Concept
Conditions for Using Force
Defense of property: land and chattels
Conditions for Using Force
Section 77 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lets a possessor use reasonable force, short of force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to prevent or end an intrusion on land or chattels, but only if three conditions are met.1
- The intrusion is not privileged, or the intruder intentionally or negligently causes the actor to believe that it is not.2
- The actor reasonably believes that the intrusion can be prevented or terminated only by the force used.3
- The actor has first asked the intruder to desist and been disregarded, unless the actor reasonably believes that a request will be useless or that substantial harm will be done before it can be made.4
The previous section established that the privilege exists and reaches only reasonable, non-deadly force. These three conditions decide whether a particular use of force on a particular occasion falls inside it. A possessor who misses any one has no privilege, and the force is a tort against the intruder.
Each condition keeps force away from a person who does not deserve it or who would have stopped without it. The first confirms that the person on the receiving end has no right to be there, since force against someone entitled to enter injures an innocent. The second makes force a last resort, so that a gentler step that would have worked cannot be skipped in favor of a blow. The third puts the simplest step first, because many intruders leave when told to, and one who has been asked and refuses has chosen the confrontation. Together the conditions confine force to the case where it is the last reasonable option against a true wrongdoer.
A related rule, in § 78, bears on the first condition. An intruder who reasonably but mistakenly believes in a right to enter does not defeat the privilege by that belief, unless the actor intentionally or negligently caused the mistake.5 The discussion below follows the order of the statute: whether the intrusion is unprivileged, how a mistake by either side affects that question, whether the force was reasonably necessary, and whether the intruder was first asked to stop.
Unprivileged Intrusion
The first condition asks whether the person receiving the force had a right to be where he was. Under § 77(a), the privilege is available only if the intrusion is not privileged, or if the other person intentionally or negligently causes the actor to believe that it is not.6 An intrusion is privileged when the law gives the entrant a right to be on the land or to handle the chattel, whether or not the possessor welcomes the entry. The condition follows from why force is tolerated at all. A possessor may respond to an intruder because the intruder created the confrontation by a wrong, and an entrant with a legal right has wronged no one. Force against that entrant injures an innocent person, and the possessor's objection to the entry is no reason for the law to excuse the injury.
Consent is one source of that right. Entry with the possessor's consent is not trespass; the invitation creates a license, which may be oral or implied. Once the license expires or is revoked, an entrant who fails to leave within a reasonable time becomes a trespasser.7 A dinner guest is therefore privileged while the invitation lasts and unprivileged only after the host has revoked it and a reasonable time to leave has passed. Only then does the host's use of force come under consideration at all.
A property right can also privilege an entry. In Magnuson v. Billmayer, a landowner used force to stop workers who were removing telephone poles, and the force was not privileged because the telephone company held an easement that authorized the entry.8 Ownership of the field gave the landowner no right to stop an entry that the easement already allowed, whatever the landowner thought of the workers.
The harder question arises when the possessor honestly takes a lawful entrant for a trespasser. The same rules of apparent necessity apply in defense of property as in self-defense, but a mistake about the intruder's actual status is not privileged. A possessor's ignorance or mistake about the entrant's privilege is no defense to the tort committed on the entrant, unless the entrant was responsible for the mistake.9 Self-defense is the contrast. It is the notable exception to the ordinary principle that a reasonable mistake does not excuse an intentional tort, and the exception is attributed to the weight courts give to “self-preservation as the first law of nature.”10 A defendant who reasonably believes force is necessary to protect himself from battery is privileged even though there was in fact no necessity. Property defense gives the possessor no comparable allowance for a mistake about who has a right to be there.
The rule places the risk of this kind of error on the possessor, who can often resolve the doubt by asking before acting, a step the third condition requires anyway. The exception in § 77(a) reverses that allocation when the entrant produced the error. An intruder who misleads the possessor, intentionally or carelessly, has created the false appearance of wrongdoing and cannot profit from it.11
The entries in both hypotheticals were authorized. The outcomes differ because the daughter did nothing to create the appearance of a burglary, while the son built it. Who created the false appearance decides the case. The opposite mistake, in which the intruder wrongly believes he may enter, is governed by § 78 and comes next.
Mistaken Intruders
The mistake rule just taught has a mirror image in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 78. A possessor's privilege to inflict a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm in order to prevent or end an intrusion is not affected by the intruder's reasonable but mistaken belief that he has a right or privilege to intrude, unless the possessor intentionally or negligently caused the mistake.13 Read beside § 77(a), the two rules pair off. A possessor's reasonable belief that an entrant is a trespasser does not create the privilege unless the entrant caused the belief, and an intruder's reasonable belief that the entry is allowed does not destroy the privilege unless the possessor caused that belief.14
In each pairing the error stays with the person who made it, and only a party whose own fault produced the false appearance loses the protection that would otherwise follow. The mistaken intruder still has no right to be where he is, and his belief, however reasonable, does not give him one. If it did, every intruder could claim it, and the possessor's self-help would turn on what was in the intruder's head.
The exception follows the same logic from the other side. A possessor who posts a sign inviting the public in has created the confusion and cannot fairly use it as a ground for force against someone who relied on it. The privilege is lost whether the possessor caused the mistake intentionally or negligently, so carelessness suffices and a deliberate trick is not required.15
Section 78 removes only one possible objection to the privilege. The possessor must still satisfy the other conditions of § 77, including the request to desist unless a request would be useless or harm would come before it could be made.16 The limit on the kind of force also stays: the privilege covers only reasonable force that is not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.17
Both students made reasonable mistakes, so the reasonableness of the intruder's belief cannot separate the outcomes. What does is who produced the belief. The first student's error came from her own sources, and the second's came from the owner's sign. On an exam, the usual error is to stop once the intruder's belief is found reasonable, when the deciding question is whether the possessor intentionally or negligently caused it.
Force Reasonably Necessary
The second condition requires that the actor reasonably believe the intrusion can be prevented or terminated only by the force used.19 Two phrases do the work. Reasonably believes sets the standard by which the actor's judgment is measured. Only by the force used sets how strong that judgment must be, since it is not enough that force would help. Together they make force a last resort.
The necessity half rests on what force is, a harm inflicted on a person. The law tolerates that harm because the intruder has to be stopped, and tolerates it only as far as stopping requires. If shutting a gate, asking the person to leave, or calling the police would have ended the intrusion, the added injury from a blow buys the possessor nothing. The same logic appears in the rule that nondeadly force may not be used when there is time to take other lawful measures, such as calling the police, which keeps anyone from being physically hurt unless it is really required.20
The reasonableness half answers a different problem. A possessor confronts the intruder in seconds and cannot test every alternative before acting. The rule therefore asks for an honest and reasonable belief that force is necessary to protect the property from an imminent taking, damage, dispossession, or trespass, and it does not demand proof in hindsight that nothing else would have worked.21 The word only keeps that room from becoming a pretext, because the belief must be that nothing milder will do.
Because the test looks to belief, the question is how the situation appeared when the possessor acted, and the measure is objective: would a reasonable person in the possessor's position, seeing what the possessor saw, have concluded that nothing gentler would stop the intrusion? The same rules of apparent necessity govern property defense and self-defense, so a reasonable mistake about how much force the situation required is excused. That allowance does not reach a mistake about the entrant's status, which § 77(a) leaves on the possessor. A reasonable mistake about necessity is excused, and a reasonable mistake about the entrant's right to be present is not, unless the entrant caused it.22
The first owner had time to speak or phone, and a word would probably have ended the intrusion. The second had neither. An alternative defeats the privilege only when it is realistically open. A gate within reach, or a call that can be made while the trespasser is still crossing the yard, is a real alternative, and a call that would be answered only after the harm is complete is not. Asking the intruder to leave is one of the gentler measures this condition weighs, but § 77(c) makes the request a separate requirement with its own excuses, taken up next.
Two errors recur. One decides the question in hindsight, asking whether the intruder turned out to be harmless or whether a call to the police would in fact have worked, when the condition asks what the possessor reasonably believed at the moment of acting. The other excuses any force the possessor sincerely thought necessary, when the belief must be one that a reasonable person in that position would hold. Force that outruns what the situation required raises a separate problem, taken up under excessive force below.
Request to Desist
The third condition makes speech the first resort. Section 77(c) requires that the actor first have asked the intruder to desist and that the intruder have disregarded the request, unless the actor reasonably believes that a request will be useless or that substantial harm will be done before it can be made.24 The provision therefore has a default and two excuses. The default is a sequence in which the possessor asks, the intruder refuses, and only then does force become available. The excuses cover the possessor who reasonably reads the situation as one where asking would accomplish nothing or would arrive too late.
The default exists because a request is the cheapest alternative to force, and an intruder who is asked and refuses has chosen the confrontation. That ties this condition to the necessity requirement, since a possessor who never asked has not shown that force was the only way to end the intrusion. A request also turns an ambiguous entry into an unmistakable wrong, and it gives an entrant who honestly misjudged his right to be there a chance to correct the mistake before anyone is hurt. The two excuses follow from the same logic. When the intruder is already using force, or when harm will be done before words could take effect, a request can do none of those jobs. The traditional statement of the rule drew the same line: the possessor first had to ask the intruder to leave or desist, unless the request would clearly be in vain or there was no time or opportunity, and if the intruder did not leave, the possessor could use a threat of force or reasonable force, but only what was minimally required to prevent or end the intrusion.25
The default is clearest in cases where a possessor ignored it. In Chapell v. Schmidt, a defendant caned an elderly person who had entered the yard to pick flowers, and in Emmons v. Quade, a mill worker clubbed a twelve-year-old boy who was scooping up grain left in a railroad car after unloading. In each, the force was unreasonable because the invasion was peaceful, took place in the possessor's presence, and no request to depart had been made.26 Presence meant the possessor could speak at once, so a request cost only seconds. A peaceful entry meant the intruder did little harm in those seconds. With both facts present, nothing excused the missing request, and any force was unreasonable until one was made.
Active force changes the analysis. In M'Ilvoy v. Cockran, the court stated that where an entry involves actual force, such as breaking open a gate or door, it is lawful to oppose force with force, because that is only returning violence with violence, and that one who comes forcibly and takes away goods may be opposed immediately, for there is no time to make a request. Where one enters the close without actual force, although the entry is construed a force in law, there must be a request to depart before the possessor can lay hands on the intruder.27 The reason is timing. A request aimed at someone in the middle of breaking in will be overtaken by the damage it was meant to avoid.
M'Ilvoy also shows how little the excuse carries. The court held that a wounding cannot be justified barely in defense of possession, so excusing the request removes only the request requirement and leaves the other conditions, and the limit on the kind of force, in place. The court added that if, in removing the intruder, the possessor is assaulted and wounds the intruder in defense of himself, the wounding may be justified, but the justification then rests on the assault and must be pleaded that way.28
The second excuse, that a request would be useless or unsafe, depends on what the intruder's conduct would tell a reasonable person. In Higgins v. Minaghan, a mob approached a house firing guns in the air, shouting, and drumming on pans, and the occupant did not have to ask it to leave, because the intruders' conduct showed that a request would be useless or could not safely be made in time.29 The judgment is made from the possessor's position at the moment of acting. The Model Penal Code's justification for protecting property has the same structure and names the danger ground outright: a request is unnecessary when it would be useless, when making it would be dangerous to the actor or another person, or when substantial harm will be done to the property before the request can effectively be made.30
The rule has two parts. The possessor must ask, and the intruder must then refuse. A possessor who shouts and seizes in the same instant has given the intruder no chance to disregard anything, and a possessor who grabs someone already complying has no refusal to point to.
A common error treats the trespass itself as the excuse. Every intruder commits a wrong, and M'Ilvoy treated even a simple entry as a force in law, yet such an entry still required a request before the possessor could lay hands on the intruder.31 If wrongfulness alone dispensed with the request, no request would ever be required. The dividing line is the intruder's conduct: a peaceful entry in the possessor's presence calls for a request, while actual force, destruction, or a menacing crowd shows a reasonable possessor that asking would be futile or too late. A second error treats an excused request as permission for any force the possessor finds convenient. Even when the request is excused, the force must still be reasonably necessary and must stay within the non-deadly limit.