem reports that someone announced a warrant, a court order, or a legal duty before the plaintiff yielded, ask first whether the claimed authority was valid, and then whether the plaintiff submitted because of the claim. If the authority was real, this defect is absent. If it was not, a yes that followed the claim does not bar recovery. The defect also differs from duress, because a false claim of legal authority works through the plaintiff's mistaken belief about the law, while duress works through fear of harm, so a stem may support both arguments and each deserves its own analysis.