Concept
Reasonable Force
Self-defense and defense of others
Reasonable Force
The three questions above (threat, reasonable belief, purpose) decide whether the privilege exists at all. This section asks how much conduct it covers once it does. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 70(1) states the limit: the actor may not use any means of self-defense that is intended or likely to cause bodily harm or confinement in excess of what the actor correctly or reasonably believes necessary for his protection.1 That rule gives content to the word reasonable in § 63(1), which privileges reasonable force and no more.2
The limit takes this shape because self-defense protects; it does not redress a wrong already inflicted.3 Force beyond what protection required defends against nothing, so the defender who uses it stands where anyone stands who has intentionally hurt another. The comments measure the response by proportion: the harm inflicted must not be disproportionate in extent to the harm the actor seeks to avoid, judged by what a reasonable person who knew the circumstances, and had to decide in a hurry, would regard as permissible.4
Two comparisons follow. The first sets the force the defender used against the force the threat called for. The second concerns a defender who answers with no contact at all, only an act meant to frighten, which § 70(2) can privilege even when force of the same degree would not be.5 Both ask whether the response fits the danger. The stricter limits on force likely to kill, and the consequences for a defender who overshoots, come in later sections.
Proportionality of Force
Section 70(1) sets two separate ceilings on a defensive response, and each asks a different question.6
The first ceiling is necessity. The defender may use only as much force as the defender correctly or reasonably believes is needed to stop the threatened contact, so the question is whether something milder would have done. A person who is slapped may block the blow or push the other away, but may not knife the aggressor, and may not even match the aggressor's own level of force if less will prevent the contact.7 Force is excused because it protects, and whatever part of the response protection did not require is a fresh invasion of the other person.
The second ceiling is proportion. Comment j says the harm the actor inflicts must not be disproportionate in extent to the harm from which the actor seeks protection, so a degree of force privileged to ward off a blow threatening substantial harm may not be privileged merely to prevent touching in an insulting manner.8 Each ceiling blocks a response the other would let through. Under necessity alone, a defender who could stop a persistent insulting touch only by breaking the other's arm would pass, and a trivial affront would license serious injury; proportion tells that defender to bear the minor offense. Under proportion alone, any threat of a given size would license a full-size response even where a gentler one would work.
Both ceilings are applied to the actual parties and not to an imagined pair of equals. Differences in age, size, and relative strength count, because the same shove is a different threat from a much larger person, and a response that would be overkill between equals may be the least that can stop a stronger opponent.9 In Silas v. Bowen, a middle-aged man of about five feet six inches and 135 pounds was permitted to ward off a young athlete of six feet six and 230 pounds by firing a shot aimed near the athlete's feet, even though the shot missed its aim and hit the plaintiff.10 A small ten-year-old who threw a broom at a larger ten-year-old in McDonald v. Terrebonne Parish School Board was likewise privileged, although the broom put out the other child's eye.11 The unintended injuries did not defeat the privilege, because the Restatement looks to the harm the actor intends, or a reasonable person would realize is likely, and not to the harm that happens to result.12 Andrepont v. Naquin shows the opposite fit: a teenager in a fistfight was not justified in using a baseball bat to protect himself from threatened injury, because a bat answers fists with a different order of force.13
The other reference point in § 70(1) is the defender's belief, and its wording protects a defender who guesses high. The test is what the actor correctly or reasonably believes necessary, and comment j fixes the vantage point: the other's conduct has forced a rapid decision, so the question is what a reasonable person in such an emergency would believe permissible, and not what a reasonable person would recognize as sufficient once the emergency has passed.14 A person under attack cannot weigh out force in exact portions, and a rule demanding it would punish the defender who guessed high while rewarding the one who hesitated and took the blow. A defender may therefore sometimes use more force than was in fact necessary, because the privilege follows the reasonable belief about necessity,15 and a reasonable mistake of this kind protects the defender.16 The question of mistake returns when a defender acts for someone else: some courts say the defender assumes the risk and is privileged only to the extent the third person was, while other courts and Restatement (Second) § 76 hold that a reasonable mistake does not negate the privilege.17
The jab fails for a reason comment j states directly: because the means must be proportionate to the danger, one may not use means intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm even against a blow likely to cause some fairly substantial injury.18 A nondeadly threat does not justify a response likely to cause serious harm, even where the only alternatives are to run or to submit to the battery.19 The deadly-force sections below take up that line in full.
Necessity is measured against the threat as it stands at each moment, so force that fits the start of a struggle can become excessive as the threat shrinks. If the actor believes the other's attempt has been frustrated or abandoned, the actor may inflict no further harm or offensive contact. One who disarms a whip-wielding aggressor by reasonable force may not then beat him.20 The moment-by-moment reading cuts both ways. A murderous assailant forfeits the privilege for the moment but not forever, and cannot regain it by retreating to the wall; the assailant must end the attack and, if unable to get entirely away, convey that the fight is over.21 How much of a defender's force stays privileged once the line is crossed is taken up in the excessive-force section below.
Hindsight most often creeps in at the third step. Learning later that a gentler response would have sufficed does not defeat the privilege; the question is whether a reasonable person in the moment would have seen a gentler response as plainly adequate.
Threats Instead of Force
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 70(2) adds a rule that can surprise a student who has just learned the proportionality ceiling. An actor may be privileged in self-defense to do an act intended to put another in immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, bodily harm, or confinement, even though the act is in excess of what the actor may privilegedly inflict. The condition is that the act be intended, and reasonably believed by the actor, to be likely to do no more than create that apprehension.23 Section 70(1) caps means of self-defense that are intended or likely to cause bodily harm or confinement, measured against what the actor correctly or reasonably believes necessary.24 Subsection (2) governs a different kind of act, one meant and expected to injure no one, and for that act the ceiling on inflicted force does not carry over.
Pointing a gun without firing it is the usual illustration. Merely threatening death or serious bodily harm, with no intention of carrying out the threat, is not deadly force, so a defender may be justified in pointing a gun at an attacker when pulling the trigger would not be.25 The tort rule says the same in general terms: a defender may threaten a harmful or offensive contact (an assault) even though the contact itself would not be privileged, provided the act is intended and reasonably believed likely to do no more than create an apprehension of that contact.26 An act of that kind frightens and nothing more, so the concern behind the ceiling, injury beyond what protection requires, is absent.
The subsection has two requirements, and each does separate work. The first is intent: the actor must mean the act only to create apprehension. That question looks at the defender's actual purpose, and it screens out the defender who points a gun planning to fire if the attacker keeps coming, because that defender intends more than fear. The second is reasonable belief: the actor must also reasonably believe the act is likely to do no more than create apprehension. That question asks what a person in the defender's position would expect the act to do, and it screens out the defender who hopes only to scare but chooses a means a reasonable person would see as likely to injure. Because both must be present, good intentions cannot rescue a careless means, and a careful means cannot rescue a defender who secretly meant to shoot.
The subsection speaks of a privilege in self-defense, so the ordinary conditions of self-defense still apply: an unprivileged threat the actor reasonably believes is coming, and a purpose of protection.27 Section 70(2) relaxes only the ceiling on how much the actor may do. A defender who brandishes a weapon at someone whose attack has already ended gets no help from it, because the privilege does not reach acts done in retaliation for a past aggression.28
The shot fails for the reason comment j gives: means intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm are not privileged even against a blow likely to cause some fairly substantial injury.29 The same pistol is privileged when pointed and unprivileged when fired, and the difference lies in what the act is meant and expected to do.
Either requirement can fail on its own, and a student who treats them as one question will miss that.
Steps two and three ask different questions. The second looks inward at the defender's purpose, and the third looks outward at what the chosen means would lead an ordinary person to expect. An answer that notes only that the defender never fired skips both, and an answer that treats every warning as privileged skips the second.