Concept
Harm to Bystanders
Self-defense and defense of others
Harm to Bystanders
The privilege of self-defense is aimed at a person. Section 63 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts permits reasonable force, short of force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, against an unprivileged harmful or offensive contact, or other bodily harm, that the actor reasonably believes another is about to inflict intentionally.1 The comments tie the defender's purpose to the same person. Harm inflicted intentionally is privileged only when it is meant to keep the other from inflicting a harmful or offensive contact, or to stop contacts the other has already begun and threatens to continue.2 The privilege follows the source of the danger.
Force does not always stay with its source. A blow meant for an attacker can strike a passerby, and a defender with no safe way out can seize the nearest stranger. In neither case is the bystander the source of the threat, and the bystander is not the person being protected either. That sets the bystander apart from the third person a rescuer defends. A rescuer may act under the same conditions and by the same means as self-defense because the person defended holds a privilege of self-defense that the rescuer shares.3 The bystander holds no privilege to lend and has done nothing that would explain why force should fall on him.
The two situations differ on one fact: what the defender meant to do to the bystander. When the injury is an accident, the privilege against the attacker carries over and negligence decides the case. When the defender chooses the bystander, the privilege offers the defender nothing.
Accidental Injury
A defender's blow can miss. Suppose a person privileged to defend against an attacker throws a chair at him, and the chair strikes a passerby who stepped into its path. The privilege that protects the defender against the attacker carries over to the passerby's claim. Ordinary negligence principles apply, and liability depends on the reasonableness of the defender's conduct under the circumstances.4 Those circumstances include the emergency and the necessity of defending against the attacker, so a court asks what a careful person would have done with an attack under way and no time to deliberate.5 The few cases on point, among them Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75 (1864), and Shaw v. Lord, 41 Okla. 347, 137 P. 885 (1914), hold the defender not liable to the bystander in the absence of some negligence toward him.6
The bystander cannot turn the claim into a battery by borrowing the defender's intent to strike the attacker. The usual route is transferred intent, which treats a person who intends a battery against one victim and hits another as having the intent the tort requires. That rule carries over only an intent that was wrongful, and the defender's intent toward the attacker was privileged. Nothing wrongful remains to transfer, and the bystander is left with a claim in negligence.
All of this assumes that the aimed blow was privileged, so that is the first thing to test. A reasonable mistake does not defeat the privilege. A defender who reasonably believes force is necessary to protect himself against battery is privileged even though no necessity existed, apparently because of the importance courts attach to self-preservation.7 The force must still fit the threat. A threat of deadly force does not by itself authorize deadly force in return; it authorizes the force the defender reasonably believes necessary to prevent the battery. Where a jurisdiction requires retreat before deadly force, a defender who can retreat safely has no privilege to use it. A blow that fails these tests is a battery against the attacker.8
The chair thrower and Lucas hurled the same kind of missile and hit the same kind of bystander. The results differ because only the chair thrower's blow was privileged against its target. The bystander's claim therefore turns on how the aimed blow would have fared against the attacker, and neither the bystander's own conduct nor the miss changes that.
The negligence standard avoids two extremes. It does not make the defender answer for every stray blow struck in a crisis, and it does not erase the bystander's claim when the defender was careless. The allowance for the emergency matches one the Restatement already makes in judging the amount of force. The test is what a reasonable person in the emergency would believe permissible, not what hindsight shows would have been enough.10 A throw that was privileged against the attacker can still be careless toward the bystander, and the bystander recovers on proof of that carelessness.
The first step does the real work. An answer that jumps to negligence skips the question whether the aimed blow was privileged, and an answer that jumps to transferred intent forgets that a privileged blow carries no wrongful intent to transfer. All of this assumes the injury to the bystander was unintended. A defender who deliberately harms an innocent person to escape danger stands elsewhere, and the next subsection takes up that case.
Intentional Harm to Bystanders
A defender who picks the bystander as the means of escape stands on different footing from one whose blow goes astray, because the privilege never reached that choice. The deadly-force section keeps the same aim as § 63: an actor may defend himself against another by force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm when he reasonably believes the conditions for it are met.12 Nothing in either rule speaks to force aimed at a person who threatens no one.
When a defender intentionally harms a person whose conduct did not cause the defender's jeopardy, because doing so is or seems necessary to save himself, no privilege of self-defense exists. The defender is liable for at least compensatory damages unless the harm was relatively minor compared with the harm that threatened him.13 The words at least make compensation the floor, so the defender may owe more. Because the defender meant to touch or restrain the bystander, the plaintiff's case needs no transferred intent, and a sympathetic motive does not erase the intent. What remains is whether some privilege covers the act, and the rule answers that self-defense does not.
Two features of the privilege explain the result. The first is purpose. Harm is privileged only when inflicted to keep the other from inflicting a contact or from continuing one, and harming a bystander stops nothing the bystander was about to do.14 The second is the source of the danger. The rule withholds the privilege from a person whose conduct did not cause the defender's jeopardy, and a stranger who merely stands in the defender's way has caused no jeopardy, any more than a stranger used as a shield has.15
Reasonable fear is the usual limit on self-defense, and it is easy to misapply here. A defender who reasonably believes force is necessary to protect himself against battery is privileged even if the necessity turns out to be unreal, and courts credit that mistake because of the importance they attach to self-preservation.16 That protection attaches to force used against the person the defender reasonably believes is about to attack him. The bystander rule reads differently, because it withholds the privilege even where harming the bystander is or seems necessary to the defender's safety.17 A defender can fear for his life entirely reasonably and still owe the bystander compensation.
The recognized examples sit at the serious end. A defender who kills an innocent person to save his own life is liable, as is one who uses another person as a shield to absorb a bullet meant for him, or who intentionally runs another down and seriously injures him to escape.18 Each defender picked a person who had no part in the danger and put the cost of the danger on that person. The rule excuses harm that is merely offensive or slight, such as knocking the person down or confining him against his will for a short time.19
The exception sets the harm to the bystander beside the harm that threatened the defender, which is why it can excuse a stumble but not a death. A knockdown is slight beside a threat of death. A fatal or serious wound is not, and a defender who relocates a grave injury onto an innocent person owes repayment. The comparison resembles the proportionality limit on self-defensive force, which measures the force against the harm the defender seeks to avoid.20
A second slip runs the other way and treats every contact with a bystander as a battery that must be paid for. The minor-harm exception covers a brief shove or detention during a genuine flight, and the size of the bystander's harm beside the threatened harm decides which side of the line a case falls on.
Steps one and four do most of the work. A stranger who stood in a doorway still created no danger, and a stumble counts as slight only when set beside the harm the defender was fleeing.