Concept
Private Necessity and Land
Necessity: public and private
Private Necessity and Land
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 197 governs most necessity problems on private land. It lets a person enter or remain on land in another's possession when doing so is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor or the actor's land or chattels, or to the possessor or a third person or the land or chattels of either. The privilege is lost if the actor knows or has reason to know that the person he would help is unwilling to be helped.1 The rule divides by whom it protects. Clause (a) covers the actor and the actor's own land or chattels. Clause (b) covers the possessor or a third person and their property, and it carries the unwillingness limit.2
Both clauses protect remaining as well as entering, and the second word matters because an emergency can outlast the step across the property line. In Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., a ship unloading at the plaintiff's dock stayed moored when a storm rose, because venturing out would have risked lives and the vessel. Mooring lines were replaced as they parted or chafed, and the ship's buffeting damaged the dock. The court held that the defendant had a conditional privilege only: it had done nothing wrong, but it had saved the ship at the dock's expense and owed for the damage.3
Public necessity under § 196 is triggered by an imminent public disaster.4 Section 197 needs no danger to the community, because serious harm to one person or one person's property is enough. A privileged entrant is not a trespasser, and the possessor is not privileged to resist or expel him. Mere technical trespass creates no liability, but actual damage must be paid for, as Vincent shows.5 Liability turning on actual damage departs from ordinary trespass law, under which trespass is actionable at least for nominal damages without proof of harm.6 The later sections on paying for private necessity take up who bears the cost. The question here is when an entry is privileged at all, and the two clauses answer it in turn.
Entry to Protect Oneself
Clause (a) protects the person in danger. One may enter or remain on another's land when that is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to oneself or to one's own land or chattels, meaning movable property such as a boat, a canoe, or an aircraft.7 Because the clause reaches the actor's property as well as his person, someone who is personally safe but whose own boat is about to be destroyed can qualify.
The standard illustrations show the pattern. A canoeist caught in a violent storm may tie up at another's dock to save life and canoe, and a pilot whose engine suddenly fails may make a forced landing in another's field.8 The settings differ, but the facts that matter repeat. An outside force put the actor in jeopardy, the harm threatened a life or valuable property, and the possessor's land was the way out. The possessor had no part in the danger, and what he gives up, an afternoon of dock or a patch of pasture, is small beside what the actor stood to lose.
The entry is privileged, so the possessor may not resist or expel the entrant while the emergency lasts.9 An owner who orders the storm-tossed canoeist off the dock demands something he has no right to demand. An owner who cuts the canoe loose acts without privilege and answers for what follows.
Three requirements keep the privilege from becoming a license to trespass. First, the threatened harm must be serious. The possessor's right to exclude yields only to something weightier, and convenience is not weightier. A commuter who cuts across a lawn to save two minutes leaves the owner's right to exclude intact. A person who runs through the same garden to escape a pursuer faces a threat to his person, which can satisfy the rule.
Second, entering or remaining must be, or reasonably appear to be, necessary to prevent the harm.10 The pilot lands in the field because the field is where the aircraft can come down. The necessity may be real or only apparent, but it must be one or the other. An older case on blowing up a house says that a building torn down without apparent or actual necessity leaves the actors liable in trespass.11 An actor who reads the emergency sensibly and turns out to be wrong keeps the privilege, because, as with self-defense, a reasonable mistake does not negate it.12
Third, the actor must be defending against a threat of imminent harm for which the possessor is not responsible, such as a storm, a fire, or a mechanical failure.13 A forecast of weather days away does not meet that standard.
Two sympathetic entrants show what the requirements exclude. A homeless person who moves into a vacant house for the winter has a real need, but a continuing need for shelter is not an imminent threat that a brief entry averts. The privilege answers an emergency and ends when the emergency does. A protester who trespasses to press a cause such as opposition to war, weapons, or the draft is delivering a message, and the entry averts no serious harm to his own person or property.
On an exam, the deciding facts usually bear on steps two and three, because a drafter who wants the privilege to fail will supply a hurry, a hardship, or a pressing cause in place of an emergency. When all four steps are met, the entry is no trespass and the possessor cannot lawfully eject the entrant or cast off the entrant's property.
Entry to Protect Others
Clause (b) protects someone other than the entrant. A person may enter or remain on another's land when that is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to prevent serious harm to the possessor or a third person, or to the land or chattels of either, unless he knows or has reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling.15 The rescuer may be a neighbor, a passerby, or a relative with no stake of his own, and the beneficiary may even be the possessor: a neighbor who steps into an absent owner's yard to fight a fire in the owner's shed is protecting the possessor's own property. The requirements carry over from clause (a). The actor must be defending against a threat of imminent harm for which the possessor is not responsible, and the entry must be, or reasonably appear to be, necessary.16
Wrinkle v. Norman explains why the law protects rescuers. The court's illustration is a person who rushes to a house to aid someone trapped inside and falls through a rotted step. Without the Restatement rules, that would-be Good Samaritan could be found liable for trespass or could be unable to sue for negligent maintenance of the premises. With them, he is protected from being the target of litigation and may recover for the injuries the hidden defect caused.17 The court said the rules promote a willingness to assist others in times of need without taking on a greater burden of risk than other people carry who enter as casual visitors, and that § 197 lets a Good Samaritan enter to avert great property loss or personal injury without being deemed a trespasser.18
A rescue case raises two questions: whether the entry is a trespass, and what the possessor owes a rescuer who is hurt on the land. Section 197 answers the first. For the second, Kansas reads § 197 together with a second Restatement section. Together they create a presumption of implicit permission to enter to prevent certain kinds of serious harm, and they give the possessor a duty of reasonable care for the wellbeing of the person exercising the privilege.19 This unit takes from the case only that a privileged rescuer is neither a trespasser nor more exposed than a casual visitor. The details of a possessor's duties belong to premises liability.
The unwillingness limit marks where the presumption of permission gives out. A person may decline help for himself or his own property, even when an outsider thinks the choice unwise, and an entry over a known refusal replaces the owner's judgment with the rescuer's. The limit speaks of the one for whose benefit the actor enters, so the first question is whom the entry serves. A person protecting only himself is not the one whose refusal the limit addresses. The test is knowledge or reason to know. An actor who has been told to stay out, or who sees facts a reasonable person would read as a refusal, loses the privilege, and an actor with no hint of objection keeps it.20
A rescue fact pattern calls for two checks in order. First, ask whether anyone with a stake in the rescue has refused it, because a known refusal ends the privilege however serious the danger. Second, ask whether the danger is serious and comes from an outside cause, since a rescuer's good intentions do not turn a minor risk into a privileged entry. When both checks favor the rescuer, the entry is lawful and, in Kansas, the possessor owes the rescuer reasonable care, so the rescuer faces no suit for the entry and may recover for an injury caused by a hidden hazard.