Concept
Private Necessity and Chattels
Necessity: public and private
Private Necessity and Chattels
The privilege to use another's goods in an emergency tracks the land privilege closely. The Restatement (Second) of Torts excuses an act that would otherwise be a trespass to another's chattel or a conversion of it when the act is, or is reasonably believed to be, reasonable and necessary to protect the person or property of the actor, the other, or a third person from serious harm, unless the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he acts is unwilling.1
The chattel rule keeps the land rule's frame: an interest to protect, serious harm as the trigger, protection for a reasonable belief, and a limit when the beneficiary refuses help.2 It departs from the land rule in two places, and those two departures are the ones to watch. The land rule asks only whether entry is necessary; the chattel rule asks whether the act is reasonable and necessary. The land rule withdraws the privilege when the actor knows or has reason to know that the beneficiary is unwilling; the chattel rule withdraws it only when the actor knows.3
Necessity and reasonableness do separate work. Necessity ties the act to the threat: the actor must need the goods to meet the danger. Reasonableness tests the means: an actor who could have met the danger with less interference has not acted reasonably, even though some response was required. A reasonable belief counts as well as the fact, so an actor who misreads the emergency in a reasonable way keeps the privilege.4
The rule also yields to the beneficiary's known wishes. The privilege disappears when the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he acts is unwilling, however serious the threat.5 The chattel text says knows, not has reason to know, so the limit bites only on an actor who actually knows of the objection.
Back to the canoe. The privilege covers both a trespass to a chattel and a conversion, so the resident need not settle which tort her use was before she invokes necessity; the defense applies either way.6 The classification still matters for damages. A court looks to the extent and duration of the interference, the actor's intent to assert a right inconsistent with the owner's right of control, any bad faith, and the expense and inconvenience to the owner. Conversion damages equal the chattel's market value. Trespass to chattels damages equal the actual harm, meaning the diminution in value, or the dispossession, which is roughly the rental value.7 Because the resident used the canoe briefly and the owner, out of town, did not need it, a court would more likely treat her use as a trespass to a chattel.8
The privilege excuses the taking, not necessarily every harm the taking causes. Whether the resident must pay for the scrape along the fence is a compensation question for the next section. The same source reaches that result for land: an actor who enters under necessity still pays for any damage she causes.9
Two questions decide most chattel necessity problems. Did the actor have a less intrusive means? Did the actor know that the owner objected? A better means at hand defeats the privilege because the act is no longer reasonable and necessary, and a known objection defeats it because the rule says so. When neither is present and the threatened harm is serious, the taking is privileged.