Concept
Mistake and Reasonable Belief
Privilege as a defense to intentional torts; incomplete privilege
Mistake and Reasonable Belief
The Restatement uses the word privilege to mean that conduct which would ordinarily subject the actor to liability does not do so in particular circumstances.1 Those circumstances are facts: whether a blow was about to land, whether the person at the gate had a right to be there. An actor who must decide in seconds can misjudge them, and what the misjudgment costs depends on the privilege. A mistake alone is no defense. Some privileges, however, are defined by what the actor reasonably believed, and for those a reasonable error is forgiven. The property privileges forgive less. This unit starts with the baseline rule and then takes self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property in turn.
Mistake Alone Is No Defense
A reasonable mistake about one's right to act leaves an intentional tortfeasor liable. One who intentionally and without a privilege enters another's land, confines another person, uses another's chattel, or performs unauthorized surgery is no less a tortfeasor because he reasonably, but wrongly, believed he was entitled to do so.2 The defendant meant to do the very act the tort forbids. The belief explains why he did it, but it does not make the act any less the tort.
Mistake enters the analysis through the privilege. Certain privileges are based on the defendant's reasonable belief about some fact, and they hold even when the belief later proves wrong.3 A mistake is generally privileged where the defendant must act quickly to protect an important interest that does in fact exist, or where the defendant is under a duty to act for the protection of the public interest.4 Haste explains the tolerance. Someone with an instant to respond cannot verify the facts, and a rule demanding a correct guess would punish the very response the privilege exists to permit. One further rule runs across the privileges: where the plaintiff induced the defendant's mistake, the defendant is absolved so long as the defendant did not act unreasonably.5 Where no privilege depends on belief and the plaintiff did not cause the error, the mistake is legally irrelevant, as the property privileges below show.
Reasonable Belief in Self-Defense
Self-defense is the clearest privilege that turns on reasonable belief. Anyone may use reasonable force to defend against a threatened battery by another.7 The privilege exists not only when the danger is real but also when the defendant reasonably, though mistakenly, believes that self-defense is necessary.8 In Courvoisier, a jewelry store owner committed a battery on a police officer, yet if he acted reasonably, the privilege of self-defense precludes his liability to the officer.9 Because self-defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant must raise it and prove the facts that establish it.10
Three rules about a defender's misperception are conceivable, and tort law picks the middle one. A rule requiring that the danger be real puts the whole risk of error on the defender, who must guess right in an instant or pay. A rule accepting any honest belief puts the whole risk on the person struck, however careless the defender's perception was. The reasonable-belief rule divides the loss by fault: the defender who read the scene as a careful person would have is protected, and the defender whose reading no careful person would share pays.
The measure is objective. The reasonableness of the belief, frequently a jury question, is judged by the standard of a reasonable person of average courage and depends in part on the circumstances of the event and any past history between the parties.11 Some older criminal cases accepted an honest belief, but that has never been the rule in torts, where courts care about the victim's need for compensation as well as the defendant's moral culpability.12 A trigger-happy subway passenger who honestly but unreasonably believes that several youths aboard are about to seriously harm him therefore may not draw his gun and fire.13 A person who sees another reach into a pocket in a way that apparently retrieves a weapon, by contrast, may act accordingly even if no weapon existed.14 Deadly force requires more: a reasonable belief that force sufficient to cause grievous bodily harm or death is about to be inflicted.15
Crabtree v. Dawson applied the standard to a belief about who was approaching. The defendant had ejected an intoxicated man, Noble, from a dance and was then told that Noble was outside getting some bricks. As the defendant stood in the doorway looking into the darkness, the plaintiff, arriving late, came running up the dimly lighted steps. Believing Noble was attacking, the defendant struck the plaintiff and knocked him down the steps, and he was held not liable.16 The warning about the bricks and the poor light are the facts that made his belief a reasonable one.
Mistaken Defense of Others
A person may use reasonable force to protect others when it reasonably appears necessary to do so.18 The hard cases arise when the intervenor reasonably believes a third person is in danger of bodily harm and the third person is not, as when the two are simply engaged in horseplay.19 An intervenor who arrives mid-confrontation can also mistake the real aggressor for the victim. Courts divide over what such a mistake costs.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 76 lets the intervenor use reasonable force to protect the third person so long as the intervenor reasonably believes that the person is about to be the victim of a battery.20 The rescuer, in effect, gets the same latitude for reasonable appearances that a person defending himself gets. Other courts hold that the intervenor steps into the shoes of the person defended and is privileged only when that person would be privileged to defend himself, so an intervenor who ends up helping the aggressor is liable.21 That view appears to be the minority position.22 It puts the risk of error on the rescuer and pushes intervenors to look before they leap.
Because the split is genuine, an answer to a mistaken-intervention problem should name the jurisdiction's approach or, where the facts are silent, apply both and show where the results part. They part only when the intervenor guessed wrong. Where the person defended was in fact entitled to use force, both approaches protect the intervenor.
Property Privileges and Mistake
The latitude for reasonable error narrows when the interest protected is property. A possessor's mistake about how a threat to the property appears is judged as it is in self-defense, since the same rules of apparent necessity apply.24 A mistake about the intruder's actual status is another matter and is not privileged. If the intruder in fact has a privilege to be on the land or to touch the chattel, the possessor's ignorance or mistake about that privilege is no defense to the tort committed on the intruder, unless the intruder was responsible for the mistake.25 Unlike self-defense, then, the defendant's mistake about whether the privilege exists is no defense unless the plaintiff knowingly induced it.26 The rule runs both ways: an intruder's mistake does not defeat the possessor's privilege unless the possessor's fault caused it.27
The narrower tolerance follows from what is at stake. A defender facing an apparent blow has an instant to decide and bodily integrity on the line. Property carries considerably less social value than the safety and bodily integrity of human beings, so the privilege to defend it is more limited.28 Read as an allocation of risk, the rule leaves the loss with the possessor who misjudged the other person's status rather than with the person who had every right to be there.
The result would change if the surveyor's own conduct had produced the mistake, because a mistake the plaintiff induced is excused so long as the defendant did not act unreasonably.29 On an exam, sort the mistake before choosing a rule. A mistake about what the plaintiff is doing, or about whether harm is imminent, falls under the apparent-necessity rules and is forgiven if reasonable. A mistake about whether the plaintiff had a right to be there or to hold the thing is not forgiven under the property privileges.