Concept
Termination of Land Consent
Consent
Termination of Land Consent
Consent to enter land protects the entrant only while it lasts, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 171 names three ways it stops, subject to the privileges of reasonable egress and removal of things.1 The privilege ends upon the doing of any act, the happening of any event, or the lapse of any specified period by which the consent is restricted;2 upon a revocation of which the actor knows or has reason to know;3 or upon a transfer or other termination of the possessor’s possessory interest.4 The earlier subsections asked what a consent covered, measured by its conditions, its area, and its period. This unit asks when consent that once covered the entrant’s presence stops covering it. The answer matters because an entrant who stays past that point is a trespasser for the staying, though the entry was welcome.
Each event removes a different support. Expiry ends the privilege on the possessor’s own terms, so the entrant, who accepted the permission with its limit attached, cannot claim surprise. Revocation ends it by the possessor’s later change of mind, and the knowledge qualifier protects the entrant, who can act only on what has reached him. Transfer ends it because the permission came from the person who controlled the land, and a person who no longer controls the land can no longer speak for it.
Two privileges soften these results, which is why § 171 opens by making itself subject to them. If the privilege ended the instant a limit was reached or a revocation arrived, a guest would become a trespasser while walking to the door, and an owner would lose any right to come back for a thing left on the land. Sections 176 and 177 answer that problem by protecting a reasonably prompt and reasonable departure and a reasonable return to remove a thing the possessor had agreed could be there.5 The subsections below take the three events first and the two softening privileges after them.
Expiry by Restriction
Under § 171(a), a possessor’s consent ends by its own terms upon the doing of any act, the happening of any event, or the lapse of any specified period by which the consent is restricted.6 Each trigger is a limit the possessor built into the permission, so the privilege carries its own ending. Consent “until the delivery is unloaded” ends with an act, consent “while the regatta lasts” ends with an event, and consent “through Sunday noon” ends with the lapse of a period. In every version the privilege stops when the limit is reached, and the possessor need say nothing more.
These triggers apply the earlier rules on limits to a privilege already under way. A conditional or restricted consent creates a privilege only so far as the condition or restriction is complied with, and consent for a specified period creates no privilege at any other time.7 Those rules mark the boundary, and § 171(a) says what happens as the entrant reaches it: a guest at a nine o’clock party stands inside the privilege, and the same guest in the same spot a week later stands outside it. A limit of area works on the map instead of the calendar, because consent to one part of the land creates no privilege in any other part, so no privilege in the closed part ever existed to lapse.8
The privilege ends without a revocation because the limit came with the permission. The entrant knew the terms from the start, so no gap in the entrant’s information needs protecting. Revocation is different. It is a new decision, made after the entrant accepted the welcome, and that is why § 171(b) ends the privilege only upon a revocation the actor knows or has reason to know.9 Without the rule on expiry, a possessor would have to follow each guest with a second message at the moment the limit arrived, and the limit would mean nothing until that message was delivered.
Expiry operates going forward. Visits made while the consent stood stay privileged, and from the moment of the lapse the consent protects no further presence.10 The lapse reaches things as well as people. If Clements, a college student, leaves her trunk of textbooks at Kobe’s house for the summer, decides not to return to school, and never comes for the trunk, she becomes a trespasser by failing to remove it at the end of the agreed time.11 The trunk was on the land with permission until the agreed time passed, and its presence afterward is the wrong.
Expiry does not make a guest a trespasser at the instant the limit arrives, because § 171 is subject to the privileges of reasonable egress and removal of things.12 Section 176 protects a reasonably prompt and reasonable departure once consent has terminated, but it withholds that protection from an actor who knew or had reason to know the time of termination a reasonable period in advance.13 A guest whose invitation names an end time ordinarily has had that notice and gets little from egress. The two subsections on egress and removal develop those privileges in full.
On an exam, find the restriction in the consent, whether an act, an event, or a period, and ask whether the limit had been reached when the defendant was on the land. If it had not, the entry fell inside the privilege as far as this restriction is concerned. If it had, the privilege ended at that moment without a revocation and without any warning from the possessor, and only egress or removal can help the defendant, which a defendant who knew the end time in advance does not get.
Revocation by the Possessor
Under § 171(b), the privilege created by a possessor’s consent ends upon a revocation of which the actor knows or has reason to know.15 Expiry was written into the consent from the start; revocation is a new decision the possessor makes after the guest has accepted the welcome. The knowledge qualifier decides most cases, because a possessor’s change of heart ends the guest’s privilege only once it has reached the guest, actually or constructively.
A possessor may revoke because the possessor controls the land. Consent may be revoked at any time by communicating the revocation, and a terminated consent no longer has effect, rules that apply to entering and remaining on land.16 If a casual invitation hardened into a right to stay, possessors would hesitate to invite anyone.
The knowledge qualifier follows from what a guest can perceive. An entrant who crosses the land on an invitation acts on what the possessor has shown, and a decision that exists only in the possessor’s mind shows nothing. The rule on apparent consent points the same way: words or conduct reasonably understood as consent are as effective as consent in fact,17 so the earlier welcome stays in force until something contrary reaches the guest. The risk also falls sensibly. The possessor can end all doubt with a single sentence, and the guest has no means of discovering a secret.
The qualifier has two prongs, and the second does independent work. Actual knowledge covers the guest who has been told. Reason to know covers the guest who has not been told in so many words but holds information from which a reasonable person would conclude that the welcome is withdrawn: a gate newly locked against the guest, a notice at the entrance that the guest passes and can read, a possessor shouting from the porch for the guest to leave. The test is objective, so a guest cannot escape the rule by declining to draw an obvious inference.18
Halloran and Orlov changed their minds for equally good reasons, and the visitors’ positions differ only in what reached them. Between those two poles lie facts that turn on how much the actor could fairly be expected to perceive. A possessor’s text message that arrives on the guest’s phone but goes unopened raises the question whether a reasonable person in the guest’s position would have looked in time. A court treats that as a question of fact, and an exam answer should argue both sides before choosing one.
Revocation operates going forward. Presence while the consent stood remains privileged, and presence afterward has no consent behind it. Once the guest knows or has reason to know of the revocation, only the privileges of egress and removal of things remain, and § 176 makes the guest’s presence while leaving with reasonable promptness and in a reasonable manner privileged.19 Vance may therefore retreat down the porch steps and walk to his car, but he may not wait on the porch for Orlov to relent. A revocation tells the guest to go, so the only presence the law excuses afterward is the presence that going requires.
The exceptions that qualify the ending of consent in general reach land as well. Consent may have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or its terms may include a privilege to continue to act, and § 167 applies those rules to entry on and remaining on land.20 A possessor who has bound himself by contract to let someone remain may therefore be unable to end the privilege by announcing a change of mind. When a stem mentions a contract between possessor and entrant, check whether the possessor gave up the power to revoke.
A stem that reports a possessor’s change of mind has not yet reported a trespass. Ask whether the revocation was communicated or otherwise apparent, whether the actor knew or had reason to know of it while on the land, whether the actor’s later presence was only a reasonable departure, and whether a contract or the terms of the consent kept the privilege alive. A possessor’s private resolve, however firm, answers none of those questions.
Transfer of Possession
Under § 171(c), the privilege to enter land created by a possessor’s consent ends upon a transfer or other termination of the possessor’s possessory interest.22 The possessor is the person in control of the land, whether owner or tenant, and an invitation is privileged because that person had the right to give it. The first two events ended a permission by its own terms and by the possessor’s change of mind. This one ends it because the person who gave the permission has stopped being the person entitled to give it. As with the other events, the result is subject to the privileges of reasonable egress and removal of things.23
Two supports carry the rule. The first is standing. A permission is the possessor’s power to decide who may be on the land being exercised, and when possession passes, the power passes with it. The buyer or new tenant never agreed to anything, and a rule binding the new possessor to a predecessor’s invitations would let a seller load the land with welcomes that the buyer could not see and could not cancel until each one revealed itself. The second is risk allocation. Between an entrant and a new possessor, the entrant is better placed to learn that the land has changed hands, because the entrant can ask the customer, confirm before the trip, or require notice of a sale in the contract. The new possessor cannot track down every vendor, contractor, and neighbor the seller ever welcomed.
The second support explains a textual difference from the event before it. Revocation under § 171(b) ends the privilege only when the actor knows or has reason to know of it, because a change of heart lives in the possessor’s mind.24 Subsection (c) carries no such qualifier.25 A sale is an outward change in who holds the land, and an entrant can check it, so an entrant who fails to check bears the cost of the omission.
In Serota v. M. & M. Utilities, Inc. an oil company had a contract to deliver heating oil to a homeowner. The homeowner sold the property without telling the company, and the company’s driver arrived on schedule to refill the heating oil tank. The tank was already full, so oil spilled, and the court held the company liable to the new owner as a trespasser.26 Deliveries made while the seller held the house were privileged by the seller’s consent. The delivery after the sale had no one’s consent behind it, because the only person who had said yes no longer held the land. The company’s mistaken belief that its visit was authorized “is of no moment since his intent is clearly shown to have been to deliver oil.”27 The intent that trespass requires is the intent to be on the land, and the company plainly intended to enter and deliver. Its belief about authorization goes only to consent, and the consent had ended with the sale.
The hypothetical shows that a transfer does not close the land to everyone the former possessor welcomed. It ends only the old privilege, and the new possessor remains free to create a fresh one. It also shows that the rule reaches more than sales, since the words “or other termination” cover the end of a lease or any other way a possessory interest stops. Like every termination of consent, a transfer works going forward, so visits made while the seller still held the land remain privileged.
Because § 171 is subject to egress and removal, an entrant who discovers the sale is not made a trespasser by the walk back to the truck. Section 176 protects a departure with reasonable promptness and in a reasonable manner, as against the possessor or his transferee, unless the actor knew or had reason to know the time of the termination a reasonable period in advance.28 Section 177 gives a similar protection to a person who must come back to remove a thing the possessor had agreed could stay.29 Neither privilege rescued the oil company, because its wrong was the delivery entry itself and not the act of leaving.
On an exam, identify the person who gave the consent and check whether that person’s possessory interest had been transferred or had otherwise ended before the entry. Then ask whether the entrant was only leaving or only removing a thing. If the interest had ended and the entry was neither, the entrant is a trespasser as against the new possessor unless the new possessor has consented. The entrant’s good faith and ignorance of the sale do not change that result.
Reasonable Egress
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 176 settles where a guest stands in the minutes after the welcome ends. When a possessor’s consent to the actor’s presence is terminated or suspended, the actor’s presence while leaving with reasonable promptness and in a reasonable manner is privileged, as against the possessor or his transferee, unless the actor knew or had reason to know the time of the termination or suspension a reasonable period in advance.31 The rule is the egress half of the qualification that § 171 attaches to expiry, revocation, and transfer alike.32 The privilege covers a single movement from wherever the actor stands to the edge of the land, and it covers nothing beyond that movement.
The privilege exists because consent ends at an instant, whether the instant is a sentence spoken on the porch or a clock striking six, but leaving is a physical act that takes time. A guest in the middle of the house cannot be off the land when the host finishes speaking. If the privilege vanished with the words, every departure would begin as a trespass, and a guest who did exactly what the possessor asked would answer for the minutes it took to do it.
Two qualifiers keep the privilege to what an exit requires, and each limits something different. Reasonable promptness limits the time. The rule fixes no number of minutes, so the answer depends on circumstances such as how far the door is and what the guest must gather in order to go. Reasonable manner limits the route and the conduct: the guest leaves by the usual way out and without detours. Both limits follow from one idea. The law excuses the presence only because leaving requires it, so a minute spent on anything else has nothing to excuse it.
The exception for advance knowledge rests on a separate reason. Egress protects the person who is surprised. A guest ordered off the porch has had no chance to prepare, so the time the exit takes is forced on the guest by the possessor’s sudden decision. A guest who knew or had reason to know a reasonable period beforehand when the consent would end could have arranged to be gone by then, and the law does not protect a delay the guest could have prevented. Knowledge carries the same two prongs here as in the revocation rule: it covers the guest who was told and the guest who held information from which a reasonable person would have worked out the end time.33 An invitation that names its own end, such as a party from five to six or a campsite through Sunday noon, therefore gives notice from the start. A revocation usually arrives without warning, and egress does most of its work there.
Two features of the rule’s text extend its reach. It applies to a consent that is suspended as well as one that is terminated, so a possessor who withdraws the welcome only for the time being triggers the same privilege of orderly departure. And it runs against the possessor’s transferee as well as the possessor, which matters when a sale ends the privilege under § 171(c) and the entrant meets a new possessor who never extended any welcome.34 Leaving the land and carrying away a thing the possessor agreed could stay there are different acts, and the second belongs to § 177, which the next subsection takes up.35
Imani and Callum each remained on the land after consent ended, and two questions, asked in sequence, separate them. Notice decides whether any privilege exists: Imani learned of the end when Tobias spoke, and Callum held the end time for two weeks. Conduct decides how far a privilege that does exist extends. Had Imani stopped in the hall to argue her side for twenty minutes, only the time she spent leaving would have been privileged, because the privilege follows the departure and gives out when the departure stops.
Removing Things
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 177 lets the owner of a thing return to land and retrieve it after the welcome has ended. If a possessor consents to the presence on the land of a thing that is to be removed at some later time, and the consent is terminated or suspended, one entitled to the immediate possession of the thing is privileged, as against the possessor and his transferee, to be on the land at a reasonable time to remove the thing in a reasonable manner and with reasonable promptness, unless he knows or has reason to know of the time of the termination or suspension a reasonable period in advance.37 Section 171 makes every way of ending a land consent subject to this privilege and to egress; the previous subsection covered the privilege of the person who is leaving, and this one covers the retrieval of things.38
The privilege exists because consent to a thing’s presence usually carries a sequel. A stored boat, a borrowed ladder, or a load of lumber waiting for pickup is on the land with permission, and the arrangement assumes that the owner will return for it. When the consent ends, the owner’s return has no consent behind it, and without a privilege the owner would choose between trespassing and abandoning the property. A possessor with no claim to the goods could then end a welcome in a moment of irritation and hold the goods hostage. Section 177 removes that leverage by giving the owner a path onto the land for the single purpose of retrieval.
Each part of the rule does its own work. The requirement that the entry come at a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, and with reasonable promptness protects the possessor, because the privilege lasts only as long as retrieval needs, and an owner cannot use a thing left behind as a reason to browse the land or to put off the pickup indefinitely. The requirement that the entrant be entitled to immediate possession ties the privilege to its purpose, which is to let the person with a present right to the property reclaim it, and the clause extending the privilege against the possessor’s transferee keeps a sale of the land from stranding the owner’s property. The exception for advance knowledge does the subtlest work. The privilege protects an owner who is surprised, since a sudden termination leaves no chance to arrange a pickup, and the same exception limits the privilege of egress under § 176 for the same reason.39 An owner who knew or had reason to know a reasonable period beforehand when the consent would end could have collected the thing while the consent still stood, so any delay is the owner’s own doing and the law supplies no privilege to cover it.
A stem about a thing left on land after a consent ends raises two questions that point in opposite directions: whether the owner may enter to get it, and whether the owner is already liable for leaving it there. The entry question comes first.
Dmitri and Imogen entered the same garage for the same purpose, and the notice each had decided the result: the end date reached Dmitri only when the consent ended, while Imogen held it for two months. Dmitri’s visit fit inside every limit the privilege sets. Imogen’s loom also stays in the garage after June 1, so she is exposed on a second front, the converse of the privilege.
The converse problem arises when the owner never comes, as with Clements’s trunk in the discussion of expiry. Nothing she did after the summer ended looks like an entry, and one can argue that not coming for the trunk is no act at all, yet leaving the trunk is treated as a trespassory act.40 The Restatement answers the objection by locating the trespass in the thing’s continued presence. A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel, or other thing that the actor placed there with the possessor’s consent, if the actor fails to remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated.41 The consent was the only thing that made the thing’s presence lawful, so when the consent ended, nothing excused the presence that remained.
Rogers v. Board of Road Commissioners, a Michigan decision of 1948, applied that rule to a public body. The road commissioners had permission to put a fence in for the winter, and in the spring they left an anchor pipe in the ground. The farmer’s survivors sued for wrongful death on negligence and trespass theories, and the court held that the complaint stated a claim for trespass, because the commissioners committed a trespass by not removing the pipe once the winter permission had run its course.42 The liability falls where the privilege’s logic would put it. The person who placed a thing on land knows where it is and can move it at the lowest cost, while the possessor agreed to its presence only for the period the consent covered. Section 177 therefore gives the owner a way in to collect the thing, and the rule on continued presence takes away the shelter of the old consent from the owner who does not use it.
The third step usually decides the entry problems, because a reasonable period of notice leaves the owner with no privilege at all. The fifth step reverses the direction of the inquiry and asks whether the owner’s failure to come is itself the wrong. A pickup that comes long after the consent ended may also fail the fourth step, since the privilege speaks of a reasonable time and reasonable promptness, and an owner who delays that long is exposed on both fronts.