Concept
The Reasonable Person Standard
Duty and negligent conduct framework
The Reasonable Person Standard
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 defines negligence as conduct that falls below the standard the law establishes for protecting others against unreasonable risk of harm, and it adds that negligence does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.1 Two limits follow, and this unit takes them in turn. The first concerns the measure: the law sets the standard, and the standard measures conduct, not the actor’s intent. The second concerns the ceiling: when an actor consciously disregards a serious danger, the case leaves negligence for a more culpable category.
The standard also gives duty its content. Duty denotes that the actor must conduct himself in a particular manner, at the risk of liability to the person to whom the duty is owed for any injury his conduct legally causes.2 The reasonable person standard names that manner, and conduct that falls below it is negligent.
Negligence as Objective Conduct
To most people, “negligence” describes a state of mind. The root word “neglect” implies forgetfulness or inattentiveness, judged subjectively and individually, and in that everyday sense negligence and moral fault coincide.3 The law uses the word differently. A jury asks whether the actor failed to exercise the care a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation, and it answers by examining what the actor did.4
Good intentions therefore cannot rescue conduct that creates an unreasonable risk. The actor may not defend by proving that he meant to act carefully; the ultimate issue is the reasonableness of his conduct, not the reasonableness of his belief that he was acting with appropriate care.5 Negligence can arise even when the actor weighed the possible consequences and used his own best judgment, because its essence is behavior that should have been recognized as unreasonably dangerous to others, not necessarily an absence of solicitude for them.6 The rule also runs the other way: an actor who was totally oblivious to the safety of others is not negligent if his conduct did not subject anyone to an unreasonable risk.7
The same reasoning disposes of two familiar defenses: “I meant well” and “I am usually careful.” When the defendant is a physician, the fact that he meant well or practiced to the best of his ability has no bearing on breach, because conduct is measured by objective criteria, namely how the average, or at least minimally qualified, practitioner would perform in like circumstances.8 A clean record does not answer a claim about one occasion, either. A finding of negligence is not a moral judgment or a finding of incompetence. It evaluates a single event after the fact against an abstract standard the law sets up, so evidence that a surgeon usually meets the standard of care is beside the point, just as evidence that she erred on other patients would not prove she was careless in this operation.9
What the actor knew still matters, because the reasonable person acts on the information available. The actor is charged with what he actually knew and perceived, as well as with what he ought to have known and perceived.10 A driver who knows her brakes are failing is judged on that knowledge. A driver who does not know, but ought to have known, is judged as one who should have perceived the problem. Knowledge and perception count; motive and the intent to be careful do not.
Because the standard belongs to the law, no trade writes its own. As one court put it, a whole calling may have unduly lagged in adopting new and available devices; it never may set its own tests, however persuasive its usages, and courts must in the end say what is required.11
An abstract standard does not make every foreseen risk negligent. Students often conclude that a defendant who foresaw a risk of injury but failed to prevent it must be liable, but that rule would amount to strict liability, and negligence law does not impose it. The railroad in one familiar case could foresee injuries if it chose a grade crossing, yet it went ahead because eliminating the risk was enormously expensive and few injuries were likely.12 A later section develops that weighing of risk against precaution.
The standard itself stays constant; what varies with the circumstances is the amount of care that is reasonable. Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care, and the care required depends on factors that include the relationship between the parties and the nature and extent of the risk. Brain surgery demands more care with the knife than carving a turkey does, and transporting dynamite or paying passengers demands different conduct than hauling potatoes.13 In general, the type and amount of care that reason requires depend on the magnitude of the risk, meaning the type, likelihood, and degree of harm that precautions of a particular cost may be expected to prevent. A great risk calls for great precautions, and a small risk calls for small ones.14
Jury instructions can blur this point. Suppose a plaintiff is injured when gasoline ignites at the defendant’s pump, and the judge tells the jury that if dispensing gasoline carries a high risk of explosion that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known, the defendant had to exercise care commensurate with that risk. That instruction states the usual due-care standard and says only that reasonable care grows with the risk.15 An instruction announcing a separate, higher duty for gasoline sellers misstates the law. It suggests that a different standard applies, it can encourage the jury to find liability for conduct that would not breach the duty of reasonable care, and it exposes the verdict to reversal on appeal.16 Courts have been moving away from instructions of that kind.
Negligence Versus Recklessness
The last sentence of § 282 fixes the boundary: negligence “does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others.”18 The first sentence measures conduct against reasonable care. The second says that some conduct lies beyond that measure, because the actor’s attitude toward the danger has changed from inadvertence to something worse. Courts usually define that conduct as a deliberate and conscious disregard of a known high degree of probability of harm to another. It forms an intermediate class between negligence, gross negligence included, and intentional torts, and in some respects it takes on the character of each.19 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 2 state the recognized definitions.20
Two requirements separate recklessness from its neighbors. The requirement of conscious disregard separates it from carelessness of any size. Negligence reaches an actor who never perceived the danger, because he is charged with what he ought to have perceived;21 recklessness asks what he actually perceived, and even gross negligence stays on the negligence side of the line.22 The requirement of a high degree of probability separates it from modest risks knowingly run. An actor who foresaw a modest risk and went ahead is not negligent merely for having foreseen it,23 and recklessness demands more still.
“High” is relative, however. Recklessness does not require the near-certainty that knowledge and knowing intention require; it requires consciousness of something far less than certainty or even probability. The value of the activity enters the calculation as well: if there is no social utility in what the actor is doing, he might be reckless though the chances of harm are less than 1%.24
A left turn across traffic shows where the line falls. In Williamson v. McKenna, the Oregon Supreme Court treated a left turn in front of an oncoming vehicle, made without signaling, as negligence that, without more, could not be regarded as facing a manifest danger with indifference to the plaintiff’s safety.25 In Bailey v. Brown, the Ohio Supreme Court held that turning left in front of an oncoming vehicle without first stopping, while unaware of that vehicle, could not be characterized as willful or wanton misconduct.26 In neither case did the turn, without more, amount to conscious disregard of the danger.
The vocabulary in this area is untidy, so an opinion’s label is a weak guide to the category. The expressions “recklessness,” “gross negligence,” and “willful and wanton conduct” evolved for the most part in statutes under which the driver of an automobile is liable to a guest passenger only for some form of aggravated misconduct. Each state then had to decide how its own term fit the driver’s conduct in the particular case, and a major component was whether the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant actually knew of the risk.27 On an exam, look to what the actor knew and how likely the harm was, and treat the label as a clue only.
The line matters because some rules of liability reach only the worse kind of fault. The guest statutes just described are one example. Hickingbotham v. Burke recognized a cause of action against a social host if the service of alcohol was reckless, and Crawn v. Campo noted that a majority of jurisdictions require a plaintiff injured in a recreational sports activity to prove recklessness, not mere negligence.28 The sports rule rests on consent, so it must track what participants reasonably expect. Professional football players must expect some rather serious misbehavior, but ping pong players should not expect to be blinded by a thrown paddle. Hunters presumably know they are at risk from other hunters, yet they should not be viewed as consenting to being shot by negligent gunners.29
Criminal law draws a parallel line. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and the risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would observe. The principal distinction between criminally negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter is whether the defendant consciously disregarded that risk or failed, through criminal negligence, to perceive it.30 Negligence-based homicide is itself prosecuted: a 1979 Montana appeal arose from a conviction for negligent homicide after a deputy sheriff responded to a call about a possible suicide at a trailer court.31 The criminal and tort definitions are not identical, so a torts answer should apply the tort definition of recklessness and use the criminal framing only for comparison.