Concept
Cost of Public Necessity
Necessity: public and private
Cost of Public Necessity
When a fire threatens a whole town and a crew dynamites a house to stop it, the owner loses her home for her neighbors’ benefit and, in most courts, collects nothing from the crew.1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the first half of that result. Sections 196 and 262 privilege an entry onto another’s land and an interference with another’s goods when the actor reasonably believes the act necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.2 They say what the actor may do and say nothing about payment, but a privileged act is not a tort, and without a tort the owner has no claim for damages.
The private form of the privilege works the other way. An actor who enters or uses property for his own benefit or a third person’s is subject to liability for any harm the privileged act causes.3 That contrast raises two questions. Why does the law require payment when one person is saved at an owner’s expense but none when an entire town is saved at the same owner’s expense? And if tort law leaves the loss on the owner, does the owner have another route to recovery? The next subsection answers the first question. The one after it answers the second, because the answer depends on whether the actor was a government.
Why the Privilege Is Complete
Where the danger threatens the entire community, or so many people that the public interest is involved, most courts hold the privilege complete and excuse the actor entirely.4 The standard examples are dynamiting a house to stop a fire that threatens the whole town, destroying diseased animals to stop an infection from spreading, and destroying property in wartime to keep it from enemy hands. Each example carries two conditions: the emergency must be sufficiently great, and the actor must act reasonably. The New York court put the rule broadly in Mayor of New York v. Lord. “In cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity,” private property “may be lawfully taken and used or destroyed, for the relief, protection or safety of the many.” Those who protect the public interest, and those acting under their direction, are not personally liable for the owner’s loss.5
The result looks odd beside Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. There a ship was unloading at the plaintiff’s dock when a storm arose. Leaving would have been dangerous, so the defendant kept the ship moored and replaced the lines as they parted or chafed. The buffeting ship damaged the dock. Staying was reasonable, perhaps the only prudent course, yet the court held the privilege conditional only. The defendant had done nothing wrong, but it had saved the ship at the dock’s expense and owed for the damage.6 A rescuer who dynamites a house in a public emergency acts no less reasonably and sacrifices an owner no less innocent, yet pays nothing. Something must separate the two cases.
The payment rule in Vincent rests on two ideas. The first is fairness between innocent parties: the one whom nature put at risk should bear the cost of saving himself or his property, not the owner of the property that does the saving.7 The second is incentive. A defendant who must pay for the choice to sacrifice another’s property has reason to weigh the risks honestly. Carried over to a demolition, both ideas would have the person who tore the house down pay for it. Three differences explain why the public rule does not.
Causation separates the cases first. In most public necessity cases the approaching fire or other force would have destroyed the property anyway, so the owner loses little that the disaster was not already taking, and the decision to destroy was the right one.8 In Vincent the pattern ran the other way: the ship’s pounding broke the dock, so the defendant’s own choice created a loss that would not otherwise have existed. A defendant whose choice creates a loss has a stronger claim to pay than one whose choice merely stands in for a loss already on its way.
Causation describes the usual case, and it cannot carry the rule alone. The privilege protects an actor who reasonably believes the act necessary,9 so it also covers a house torn down ahead of a fire that would in fact have stopped short. That owner suffered a real loss and still has no claim. Two further differences account for those cases.
Second, the rescuer acts for others. A person who pulls down a house to stop a fire serves the public and is often a private citizen who happened to be present when the danger arrived.10 Charging that person the house’s full value would put the cost of a community’s rescue on someone who gained nothing in particular from it. It would also distort the decision. An actor who must choose in minutes, and who pays out of pocket for a wrong guess while the neighbors reap the benefit of a right one, has every reason to wait, and waiting lets the fire cross the street. The defendant in Vincent differs on both counts: it saved its own asset, so the charge fell on the party whose interest the choice served.11
Third, when the rule took shape, no one could feasibly be made to pay. Towns could not be sued, the individuals who acted were serving others, and the many owners who benefited from the demolition could not realistically be identified and charged.12 By the time municipalities could be sued, the complete privilege had hardened into the rule. It is a rule with a history, then, and tort logic does not compel it, as Vincent shows.
A privilege that costs the actor nothing raises a worry: an actor who never pays may pull buildings down at the slightest risk. The privilege answers with its own limits. The emergency must be sufficiently great, and the actor must act reasonably under the circumstances.13 The word complete describes only what follows once the privilege exists, namely that no payment is owed. It does not widen the occasions on which the privilege exists.
Government Actors and Takings
Sections 196 and 262 describe what a person may do and never ask whether the actor holds an office.15 A government employee who dynamites a building during a conflagration therefore stands where the private rescuer stands, and the owner has no tort claim against him. The harder question is whether the owner can recover from the governmental unit that employed or directed him. Some courts hold the privilege complete even then, so long as the act was done by its employee or under its specific direction for the benefit of its citizens.16 The Alaska Supreme Court took that position in Brewer v. State. It reasoned that public necessity is an individual privilege that state officials may exercise, so the state generally owes no compensation when the destruction or damage was, or reasonably appeared to be, necessary to prevent an impending or imminent public disaster from fire, flood, disease, or riot.17
Extending the privilege to government is a less obvious step, because one of its justifications weakens. The privilege is complete for a private individual partly because he ought not to pay out of his own pocket for acts that benefit the public.18 A government can spread the loss across the taxpayers who benefited from the rescue, so the case for compensation is stronger when the government is the defendant. The New York formulation shows how narrow the tort privilege is. It shields the officials charged with protecting the public interest, and those acting under their direction, from personal liability for the owner’s loss, and it does not say whether the public treasury owes anything.19
The constitutional guarantee against taking private property for public use without just compensation supplies a second layer of protection for the government. Courts have generally held that the guarantee does not reach action under the police power, meaning the government’s authority to protect public health and safety, when the action meets a contagious disease, a devastating fire or flood, or another exigency.20 The leading wartime example is United States v. Caltex, Inc. In December 1941 the United States Army destroyed an oil company’s stored petroleum, terminal facilities, and vital parts of its plant in Manila to keep them from the advancing Japanese army, and the Supreme Court treated the destruction as a privileged use of the police power, not a compensable taking.21
The kind of choice the government makes explains why emergency destruction is treated differently from an ordinary taking. An ordinary taking selects property for a public use and can be priced and budgeted in advance, so the public that benefits can be the public that pays. An emergency has no planning stage, because the peril sets the timetable. The doctrine covers a government that acts under pressure of public necessity to avert impending peril and damages private property as the lesser of two evils.22 In Caltex the choice lay between destroying the facilities and leaving them for the enemy, so much of what the owner lost was already at risk from the advancing army.
Property damage from police operations is a different kind of case, and the courts have not agreed on it. In Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co. a SWAT team used tear gas and flash-bang grenades to force a suspected felon out of a house, and the municipality was held liable for the damage.23 Other courts have refused recovery for comparable damage, treating it as an exercise of the police power, as in Kelley v. Story County Sheriff.24 Wegner shows that an owner’s claim against a municipality can succeed under law other than the tort privilege.
Where the owner has no claim in tort or under the takings guarantee, compensation may still come from other law. Some states read the takings clause of the state constitution to give the owner compensation when a state actor destroys private property in an emergency for the public good.25 Some jurisdictions provide for compensation by statute.26 Surocco v. Geary anticipated that division of labor. The court observed that the legislature may regulate how buildings may be destroyed and how compensation shall be made, and it hoped the legislature would act.27 At the level of tort the result is therefore stable: the privilege defeats the owner’s claim against the rescuer, and whether the owner is ever paid depends on the state constitution or statute of the jurisdiction.
The government’s exception has a boundary that keeps it from swallowing the takings guarantee. The government must show that the danger to the public was imminent and that the destruction was a necessity, not a convenience.28 The older rule is the same. An owner’s judgment may be clouded by interest, so the actor must act on his own judgment, but a building torn down without apparent or actual necessity exposes the person who destroyed it to a trespass action, and in every case the necessity must be clearly shown.29 The wildfire cases show where the line falls. In Brewer major fires swept through Fairbanks and threatened several landowners’ structures, and state forestry officials deliberately set backfires that destroyed the landowners’ vegetation but saved their structures. The landowners’ tort claim failed on statutory immunity grounds, and their takings claim failed under the police power because of necessity.30 TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States involved a landowner seeking compensation for timber lost when the Forest Service intentionally lit fires to manage a group of wildfires, and it is the decision cited for requiring the government to prove imminent danger and necessity.31 A fire lit to manage a wildfire forces the question whether the peril was imminent or the burn merely suited the agency’s plans.