Concept
Limits on the Kind of Force
Defense of property: land and chattels
Limits on the Kind of Force
The conditions for using force against an intrusion (an unprivileged intrusion, reasonable necessity, and a request to desist) decide whether a possessor may act at all. They do not decide how severely the possessor may act, and a possessor who meets every condition can still lose the privilege by choosing the wrong kind of force.
A ranking of interests sets the limits. The social value of property is considerably less than that of human safety and bodily integrity, so the property privilege is narrower than the privilege of self-defense.1 The first limit sits in the opening words of the rule: the privilege covers reasonable force that is not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.2 Section 79 supplies the one exception, and it turns on danger to persons, not on the value of the property.3
Force in this setting covers more than a blow. A possessor may also confine an intruder or put the intruder in fear of a contact, and each of those is an intentional tort that the privilege must answer. Section 80 applies to confinement and apprehension the same conditions that govern contact,4 and § 81(2) adds a narrow privilege to threaten more harm than the possessor could inflict, so long as the threat is reasonably believed to stay a threat.5 The three subsections below take the limits in that order: deadly force, confinement and apprehension, and threats short of contact.
Deadly Force Barred
Section 79 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts allows a possessor to use force by a means intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm only when the possessor reasonably believes that the intruder, unless expelled or excluded, is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the possessor or to a third person the possessor is privileged to protect.6 Section 77 sets the ceiling for the property privilege, and § 79 marks the single occasion on which a possessor may rise above it.7 The rule looks to the means used, so a shot fired at an intruder counts as deadly force even when the shooter hopes only to wound.
The belief that § 79 requires concerns danger to people. The rule does not ask how valuable the land or chattel is, and it contains no request condition that a refusal to leave could satisfy. The general, though not universal, rule is that a person may not use deadly force solely to protect personal property,8 and the rule rests on the judgment that human life is worth more than property.9 A possessor who reasonably believes the intruder will kill or seriously injure a person is acting to protect a person, so the justification comes from the danger and not from the property interest. Most jurisdictions excuse a reasonable belief that the elements of the privilege exist, but force based on a negligently formed belief is unlawful.10
Students most often go wrong by treating the request to desist as the gateway to deadly force, as though an intruder who refuses to leave has climbed a rung on the ladder of permitted responses. The request governs ordinary force, and § 79 never mentions it.
Every fact the landowner can point to is a fact about property: a few tomatoes and a right to exclude. A refusal to leave may bear on how much non-deadly force is reasonable, but it adds no danger to any person, and the general rule has long been that force calculated to cause death or great bodily harm is not permitted merely to repel an intrusion.11
What separates the two scenes is whether anyone's life or body was in danger. Both entrants were unprivileged intruders, so the entry cannot explain the different outcomes. Courts meet the same question in homicide prosecutions. In People v. La Voie, the accused was charged with murder, and the trial court directed a verdict of not guilty on the view that the evidence established a clear case of justifiable homicide.12
A single encounter can cross the line in the middle. A thief who answers an owner's non-deadly resistance by drawing a knife has become likely to cause the owner serious bodily harm, which satisfies § 79 and brings in the privilege to protect oneself.13 The converse also holds. An owner who uses deadly force when the thief does not appear to be using it has exceeded the privilege, and the thief then has a right of self-defense against the owner.14
On the facts of Goldfuss v. Davidson, no one in the house faced any danger. The defendant fired a shot from his kitchen window at two men who had broken into his pole barn, and the Supreme Court of Ohio approved the trial judge's refusal to give a self-defense instruction. The defendant and his family were inside with the doors locked, the police had been called, the barn stood a hundred feet from the house, and the men were running away when he fired.15 The trial judge makes the initial call on whether the facts warrant a self-defense instruction, and a shot that defended only property did not.
Many jurisdictions give the possessor more room when the intrusion is into a dwelling. In many of them the old rule that force calculated to cause death or great bodily harm was not permitted has been superseded, at least as to the defendant's dwelling, by the castle doctrine, which allows deadly force against an unlawful entrant the defendant reasonably believes has entered to commit a felony.16 In some of those jurisdictions the occupant need not prove a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, because a reasonable belief that the intruder intended a felony is enough.17
Some states have gone further with castle and stand-your-ground laws. These statutes let residents use deadly force against intruders who enter a dwelling, and in some cases an occupied vehicle, unlawfully and forcefully; they presume that the resident reasonably fears death or great bodily injury and remove any duty to retreat.18 The Model Penal Code is more structured. It permits deadly force to protect property only where the actor believes she is defending her dwelling against someone with no claim of right to possession, where the aggressor is committing a serious crime and has used or threatened deadly force, or where non-deadly force would expose the actor or someone in her presence to substantial danger of serious bodily injury.19
Even the dwelling rules stay close to the logic of § 79. Deadly force is privileged, if apparently necessary, to prevent a felonious intrusion into a dwelling or a felonious attack on the house itself, such as arson, but the privilege in those cases is one of crime prevention and not property protection, and deadly force is not proper just to protect uninhabited realty or personal property.20 The Iowa court in Katko v. Briney, a spring-gun case taken up later in this chapter, framed the same divide: it asked whether an owner may protect personal property in an unoccupied, boarded-up farmhouse with a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious injury, and it set aside any question about a person's right to protect home and family.21 Because the dwelling rules vary from one jurisdiction to another, an answer should apply the rule the question supplies and otherwise fall back on § 79.
Confinement and Apprehension
Section 80 carries the possessor's privilege beyond physical contact. The actor may intentionally confine another, or put the other in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, to prevent or terminate an intrusion on the actor's land or chattels, but only under the same conditions that would justify inflicting the contact itself for that purpose.23 Tort law needs the section because it treats these responses as separate wrongs: a possessor who bars a gate commits what would otherwise be false imprisonment, and one who raises a fist commits what would otherwise be assault. The general privilege to use reasonable force is stated to defeat liability for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and trespass to chattels alike,24 and § 80 makes the conditions for confinement and apprehension match those for contact.
The conditions are the ones taught above. A possessor who confines or threatens must show an unprivileged intrusion, a reasonable belief that nothing gentler will stop it, and a request to desist that was made or was excused as useless or too late. The rule gives confinement and threat no easier terms than contact and no harder ones: a possessor who may shove an intruder may also block the intruder's path, and a possessor who may not shove may not block it either. A threat of deadly force likewise needs the belief that § 79 requires, subject to the narrow exception, taken up below, for a threat reasonably believed to stay only a threat.
The privilege ends when its purpose does. Section 80 authorizes confinement to prevent or terminate the intrusion, so a detention that continues after that purpose is spent has no footing in the rule.25 The Model Penal Code states the point directly for confinement used as protective force. The justification extends to confinement only if the actor takes all reasonable measures to end it as soon as the actor knows this can be done with safety to the property, unless the person confined has been arrested on a charge of crime.26
The trespasser in the shed remains answerable for the original entry, and later sections explain how the law accounts for force that outruns the privilege. A related application appears in the detention of suspected shoplifters. Court decisions and statutes authorize a shopkeeper to detain a suspected shoplifter for a reasonable time to investigate the suspected crime without liability for false imprisonment, and the rule grows from the same principle that supports recapturing a chattel.27 Here too the detention is justified by a protective purpose and lasts only as long as that purpose reasonably requires.
On an exam, the label of the tort rarely matters. A stem that has a possessor blocking a path, locking a door, or shouting a warning calls for the same checklist as a stem with a punch: was the intrusion unprivileged, was the response reasonably necessary, was a request to desist made or excused, did the means stay non-deadly, and, for confinement, did it end once it could safely end?
Threats Short of Contact
Section 81(2) gives the possessor one more response short of real force. In defense of land or chattels against intrusion, the actor may do an act intended to put another in immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact, bodily harm, or confinement greater than the actor is privileged to inflict, so long as the actor intends the act, and reasonably believes it likely, to do no more than create that apprehension.29 The preceding section tied threats to the conditions that govern a blow, so a possessor could threaten no more than the possessor could carry out.30 Section 81(2) loosens that tie in one direction only. A display of force may exceed the force the possessor could apply, provided the possessor reasonably expects the display to stay a display.
The privilege makes sense given what a threat does. The caps on real force protect an intruder's body and life, and those interests rank above property.31 A threat expected to do no more than frighten leaves the intruder free to walk away unharmed, and the possessor gets an intruder who leaves. The belief requirement keeps the privilege from becoming a loophole. An act likely to do real harm no longer fits § 81(2), so the limits on actual harm apply: reasonable non-deadly force under § 77, and deadly means only when § 79 is met.32
Two requirements do separate work. The act must be intended to create apprehension and not to injure, and the possessor must reasonably believe it likely to do no more than that. The second requirement carries most of the weight, because an owner will often say after someone is hurt that the aim was only to scare. The question is what a reasonable person in the owner's position would have believed the act could do, and the owner's own account of the purpose does not settle it.
Commentary poses the same problem for criminal law. Suppose Bob tries to steal Albert's laptop, and Albert points an unloaded firearm at Bob and threatens to kill him unless he releases it. If Albert is charged with brandishing a firearm, should defense of property be available?33 The commentary poses the point as a question. In tort, § 81(2) protects the display, because Albert knows an unloaded gun can do no more than frighten.
The unloaded gun and the loaded one mark the two sides of the line. The shooter in Goldfuss fired a gun that could hurt, and a gun that fires is a means likely to do real harm whatever the shooter meant by it, so it is judged by the limits on actual force. An owner who grabs a pistol without checking whether it is loaded likewise cannot claim a reasonable belief that it can do no more than frighten. On an exam, intent to scare is not enough, and § 81(2) is no approval for every display of a firearm. The question is whether the actor reasonably believed the act was likely to do no more than create apprehension.