Concept
Recapture of Chattels
Defense of property: land and chattels
Recapture of Chattels
The defensive privilege protects a possession the owner still has. The Restatement (Second) of Torts permits reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to prevent or terminate another's intrusion upon the actor's land or chattels, and each of its conditions (an unprivileged intrusion, reasonable necessity, a prior request to desist) assumes an intrusion still under way.1 Once a thief has carried a chattel off, no intrusion remains to resist. The owner now wants the chattel back, and the law handles that goal under a separate privilege, usually called recaption.
Courts first recognized the recapture privilege where the owner's possession had been interrupted only for a moment, so that the owner could be seen as defending the original possession and not as interfering with another's. Later cases extended it to a taker who had obtained the chattel by force or fraud and escaped with it, provided the pursuit was fresh, and both limits still apply.2 The privilege therefore lasts only while the owner's effort looks like a continuation of the interrupted possession; once the effort stops looking that way, the owner must resort to the law. Three questions follow. When does the privilege arise? What must the owner do before using force, and how much force may the owner use? And may the owner go onto someone else's land to retrieve the chattel? The subsections below take them in that order.
Fresh Pursuit Requirement
Two requirements must both be met before an owner may use force to retake a chattel: the chattel must have been lost in a particular way, and the owner must have acted at once. Where another person has wrongfully and forcibly taken the owner's chattel, even under a claim of right, or has obtained it by fraud or duress, the law recognizes a limited self-help privilege to recapture it by force or threats of force.3 The owner must also begin recapture efforts promptly after the dispossession, or at least immediately on learning of it, and must continue them without interruption; the cases call this 'fresh pursuit.'4 If the chattel rightfully came into the other person's possession and is merely wrongfully detained, or if the owner acquiesced in the possession for any period of time even though it was wrongfully acquired, the owner has no privilege and must resort to legal remedies.5
The first requirement screens out disputes that a court, and not a fight, should settle. A buyer who holds goods under a sale, or a borrower who will not return what was lent, got the chattel through the owner's own act, so the quarrel is about a contract or a loan. Watson v. Rheinderknecht fits that pattern: a seller in a contract dispute could not take his sheep back from the buyer, because no force or fraud had been used to obtain them.6 The privilege does cover a taking by force, fraud, or duress, even when the taker claims a right to the chattel.7
The second requirement, timing, appears in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 103: any undue lapse of time during which the pursuit has not been commenced, or has come to a halt, means the owner is no longer privileged to fight back into possession and must resort to the law.8 The criminal-law statement of the privilege is similar. It permits nondeadly force to recover personal property 'immediately after it has been taken,' and it bars force when there is time to take other lawful measures, such as calling the police.9
Both owners had a chattel taken by force, so the manner of the taking cannot explain the different results. What separates them is promptness and persistence. The owner who keeps after the thief without a break stays within the privilege, and the owner who lets the pursuit lapse must go to court.
The common-law rule comes first because the Model Penal Code departs from it. At common law, force to retake a chattel after an interval has passed is not justified, and the victim of the original dispossession is left to a remedy in the courts.10 The Code permits recaption of personal property at any time if the actor believes the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to possession.11 Its reason is that criminal-law rules in this area are unlikely to be known to the general public, so they should match the privileges 'a well-conducted person would expect to have.'12 The Code still conditions force on a prior request to desist, subject to its stated exceptions.13 Apply the Code only when a question says the jurisdiction follows it or asks about criminal liability; otherwise apply the common-law requirements.
Entitlement does not decide these problems. That the chattel belongs to the owner and the other person wrongfully keeps it does not create the privilege; what decides is how the other person obtained the chattel and how fast the owner acted. The owner's belief does not decide them either. A mistake about whether the privilege exists is no defense unless the other person knowingly induced it, so an owner who wrongly assumes that the taking was forcible or the pursuit fresh acts at his own risk.14
Demand and Reasonable Force
Fresh pursuit opens the privilege but does not authorize force at once. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 104, no force at all is justified until the owner has demanded return of the property, unless it reasonably appears that a demand would be useless or dangerous, and § 106 bars force calculated to inflict serious bodily harm.16 In working form, the owner must first demand return where that is feasible, and if the holder refuses, the owner may use necessary and reasonable force, though never force calculated to cause serious bodily harm.17 The demand comes first in time and the limit on force second, so this subsection takes them in that order.
The demand does for recapture what the request to desist does for defense of land and chattels, where the Restatement likewise excuses the request if it would be useless or substantial harm would result before it could be made.18 A demand costs the owner little, and a holder who refuses has chosen to keep what the owner claims. A demand is useless when, for example, the holder has already run off with the chattel after being told to stop, and it is dangerous when, for example, the holder is armed or hostile. Either way the demand drops out, but the limits on the force itself remain. The criminal-law statement of the privilege makes a similar move: a person must warn the aggressor to stop if the warning can be given without risk to himself or his property, unless it is clear the warning would be useless.19
The knife in that variation changes the analysis in a second way. If the thief meets the owner's non-deadly effort with what reasonably appears to be deadly force, the owner may respond in self-defense, because the thief's resort to deadly force has changed the situation from defense of property to defense of human life.20
The limit on force follows from a ranking of values: a person may not use deadly force solely to protect property, because human life is worth more than property.21 The same logic reaches serious injury short of death. It is not reasonable to use force calculated to inflict serious bodily harm to protect a property interest.22 In Gortarez v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., a shopowner chased a teenage boy suspected of shoplifting through a parking lot and put him in a choke hold, and the force was not reasonable.23 Neither the owner's entitlement to the goods nor a prompt pursuit rescues a choke hold. Short of that line, the owner may use only necessary and reasonable force to recover the chattel; see also Hamilton v. Barker. Shopkeepers have a special application of recapture: decisions and statutes allow a shopkeeper to detain a suspected shoplifter for a reasonable time to investigate without liability for false imprisonment.24
A holder has no privilege to resist a proper recapture, and resistance widens what the owner may do. If the holder resists and thereby threatens the owner's person, the owner may use any force required to defend himself.25 In Gyre v. Culver, a woman kept trying to take wood she had gathered from the defendant's property even after he had taken it from her, and her persistence justified additional force by him.26 Force beyond what the threat requires falls back under the rules on excessive force earlier in the chapter.
Recapture also departs from self-defense on the question of mistake. A person who reasonably fears an attack is protected even if none was coming. In Keep v. Quailman, a man with a reputation for shooting people suddenly put his hand into his pocket, and the defendant, believing the man was about to draw a revolver, struck him on the head with a cane. The court held that the jury should have been instructed that the defendant was liable only if he lacked reasonable grounds to fear an immediate attack.27 Recapture offers no comparable protection. The owner's mistake about whether the privilege exists is no defense unless the holder knowingly induced it.28 The holder may be wholly innocent, and the owner, who could have gone to court, bears the cost of a wrong guess.
The exception for a knowingly induced mistake reaches a holder who stages the confusion deliberately, as by riding a look-alike past the owner to draw a chase. The usual error on an exam is to carry the reasonable-mistake protection of self-defense into recapture, when the question on these facts is whether the privilege in fact existed.
The steps also show where an open problem leaves room for argument. During a quarrel, a man's former girlfriend grabs his small dog and carries it to her car, and she refuses to release it even after he kicks the car. He then pulls her hair and punches her in the face with a closed fist. Whether that force was reasonable is an open question. In Raynes v. Rogers, a Vermont court considering a protective order under an abuse-prevention statute discussed the privilege to defend property, the dog, but did not decide whether the force was reasonable.29 A good answer argues both sides along the steps. The grab and the walk to the car arguably amount to a forcible taking pursued at once, but a kick at the car is hardly a demand for return, and a closed fist to the face is a great deal more than retrieving a small dog usually requires.
Entering Land to Retrieve
Recapture sometimes leads an owner to someone else's land, where a second interest enters: the possessor's right to exclude. The recapture privilege can include a privilege to enter another's land in pursuit of the chattel without trespass liability, as where the land is the taker's, where the possessor knows the facts and still refuses the owner reasonable entry, or where the possessor is otherwise at fault.31 In other cases the owner may have a right to enter but will be liable for any damage the entry causes.32 Where the chattel is on the land with the owner's consent or through the owner's own fault, the owner has no privilege to enter and must resort to legal process.33
Consent and fault draw the line. A taker who carries the chattel home cannot use the property line as a shield, since the owner's presence there continues a pursuit the taker made necessary. A possessor who learns the facts and still refuses reasonable entry has put himself in the wrong. An owner who consented to the chattel's presence on the land, or whose fault put it there, has no claim to override the possessor's right to exclude, and a court can decide who is entitled to the chattel without anyone entering a stranger's property on a private judgment.
Even a privileged entry carries a price. A person is generally privileged to enter another's land to reclaim personal property that was put there without the owner's own tortious conduct or negligence, but is liable for any damage caused to the other's property in the recovery.34 An owner whose stolen bag is thrown over a fence into an innocent neighbor's garden may go in after it, and pays for the trampled flowerbed. The entry benefits the owner, so the owner, and not the landholder, bears the cost of retrieving the chattel.
A conditional seller, who delivers goods on credit and keeps title until the price is paid, stands in a different position. The goods reached the buyer's premises through the seller's own delivery, so the recapture privilege, which depends on a wrongful taking, does not carry the seller onto the land. The seller's right of entry comes from the contract. A clause in the sale agreement may give the seller an irrevocable license, meaning permission the buyer cannot withdraw, to enter the buyer's premises on default and remove the goods.35 Even that license permits only a peaceable entry, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, and the seller is liable if he uses any force to break in.36 A clause authorizing the seller to use force is probably void as contrary to public policy.37
The analysis therefore turns on how the chattel came to be on the land and on whether the owner consented to it or caused it. The owner's entitlement to the chattel does not decide the question, and neither does a possessor's refusal to hand it over, since a friend who borrowed the chattel with permission can refuse without becoming a wrongdoer. The occupant's side of the door has its own rule as well: an occupant in lawful possession of a dwelling may use deadly force against an aggressor only if she reasonably believes he intends to commit a felony against person or property inside.38 The same tension between a possessor's right to exclude and an owner's claim to what has been lost returns in the next section, where what the owner has lost is the land itself.