Concept
Self-Defense Against Negligence
Self-defense and defense of others
Self-Defense Against Negligence
The self-defense privilege does not end with deliberate attackers. An actor may also defend against a person who threatens harm through carelessness alone, such as a worker who swings a ladder toward him without looking or a guest who waves a loaded pistol while telling a story. Tort law recognizes a privilege to use reasonable force even against the threat of negligently caused harm, as part of the same self-help remedy that covers intentional attack.1 Negligence here means a risk created through want of due care, with no purpose to injure.
The privilege comes on tighter terms than its intentional-attack counterpart, and the tightening depends on how much force the actor uses. Reasonable nondeadly force is privileged, but the privilege disappears if the actor knows or should know that he can escape the need to defend himself.2 Deadly force is privileged only if the actor reasonably believes that the conduct will cause him death or serious bodily harm that can be prevented only by such force.3
Both limits make sense once we ask who stands on the other side of the force. An intentional attacker has chosen to hurt the defender, so force that repels him lands on the person who made the danger on purpose. A careless person has chosen nothing of the kind. He may notice the danger and stop, and force against him lands on someone who was aiming at no one. The rules below therefore ask the defender to use cheaper means whenever they are reasonably available.
Nondeadly Force Against Negligence
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 64(1) lets an actor use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, against a harmful or offensive contact or bodily harm that he reasonably believes another's conduct threatens, even though he recognizes the conduct as negligent.4 Most of the machinery comes over from § 63(1), the rule for intentional attack. The actor's belief in the threat must be reasonable, the force must be nondeadly, and the force must be proportionate to the harm threatened.5 What changes is the source of the danger. Section 63(1) speaks of a contact that another is about to inflict intentionally, while § 64(1) speaks of harm that another's conduct threatens, so the actor need not believe that the other means any harm at all.
The privilege reaches careless conduct because the actor's injury does not depend on the other person's state of mind. A ladder swung into the ribs breaks them whether the swinger was aiming or daydreaming, and an actor who sees it coming has no time to inquire into motive. Self-defense is a self-help remedy for moments when no one can resort to the law in time, and that need arises against a careless threat as much as against a deliberate one.6 A privilege that vanished whenever the other person was merely careless would force the actor to take the blow and sue afterward.
The privilege against careless conduct carries a condition that the privilege against intentional attack lacks. Under § 64(2), the actor is not privileged to defend himself if he knows or should know that he can escape the necessity of doing so by retreating, or by giving up the exercise of a right or privilege that, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to require him to relinquish.7 The words "should know" make the test objective. An actor who overlooks an open exit that an ordinary person would have noticed loses the privilege, while an actor with no reason to see an escape, such as a gap hidden behind stacked crates, keeps it. The word escape matters too, because a retreat that leaves the actor in the path of the danger does not escape the necessity of defending. The second route, giving up a right or privilege, carries its own qualifier: the surrender must be one that it is reasonable to require under the circumstances. Waiting a moment before crossing a shared hallway is easy to require, and giving up a substantial entitlement may not be.
Section 63(2) takes the opposite position toward an intentional attacker. Self-defense remains privileged under § 63(1) even though the actor correctly or reasonably believes that he could avoid the necessity by retreating, by giving up a right or privilege, or by complying with a command that he has no duty to obey.8 Force against an intentional attack is still a last resort, but § 63(2) lifts retreat and surrender from the lesser means the actor must try first.9 Section 64(2) leaves both on the list when the threat is mere carelessness. The difference tracks what sits on the other side of the scale. A step back costs the actor little and spares someone who meant no harm, while requiring a victim to give ground before an intentional attacker would let the attacker's wrongful choice decide where the victim may stand.
Bar questions on this rule usually pair a clumsy swing of some object with a shove in return, and the real question is whether the person who shoved had a cheap way out.
The two scenes share the same carelessness and the same shove, and only the available escape separates liability from privilege.
Which subsection controls depends on how the actor reasonably reads the other's conduct. Section 63 privileges force against a contact that the actor reasonably believes the other is about to inflict intentionally, and that belief supports the privilege even if the other in fact meant nothing by the gesture.10 An actor who reasonably mistakes a careless swing for a deliberate one is therefore judged under § 63, where a safe exit does not matter. An actor who sees the carelessness for what it is falls under § 64 and faces the escape limit.
The last two steps do the real work in most problems. An answer that stops after finding the force reasonable has applied only § 64(1), and an answer that carries the stand-your-ground rule over from intentional attacks has applied the wrong subsection.
Deadly Force Against Negligence
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 66 governs deadly force against a threat that the actor recognizes as merely careless. It privileges force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm against such conduct "if, but only if," the actor reasonably believes that the conduct will cause him death or serious bodily harm that can be prevented only by the use of such force.12 The preceding subsection allowed reasonable nondeadly force under § 64(1). This one addresses the most dangerous response, and it sets the most demanding terms. Two limits taught earlier meet here: the proportionality ceiling, which reserves deadly means for the gravest threats, and the last-resort principle, which justifies force only when nothing gentler would do.
Serious bodily harm is harm so grave that it differs in kind, and not merely in degree, from other bodily harm. Harm that creates a substantial risk of fatal consequences qualifies, as does mayhem and the permanent or protracted loss of the function of an important member or organ. Force counts as deadly by what the actor intends or a reasonable person in his position would realize is likely, not by what happens to result.13
The words "if, but only if" make § 66 narrower than the privilege against an intentional attacker. A bare "if" would state a sufficient condition, one route to the privilege among several. "If, but only if" makes the stated condition the sole route, so a defender who cannot satisfy it has no privilege to use deadly force against that conduct, however alarming the encounter felt. The condition has two parts, and both must be present. The defender must reasonably believe that the conduct will cause death or serious bodily harm, the same grade of harm as the force he uses, and he must reasonably believe that such force is the only way to prevent it. Both beliefs are judged as every self-defense belief is judged, by what a person of ordinary firmness and courage would conclude from the circumstances the defender knew or should have known, in the emergency as it appeared at the time.14
The contrast with § 65(1) shows how much the text tightens. That section privileges deadly force against an attacker when the defender reasonably believes both that the other is about to inflict an intentional contact or other bodily harm and that he is thereby in peril of death, serious bodily harm, or ravishment that can safely be prevented only by the immediate use of such force.15 Three differences appear on the face of the two rules. Section 66 has no alternative for ravishment, which fits a rule about careless conduct, since a sexual assault is something a person does on purpose. Section 66 is also stated as an exclusive condition, where § 65(1) lists what the defender must believe. And § 66 asks the defender to believe that the conduct will cause the harm, a formulation that on its face demands more than being put in peril of it.16
The reason for the tighter terms lies in who stands on the other side of the force. An intentional attacker has chosen to put the defender's life or body at risk, so repelling him costs the person who created the danger on purpose. A careless person has chosen nothing of the kind, so deadly force against him lands on someone who was aiming at no one, who may notice the danger and stop on his own, and who may respond to a shout. Each part of § 66 answers one of those facts. Limiting the privilege to threats of death or serious bodily harm applies the rule that deadly means are not privileged to prevent a lesser harm, even when no other means would prevent it.17 The line has an evident logic, since a later award of damages can repair a bruise or a broken tool but not a death. The requirement that such force be the only way to prevent the harm carries the last-resort principle into the negligence setting. A warning, a step aside, or a moment's patience are all lesser means when the danger comes from carelessness that a shout may cure.
Section 64(2) says outright that the ability to escape defeats the privilege for nondeadly force against careless conduct.18 Section 66 contains no separate retreat clause, and it appears to need none. A harm that the actor can avoid by stepping out of the line is a harm that something other than deadly force can prevent, so the exclusive necessity condition does the same work.
Because the privilege depends on how the actor reasonably reads the other's conduct, § 66 binds only a defender who recognizes the conduct as negligent. A defender who reasonably but mistakenly believes that the other intends a harmful contact is judged under the rules for intentional attack, because the privilege exists when the actor reasonably believes the other intends the contact, even if the other has no such intention.19 The same careless gesture can therefore fall under either section, depending on what an ordinary person in the defender's position would have made of it, and the narrower terms govern only the defender who sees the carelessness for what it is.
An essay problem that pairs a careless actor with a defender who uses deadly force asks two questions in order. The first is how grave a harm the defender reasonably expected, and the second is whether deadly force was the only way to prevent it.
The doorway variation in the first scene fails the necessity condition, and the bar in the second fails the gravity condition, so either failure defeats the privilege on its own. A defender who answers a careless threat of minor harm with deadly means has used a higher grade of force than the harm justified, and the real need to do something does not repair that mismatch. A defender who cannot meet § 66 is not defenseless, because reasonable nondeadly force remains available under § 64(1), subject to the escape limit in § 64(2).20 The consequences of using more force than the privilege allows come up in the excessive-force section below.